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> DNSSEC does nothing to protect queries on the wire on their way to resolving servers (it collapses down to a single bit in the header), unlike DoH, which does
by mlyle 7y ago
> DNSSEC does nothing to protect queries on the wire on their way to resolving servers (it collapses down to a single bit in the header), unlike DoH, which does protect those queries.
Yes, and DoH does nothing to protect queries between resolving servers and authoritative servers, unlike DNSSEC, which does protect those queries. Together, you end up with end to end protection.
- tptacek 7y agoThat's true: DOH doesn't protect outbound communication from caches, until authority servers expose DOT or DOH endpoints for them to talk to --- which should happen, and is likely to happen long before DNSSEC. But DNS attacks almost always target endpoints (DNS attacks are rare, and heavily mitigated by the rest of the networking stack, which is why practically nobody deployed DNSSEC).
- mlyle 7y agoDOH resolvers don't recurse via HTTPS, and there are few/no authoritative DOH authorities. DOH just exposes much larger, more dangerous targets for poisoning at this point. Something like 30% of domains in .COM have DNSSEC, in part because of things like Cloudflare making it so dang easy. Yes, the top domains / services tend not to, and this is unfortunate. But we're well on our way. And the possibility for poisoning worsens other attacks (it's still trivial in many cases to steal email with DNS cache poisoning... 25 years after I first played with the idea). There's no reason not to deploy DNSSEC today. The DOH resolvers you're enamored with are almost all validating, so it's a way to get end to end validation right now.
- tptacek 7y agoNothing resembling 30% of the domains in .COM are DNSSEC-signed. The number is much closer to 1% (like, it may by now be 2%; it is not 4%). This is an easy stat to look up, but it's often presented misleadingly; you may need to look at whatever chart you're looking at knowing in advance how many domains are in .COM. And, of course, that 1-2% is almost entirely a bunch of random tiny zones nobody cares about. You can quickly discover that for yourself by feeding any list of the Internet's most popular zones (the Moz 500 is an easy one to download) through a bash for-loop against "host -t ds". There is no evidence of any cache-poisoning attacks on DoH servers that I'm aware of. DNS attacks are in general far rarer than you'd think given the attention they've received in the past (again: there isn't much you can do with a DNS cache-poisoning attack other than trying to get a certificate mis-issued, and CAs have multiple levels of defense against that attack). It's interesting that you played with DNS cache poisoning 25 years ago. So did I! Small world. I wrote a QID-brute-forcing cache poisoner in late 1995 (to get onto IRC from funny domains with). Towards the end of 1996, I wrote the DNS cache poisoning checks for Secure Networks Ballista scanner, which did QID stuff a la Johannes Ulrich, and the DNS authority record caching tricks Kashpureff used, plus some others. It's fun stuff! There's not much to do with it anymore, though. In 1995, reliable domain forgery would get you past rutils filters and NFS exports; it was a very big deal, so much so that people took the time to do crazy things like elaborate source-routing attacks. But just a year or two later, everything was SSH; a few years after that, and most sensitive things on the web were SSL (it wasn't good SSL, but DNS wasn't the low-hanging fruit). It's been hard times for people who wanted to spend their careers protecting the DNS. There are, of course, lots of good reasons not to want to deploy DNSSEC. A good starting point would be that it drastically harms the reliability of all your sites, because when DNSSEC fails, every site in your zone vanishes as if it was never there. That's what happened to HBO the week they rolled out HBO NOW. But there are strong architectural arguments against it, too. I end up saying a version of a bunch of this stuff any time people complain about DNSSEC not being available on this or that online service. I appreciate the opportunity to write a new and hopefully more interesting version of the comment. Thanks!
- hugoromano 7y agoMy Logs, for the last 30 days, domains validated with DNSSEC was 5.34%. In general, it feels that ISPs like to be slow adopting standards, e.g. IPv6 it is still rolling.
- tptacek 7y agoJust look it up on dnssec-tools. As of March of this year, there were ~1.7MM signed domains in .COM. As of Q3 of last year, there were 144MM domains in .COM. Wherever you got that "30%" stat from, it was wildly off. Even I was overcounting. And (I'm ninja-editing this in, so sorry if I caught you while replying), as you noted, much of the growth in .COM signings is attributable to Cloudflare auto-signing --- which is the same thing that is happening in places like .NL. But registrars auto-signing domains is security theater. Ironically: attacks against registrars are far more common than attacks on the DNS protocol itself; the recent spate of "DNS attacks" from the end of last year turned out to have been phishing attacks.
- mlyle 7y agoYes, I slipped a zero. Still, your argument is: It's not adopted much, so we shouldn't adopt it--- plus it doesn't matter if naming isn't trustworthy? :P I don't find that a very good argument. Your same argument seems to imply that since we have good TLS on many protocols, we shouldn't be too heartbroken about people stealing traffic with BGP, either.
- tptacek 7y agoSo, that's actually not my argument. But, though you're trying to dunk on it, it is a solid argument. Here's why: the cryptography in DNSSEC is obviously outmoded (it's PKCS1v15 RSA signatures, most of them 1024-bit, with an outlandish hack that combines spoofing and a KDF to prevent zone enumeration). The protocol "supports" P-curve ECDSA signatures, and, of course, both the P-curves and the NIST DSA signing algorithm are themselves outmoded --- and that's the frontier of crypto in DNSSEC; Geoff Huston did studies of this and found a substantial fraction of deployed DNSSEC verifiers can't even handle that. The point being: it will take decades, literal decades, to get the baseline level of cryptographic competence we expect from secure messengers (to say nothing of modern signing crypto) into DNSSEC. And every new deployment of 1990s-grade DNSSEC makes that problem harder. If we started from scratch, the very first thing that would change would be the notion that cryptography is too expensive to support online signing, which is one of the two original sins of DNSSEC. The entire protocol would be drastically cleaner, easier to deploy, and, of course, much more secure. This is not the core argument I have against DNSSEC (for that, just Google [against DNSSEC]). But it's a good one. What they say about PHP holds true for DNSSEC: it's a fractal of bad design. I don't know what BGP has to do with any of this except to say that DNSSEC obviously doesn't do anything to prevent BGP hijacking attacks; attackers who control BGP control IP addresses, the things DNS maps in the first place. I'm doing my best to keep these responses varied and interesting, because an HN search will show this is an argument I've made here a lot. Hopefully I'm doing an OK job of that.