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It's a nice tech demo, but it runs into the same problem that so many of these systems run into: individual users don't want to be arsed to self-manage their en
by shadowgovt 7y ago
It's a nice tech demo, but it runs into the same problem that so many of these systems run into: individual users don't want to be arsed to self-manage their encryption keys. You can't solve the UX on that, and users will ignore your service in favor of one that doesn't require that of them.
As service provider, you could keep their keys, but if they trust you with their keys, why aren't they trusting you with being MITM on encryption? Especially since if you have their keys you already could.
Still, very cool technical demo, even if the odds of it displacing something like Zoom are near nil.
- drivingmenuts 7y agoAt its most basic, encryption should be a thing that just happens, out of sight and mind of the user. Yes, that leaves vulnerability, but people generally don’t want to have to deal with it. Most of us are more interested in getting work done, rather than fiddling with the tools.
- diablo1 7y ago> out of sight and mind of the user Which can be sometimes dangerous as more and more crypto is designed to be set-and-forget. It leaves the windows open for bad actors to exploit such simplicity and introduce backdoors when no-one was looking. Vigilance in managing keys (and integrity of the cryptosystem) is still required.
- shadowgovt 7y agoYou can require something people won't do all you want, and it doesn't get done. Cryptographic theory breaks down at the UX layer. If you try to improve security by cycling passwords too frequently, users start writing them on sticky notes tacked to their monitors. If you require users to keep their private keys in their own possession, users lose their private keys, get angry when you can't reconstitute those keys for them, and go use a service that can offer that feature. I think there's a reason the entire ecosystem has moved in the direction of trusted actors who could, in theory, exploit that trust to know everything they can about the signal passing through their trusted zone (with those who trust nobody still operating independently as a fringe minority).
- snarf21 7y agoExactly. The challenge is the balance between security and convenience. The issue is that without full management of keys and building of source that has been signed and then investigated, you have to trust someone. I think this is the issue, if you decide to trust, then you trust. The harder question is who can you actually trust.
- mvanbaak 7y agoyou mean, like having people to remember to bring their house keys when they leave so they can get back in? Yes, it's an extra step that has nothing to do with the task I want to complete, but the price I pay is totally fair for the security I get for it.
- shadowgovt 7y agoThat's a really decent example, because if you forget your house keys, you aren't forever denied access to your house / your house doesn't collapse into a shower of noise, never to be reconstituted. If it did, you can pretty much guarantee people would either stop using house keys completely and just leave the key in the lock all the time or would come up with schemes to make it impossible to lose the key (such as locking the key in a tiny box, and then that box is secured with a key that doesn't cause the box to burst into flames if the second key goes missing). In non-digital life, we make the tradeoff of less-than-perfect security for convenience, backed by the law (i.e. any competent locksmith can break into your house, and the things that keep them from doing it are (a) a general societal understanding that cracking open someone's front door without consent is a really dick move, and (b) if you do it, you're trespassing and can go to jail).
- Vinnl 7y agoI'm not sure if that's such an unsolvable problem. For example, Firefox Send [1] also provides E2E encryption, but that's practically transparent to the user. The key is added as a hash to the URL, which the browser never sends to the server. The user just has to copy the sharing URL (which they do anyway) do obtain and share the key. Jitsi might have an additional challenge in that their URLs are often human-readable and user-picked, so not everybody might be used to copy-pasting the links, but then they have the advantage of encryption probably being optional. Or they might think of a whole other solution that provides good UX that doesn't require users to manage keys. (Which, again, might be optional anyway.) [1] https://send.firefox.com/ https://send.firefox.com/
- shadowgovt 7y agoYeah, it shouldn't be unsolvable; my key thought is that it's actually the hard part of the story now (encryption client-side is pretty well-understood) and is under-solved. Even still, having more options in the world is better than having fewer, so I'm excited about this demo.
- Vinnl 7y agoI disagreed with "you can't solve the UX", but I definitely agree that it's a hard problem. Looking forward to seeing what they come up with.
- shadowgovt 7y agoI think my choice of words left me open to misinterpretation: the "you... and...." phrasing was meant as synonymous with "If you... then...", not as a categorical claim that I believe the UX is unsolvable.
