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If you are running a project like Tor Browser, that needs the highest security going, you would want: 1. Signing with an offline key, so an attacker can't make
by michaelt 7y ago
If you are running a project like Tor Browser, that needs the highest security going, you would want:
1. Signing with an offline key, so an attacker can't make a release just by hacking the web server, and the key doesn't end up on however many hundred CDN web servers around the world.
2. Clear boundaries between releases, and a slow enough release schedule that third-party auditors can keep up.
3. Non-repudiation, so users know everyone else saw the same version they saw.
4. Reproducible builds from code in a public repo, so third-party auditors know what was released is what they reviewed.
5. An update process that verifies 1-3 before applying an update.
These requirements are fundamentally incompatible with webapps - where a no-questions-asked software update is only a press of F5 away, by design.
- dane-pgp 7y ago> These requirements are fundamentally incompatible with webapps - where a no-questions-asked software update is only a press of F5 away, by design. If by "webapps" you mean "applications that run inside a web browser" then I disagree, since it is possible to pin a specific (presumably third-party audited) version of a webapp by using a static local bookmarklet or saved file. See my other comment [1]. You're right, though, that this is not the typical user experience for a web app, and you might reasonably believe that all webapps should be visibly associated with a domain on the internet. Personally I think it is acceptable if a high security webapp requires a slightly less convenient UX compared to normal webapps. Nevertheless, it should still be quicker and safer to "install" a bookmarklet than install a native application like the Tor Browser. [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22862376 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22862376