The gist of the article is that there are few historical parallels. That seems fair. > ... In a crisis, it is easy to agree to spend money. But that fight is c

The gist of the article is that there are few historical parallels. That seems fair. > ... In a crisis, it is easy to agree to spend money. But that fight is coming. We are engaged in the largest-ever surge in public debt in peacetime. Right now we are parking that debt on the balance sheet of central banks. Those central banks can also hold the interest rate low, which means that the debt service will not be exorbitant. But that defers the question of what to do with them. To the conventional mind debt must be eventually repaid through surpluses generated through tax increases or spending cuts. The most likely outcome is that the debt from the many fiscal stimulus packages to come (infrastructure, direct payments to taxpayers, tax holidays) will just stay parked on the Fed's balance sheet. The US can afford to do this, but only if the Fed commits to pegging the yield curve through unlimited treasury purchases. The dollar will head much lower, making US goods more competitive abroad. Nominally, the economy should start looking better pretty quickly. So in the short term, it seems plausible that the economy can return to normal outward appearances pretty quickly. In the long term, however, the Fed will be left with a balance sheet approaching or even exceeding GDP. Where that ends up going is anybody's guess. But historical precedents don't paint a pretty picture. The joker in the deck is how long the virus crisis lasts. Nobody knows the answer, so the degree of departure from normal will be a riddle for some time.