3 ms·

To be clear, I don't reject Many Worlds at all and in fact consider it a promising candidate due to it sort of "falling out" of the Schrodinger's equations take

To be clear, I don't reject Many Worlds at all and in fact consider it a promising candidate due to it sort of "falling out" of the Schrodinger's equations taken literally unless you add complexity. But the fact remains that it is impossible to prove and it is conveniently well equipped to handle this situation. I'd prefer an argument that presupposes the Copenhagen interpretation as that is when my intuition fails.

kubanczyk 7y ago
If experimenters disprove Many Worlds, they've also disproved Copenhagen. These are exactly the same equations after all. Theoreticians choose very different mindsets about the same equations, which (they say) somehow create them grounds to form various new hypotheses. As far as I know neither approach was very fruitful so far in terms of new science, so people try multitude of others. What I've meant to say above, I have much trouble using Copenhagen to understand Bell's experiment. MWI fits the bill here for me.
AgentME 7y ago
>But the fact remains that it is impossible to prove and it is conveniently well equipped to handle this situation. I'd prefer an argument that presupposes the Copenhagen interpretation as that is when my intuition fails. Is that not like trying to get a better intuition for planetary movement by using an epicycle-based model? The fact that the interpretation is conveniently shaped in a way that a paradox isn't an issue is not a coincidental thing that should be overlooked in the spirit of fairness to alternative interpretations. Regardless, I think my post below is useful for answering your want. >So now we're back to the essence of the original question - if these things seem random why do we know that they're in fact deterministic without any hidden variables? The world is only deterministic under Many-Worlds, and it's deterministic in the sense of "each outcome happens (mostly) separately". It doesn't make any sense to try to make sense of the "deterministic" part separately from MWI. MWI is the only deterministic QM theory (unless you're going to consider "superdeterminism", but there's nothing concrete to that interpretation besides "what if there existed a way that we had QM+determinism but not MWI". There's no basis to it, besides a yearning from people that like the abstract idea of determinism and don't like the abstract idea of MWI). EPR doesn't tell us that the world is deterministic. It tells us that local hidden variable interpretations (where experiments have a single outcome) of QM can't work, because it shows that a measurement on a particle can appear to you to affect the measurement made by someone else on a distant particle. The Copenhagen interpretation response to this is that the wave function collapse must be faster than light. Therefore, the Copenhagen interpretation is not a "local" theory. (The Copenhagen interpretation doesn't give us any answer for who we should expect to trigger this wave function collapse first when two measurements are taken simultaneously at a distance though.)

kubanczyk 7y ago

If experimenters disprove Many Worlds, they've also disproved Copenhagen. These are exactly the same equations after all. Theoreticians choose very different mindsets about the same equations, which (they say) somehow create them grounds to form various new hypotheses. As far as I know neither approach was very fruitful so far in terms of new science, so people try multitude of others. What I've meant to say above, I have much trouble using Copenhagen to understand Bell's experiment. MWI fits the bill here for me.

AgentME 7y ago

>But the fact remains that it is impossible to prove and it is conveniently well equipped to handle this situation. I'd prefer an argument that presupposes the Copenhagen interpretation as that is when my intuition fails. Is that not like trying to get a better intuition for planetary movement by using an epicycle-based model? The fact that the interpretation is conveniently shaped in a way that a paradox isn't an issue is not a coincidental thing that should be overlooked in the spirit of fairness to alternative interpretations. Regardless, I think my post below is useful for answering your want. >So now we're back to the essence of the original question - if these things seem random why do we know that they're in fact deterministic without any hidden variables? The world is only deterministic under Many-Worlds, and it's deterministic in the sense of "each outcome happens (mostly) separately". It doesn't make any sense to try to make sense of the "deterministic" part separately from MWI. MWI is the only deterministic QM theory (unless you're going to consider "superdeterminism", but there's nothing concrete to that interpretation besides "what if there existed a way that we had QM+determinism but not MWI". There's no basis to it, besides a yearning from people that like the abstract idea of determinism and don't like the abstract idea of MWI). EPR doesn't tell us that the world is deterministic. It tells us that local hidden variable interpretations (where experiments have a single outcome) of QM can't work, because it shows that a measurement on a particle can appear to you to affect the measurement made by someone else on a distant particle. The Copenhagen interpretation response to this is that the wave function collapse must be faster than light. Therefore, the Copenhagen interpretation is not a "local" theory. (The Copenhagen interpretation doesn't give us any answer for who we should expect to trigger this wave function collapse first when two measurements are taken simultaneously at a distance though.)