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Cgroups limit the impact anything inside the container can do to anything outside the container. It doesn't matter that the daemon runs as root, it starts proc
by colechristensen 7y ago
Cgroups limit the impact anything inside the container can do to anything outside the container.
It doesn't matter that the daemon runs as root, it starts processes in an a way that prevents them from interacting with other daemons, filesystems, etc. resources.
You don't quite understand docker correctly :)
- TheDong 7y agoIt's not cgroups, but rather namespaces and seccomp (and apparmor/selinux on some distros) that sandbox the processes inside the container. cgroups are used mostly for resource limits, not for sandboxing (aka namespacing). docker by default does have a slightly more lax security posture than systemd or lxc (i.e. a default set of capabilities that isn't explicitly enumerated and a focus on UX over tweaking them, no usernamespaces by default, etc), though you're right that it is largely meant to be a secure sandbox for untrusted containers, as long as you know hat you're doing.
- colechristensen 7y agoAh, I was under the impression that namespacing was a part of cgroups in general.
- TheDong 7y agoTo quote Jessie's blog post [0]: "containers were not a top level design, they are something we build from Linux primitives [Linux namespaces and cgroups]". cgroups can be used without namespaces, and the reverse is also true. Both of them are part of linux container implementations (like lxc and docker), but for an easy example, systemd uses cgroups for every service, and only uses namespaces for ones you very explicitly turn them on for. Don't quote me on this, but I also think cgroups landed in the kernel many years before namespaces did. [0]: https://blog.jessfraz.com/post/containers-zones-jails-vms/ https://blog.jessfraz.com/post/containers-zones-jails-vms/