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Of course they do have such equipment, which makes you wonder how sophisticated the attacks are and now flimsy the security is. It’s obvious that this equipment
by aspenmayer 7y ago
Of course they do have such equipment, which makes you wonder how sophisticated the attacks are and now flimsy the security is. It’s obvious that this equipment exists. How else would the equipment in the same or likely next room over [0] know the state of packets that need further routing adjustments?
Maybe the relevant parties didn’t get the message because the call was coming from inside the building. [1]
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A
[1] https://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/TheCallsAreComingFromInsideTheHouse https://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/TheCallsAreComin...
- topranks 7y agoI’m not so sure. The internet community (I.e. routing guys/Nanog/ietf etc) is fairly open. I’ve not heard much of such approaches being used. It is a very interesting idea.... I guess you gotta weight delaying inserting an update with potentially blackholing a destination until you do.
- aspenmayer 7y agoFor an quick dragnet to get an IP in a sea of noise, it would work. In any case, you just have someone else do it, accidentally of course. The more accidental and and wide reaching and quickly reverted the outage is, the more plausibly deniable it is. I agree that this approach isn’t really suitable for much else because it’s much too overt and likely to notify the target. Modern engagements use BGP hijacks as a critical tool with a lot of capabilities but also extreme visibility and publicity. So it’s not good for most jobs as other better suited tools for those jobs already exist. [0] [1] [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Onymous https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Onymous [1] https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/11/fbi-the-allegation-that-we-paid-cmu-1m-to-hack-into-tor-is-inaccurate/ https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/11/fbi-the-allegati...