17 ms·
Yay, let's leave DNS pwned because we have some disputes and the alternative isn't perfectly technically pretty. /s
by mlyle 7y ago
Yay, let's leave DNS pwned because we have some disputes and the alternative isn't perfectly technically pretty. /s
- tptacek 7y agoThis is snark but it's snarking up an interesting architectural issue, that being: "where do we draw the line?" Say we protect DNS (we could, with a better protocol design). But other redirection protocols aren't protected. Do we similarly authenticate OSPF? IP options? ARP? The easy response to your snark is "no, people are just going to use DoH".
- mlyle 7y agoWe've had decent authentication in OSPF for ... decades. Most of the egregious problems with IP options have been worked around well, again for decades. ARP is problematic, but only within a segment. Your attacker has to be close. For IPv6, we have SEND, but it is not without problems. > The easy response to your snark is "no, people are just going to use DoH". DoH doesn't prevent someone from poisoning well-trafficked DoH resolvers to redirect individual domains. DNSSEC does. I run it on my zones, and it's not so bad... About 40% of resolver traffic to my domains is verifying, too, so we're getting there...
- tptacek 7y agoDNSSEC does nothing to protect queries on the wire on their way to resolving servers (it collapses down to a single bit in the header), unlike DoH, which does protect those queries. Those queries are the most likely attack vector against DNS. Meanwhile, however many resolvers are validating queries to your own domains, virtually none of the most important (ie, well-trafficked) domains on the Internet are signed, or likely ever to be signed. At the same time, browsers have removed DNSSEC code. DNSSEC is moribund. DoH has already protected more people in the brief time that it has existed.
- mlyle 7y ago> DNSSEC does nothing to protect queries on the wire on their way to resolving servers (it collapses down to a single bit in the header), unlike DoH, which does protect those queries. Yes, and DoH does nothing to protect queries between resolving servers and authoritative servers, unlike DNSSEC, which does protect those queries. Together, you end up with end to end protection.
- tptacek 7y agoThat's true: DOH doesn't protect outbound communication from caches, until authority servers expose DOT or DOH endpoints for them to talk to --- which should happen, and is likely to happen long before DNSSEC. But DNS attacks almost always target endpoints (DNS attacks are rare, and heavily mitigated by the rest of the networking stack, which is why practically nobody deployed DNSSEC).
- mlyle 7y agoDOH resolvers don't recurse via HTTPS, and there are few/no authoritative DOH authorities. DOH just exposes much larger, more dangerous targets for poisoning at this point. Something like 30% of domains in .COM have DNSSEC, in part because of things like Cloudflare making it so dang easy. Yes, the top domains / services tend not to, and this is unfortunate. But we're well on our way. And the possibility for poisoning worsens other attacks (it's still trivial in many cases to steal email with DNS cache poisoning... 25 years after I first played with the idea). There's no reason not to deploy DNSSEC today. The DOH resolvers you're enamored with are almost all validating, so it's a way to get end to end validation right now.
- tptacek 7y agoNothing resembling 30% of the domains in .COM are DNSSEC-signed. The number is much closer to 1% (like, it may by now be 2%; it is not 4%). This is an easy stat to look up, but it's often presented misleadingly; you may need to look at whatever chart you're looking at knowing in advance how many domains are in .COM. And, of course, that 1-2% is almost entirely a bunch of random tiny zones nobody cares about. You can quickly discover that for yourself by feeding any list of the Internet's most popular zones (the Moz 500 is an easy one to download) through a bash for-loop against "host -t ds". There is no evidence of any cache-poisoning attacks on DoH servers that I'm aware of. DNS attacks are in general far rarer than you'd think given the attention they've received in the past (again: there isn't much you can do with a DNS cache-poisoning attack other than trying to get a certificate mis-issued, and CAs have multiple levels of defense against that attack). It's interesting that you played with DNS cache poisoning 25 years ago. So did I! Small world. I wrote a QID-brute-forcing cache poisoner in late 1995 (to get onto IRC from funny domains with). Towards the end of 1996, I wrote the DNS cache poisoning checks for Secure Networks Ballista scanner, which did QID stuff a la Johannes Ulrich, and the DNS authority record caching tricks Kashpureff used, plus some others. It's fun stuff! There's not much to do with it anymore, though. In 1995, reliable domain forgery would get you past rutils filters and NFS exports; it was a very big deal, so much so that people took the time to do crazy things like elaborate source-routing attacks. But just a year or two later, everything was SSH; a few years after that, and most sensitive things on the web were SSL (it wasn't good SSL, but DNS wasn't the low-hanging fruit). It's been hard times for people who wanted to spend their careers protecting the DNS. There are, of course, lots of good reasons not to want to deploy DNSSEC. A good starting point would be that it drastically harms the reliability of all your sites, because when DNSSEC fails, every site in your zone vanishes as if it was never there. That's what happened to HBO the week they rolled out HBO NOW. But there are strong architectural arguments against it, too. I end up saying a version of a bunch of this stuff any time people complain about DNSSEC not being available on this or that online service. I appreciate the opportunity to write a new and hopefully more interesting version of the comment. Thanks!