3 ms·
> and then verifies that the response has the steampowered.com domain and is https://* https://* One would still need a justification for that design IMHO, bu
by detaro 7y ago
> and then verifies that the response has the steampowered.com domain and is https://* https://*
One would still need a justification for that design IMHO, but I don't think it is vulnerable to what you describe.
- djsumdog 7y agoBut why even deal with that complexity? It's another place where thinks can break or you forget something. You can verify the doamin there too, but that still doesn't mean you can just make the request for the redirect over http and think that's okay.
- staticassertion 7y agoIt's definitely a fine sanity check but I'd have to really think about whether it's a barrier. Immediate things I worry about are around URL parsing. Is evil.com<insert something here>steampowered.com going to pass as "steampowered.com" when it isn't? Will it handle punycode? All sorts of shit can go wrong when parsing a URL, and it's a real world problem when people implement the mitigation you're describing[0]. https://labs.detectify.com/2016/07/27/how-i-made-lastpass-give-me-all-your-passwords/ https://labs.detectify.com/2016/07/27/how-i-made-lastpass-gi... This is just for starters. I think if I were being paid to think about it I'd probably be able to come up with some more. Can I mess with DNS? Can I inject some other malicious payload into the page, to take advantage of other vulns? etc etc etc I would be extremely wary of this technique as a real boundary rather than just an assertion in code.