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We don't exactly need signatures that will stand forever to greatly mitigate DNS interception. I agree DNSSEC isn't wonderful, but perfect is the enemy of good
by mlyle 7y ago
We don't exactly need signatures that will stand forever to greatly mitigate DNS interception.
I agree DNSSEC isn't wonderful, but perfect is the enemy of good. I'd take 768 bit RSA over "doing nothing"-- it raises the difficulty level of a successful DNS attack enormously.
Some of us don't care about enumeration. If we do, there's whitelies, as you say, and eventually NSEC5 will be around.
> I don't know what point you're trying to make about BGP. I think you think I'm opposed to RPKI. I'm not.
You argued earlier that worrying so much about redirection isn't justified: "Say we protect DNS (we could, with a better protocol design). But other redirection protocols aren't protected. Do we similarly authenticate OSPF? IP options? ARP?"
In which case, maybe we should just ignore RPKI, too. :P And unfix source routing, not bother with SEND, etc.
- tptacek 7y agoIf DNSSEC were free, rather than a many-tens-of-millions-of-dollars proposition, and if it were safe, rather than a demonstrated reliability nightmare, and if it was a well-contained solution to a specific problem, rather than a transparent attempt to bootstrap a government-controlled PKI, and if complicated new protocol deployments weren't a giant source of new bugs to exploit, sure. Sure, it would make sense to deploy a little bit of 768-bit RSA to fix some marginal problem the rest of the stack already heavily mitigates.
- mlyle 7y agoI don't think it's a many tens of millions of dollars proposition. It was about 45 minutes of my time to get it deployed on my zones, tested, automated, and then installed by my registrar.. and it's been reliable for 3 years since. I understand the tooling is better now, too, so some of the crap I fiddled with is probably not necessary anymore. And it's even mechanized entirely for you if you use Cloudflare DNS, etc.
- tptacek 7y agoNo. TLS is a many-tens-of-millions proposition, demonstrably so, and TLS is easier than DNSSEC. You're intuiting global cost from a single extremely simple test case; I think you're mistaken both about the multiplicand and the multiplier. Further evidence on this is easily obtained both from survey papers that collect DNSSEC misconfiguration statistics (they're hilarious) and from the IANIX collection; many of the organizations IANIX notes are extraordinarily clueful operators. I'm right about this. It's feasible to get DNSSEC deployed globally (it would be a catastrophe, but we indeed have the tools to make that catastrophe happen). But it would be very, very expensive. This has been a fun thread, but we are way into the right margin now and are probably the only two people reading it, so I suggest we tie it off at whatever your next response is.
- mlyle 7y agoIf you're stating a global cost, make it explicit. Because most organizations can deploy DNSSEC cheaply, and who knows the global cost for total deployment of anything.