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I'm actually really curious as to whether verifiable E2EE is possible in normal business videoconferencing -- if someone here can enlighten me I'd really apprec
by crazygringo 7y ago
I'm actually really curious as to whether verifiable E2EE is possible in normal business videoconferencing -- if someone here can enlighten me I'd really appreciate it.
It seems clear that there has to be a single key, rather than separate keys for each pair of participants, since in a large meeting we need all video streams running through a server and everyone receiving the same streams, for manageable upload bandwidth. Also, many participants often cannot peer directly due to NAT etc.
But therefore... as long as you're trusting the server with key distribution/management in the first place... don't you necessarily have to simply trust that the server isn't peeking? That by necessity, since anyone else can join the call and get the decryption key from any of the peers... that the server can too, whether by MITM attack, a "fake participant" that joins for a millisecond but doesn't appear in UX, etc.?
That unless you actually have the capability of auditing the server and the code it's running, E2EE doesn't actually give you any concrete guarantees whatsoever? You've just got to trust? Which at the end of the day, is no different from trusting them not to peek at transport encryption?
Of course you can run your own Jitsi server. But if you've already got control over your servers then you might as well just be using transport encryption anyways, since you trust yourself -- right?
(Obviously if you come up with your own keys and send them to participants via a separate channel of communication then it's fine -- but obviously that's not something regular users are ever going to do.)
Would love to know if I'm misunderstanding something here -- if the newfound significance of E2EE in videoconferencing is just due to Zoom falsely advertising it, or if it's actually a realistic goal.
- tpolzer 7y agoKey distribution is a problem, yes (as discussed in other comments here). Upload bandwidth isn't so much of a problem with the number of participants, as you of course wouldn't encrypt the whole data stream separately for each peer. Instead, you would encrypt it with a rotating symmetrical key that you can then safely exchange with all peers (at negligible bandwidth cost). You would still depend on the server to replicate your encrypted stream (and do NAT traversal etc), but it wouldn't be able to peek inside. A separate problem is that you usually want your server to actually create reencoded video of your stream for participants with bad internet. There's potentially some ways to do that without server involvement with some clever video encoding (so that instead of reencoding you can just throw away some chunks), but afaik there's nothing production ready for video codecs here.
- PureParadigm 7y ago> It seems clear that there has to be a single key, rather than separate keys for each pair of participants, since in a large meeting we need all video streams running through a server and everyone receiving the same streams, for manageable upload bandwidth. Why is this the case? Watching streams on Twitch or YouTube with HTTPS are all encrypted individually for each connection. It's not like TV or radio where you have to broadcast the same thing to everyone. > But therefore... as long as you're trusting the server with key distribution/management in the first place... don't you necessarily have to simply trust that the server isn't peeking? I think you're right that you'll need to trust key distribution. Some companies might actually have PKI set up properly and can do this. Other individuals who are particularly privacy conscious may also have this. Just because verifiable E2EE might not be applicable to a mass market doesn't mean it's not incredibly useful for those who do need it.