it's https://github.com/warner/magic-wormhole https://github.com/warner/magic-wormhole but see in particular https://github.com/warner/magic-wormhole/issues/10

it's https://github.com/warner/magic-wormhole https://github.com/warner/magic-wormhole but see in particular https://github.com/warner/magic-wormhole/issues/107 https://github.com/warner/magic-wormhole/issues/107 . It uses a static wordlist and by default uses a shared pool of rendezvous servers. The (an?) author addresses this here https://magic-wormhole.readthedocs.io/en/latest/attacks.html https://magic-wormhole.readthedocs.io/en/latest/attacks.html but I think characterizes the attack poorly: it's not important that it's low-probability that an attacker can pull off a MitM transparently, all an attacker needs to do is be able to guess the channel + code words before the receiver receives the message. The default is to only use two code words, so 65536 possibilities. I don't think it would be hard to open 64k connections very quickly, so this seems like an easy-to-win race. Maybe I misunderstand the math. I don't think wormhole should be used for anything important without a private rendesvous server, and if you have secure access to a private rendezvous server, why bother with wormhole?