- Vinnl 7y agoAh, I see now! Definitely agree; if it hampers UX, users will switch.
- 7y ago
- sergiotapia 7y agoYou're downvoted but I agree. I'm a software dev and can't be assed about this. Even 2FA is a pain because I switch devices pretty regularly throughout the day. Managing my keys, no I have better things to do. Imagine a normie doing this? No chance.
- mvanbaak 7y agoThere's usb and nfc solutions for this ;P
- lucb1e 7y agoEven so, the person you're replying to is calling for removing end to end encryption. I'm fine if you don't want to use 2FA or end to end encryption, but can't we let people like myself have it?
- shadowgovt 7y agoRemoving? Hardly. I'm just saying that as a feature, it's not on the critical path to mass-adoption without solving the key-tracking UX.
- Arathorn 7y agoIf they hook into Matrix's E2EE key management stuff, then they'll benefit from the huge amount of work we've put into letting individual users transparently self-manage their keys - c.f. https://youtu.be/APVp-20ATLk?t=6355 https://youtu.be/APVp-20ATLk?t=6355 for a demo from last Wednesday. This stuff is due to ship in Matrix/Riot in the coming week. That said, agreed that it's a massive and (up to now?) unsolved problem for how to get mainstream users to manage their keys sensibly. Keybase could have gone there, but ended up being poweruser-only. It'll be interesting to see if we've solved it in Riot.
- jadbox 7y agoCan you explain a bit about "Matrix's E2EE key management stuff" and how it "letting individual users transparently self-manage their keys"? Is there docs on it?
- est31 7y agoEach end device you use to connect to your Matrix account creates own keys per default, but you can also import/export keys if you want to. Then other parties can enable or disable trust for each key. For browser based clients like riot, I think each session creates another key. Docs (the first link is most relevant to your question): https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/blob/master/specification/modules/end_to_end_encryption.rst https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/blob/master/specifi... https://matrix.org/docs/guides/end-to-end-encryption-implementation-guide https://matrix.org/docs/guides/end-to-end-encryption-impleme... https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/olm.md https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/ol... https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/me...
- rjzzleep 7y agoI really like the work matrix did. But the UI for having just an e2e encrypted chat with someone you can't physically authenticate keys with on a simple not so important chat is so annoying and confusing. As I understand it they're redesigning it. But as it stands for a normal end user the UI is broken if you ask me. Personally I liked the flow of knowing a shared secret to a private channel back when people were doing blowfish in IRC was way better than this exponential key exchange thing. Sure it's not as secure, but at least it's somehow humanly feasible.
- chvid 7y agoThis hits the nail on its head. In the end it is all about making something that people will use because it provides what they need in a broad sense covering security, usability, video quality and a lot of other things.
- kodablah 7y agoYou can use KDFs based on passwords, shared phrases, etc even if they are just a shared secret in a DH exchange. I made a thing a while back (https://myscreen.live/ https://myscreen.live/) that did a common-phrase that was in a URL fragment which gives pretty good entropy (granted it's only for encrypting signalling).
- est31 7y agoThings like Matrix use jitsi for video chatting. There is already existing end to end for messages, but the jitsi component wasn't end to end. Now Matrix can use its existing E2E messaging channels to distribute keys for an E2E jitsi session. In fact, group chat keys are distributed via two party E2E chats handled transparently by the clients, so it wouldn't even be a novel concept.
- sigwinch28 7y agoI don't understand where this problem of distributing encryption keys comes from in the context of this tech demo. Zoom uses "passwords" and people are more than happy to distribute them by email / WhatsApp / shouting from the rooftops. The important aspect is that the video conferencing provider and server do not know the key. I also disagree with your opinion that "you can't solve the UX on that". The tech demo here essentially gives the same UX as Zoom call + passwords, but with actual end-to-end encryption. There is the notable caveat in this tech demo that client-side scripts can still read the key (we have to assume the javascript that can read the URL hash is friendly). Really, though, this can be solved: provide a native(ish) app even if it's just an Electron wrapper of the existing static assets and javascript code, register a handler with the OS for `jitsi://`, and use links like `jitsi://server.name/room#e2ekey=foo`, so we only have to trust the code on our machine, not the server.
- Arathorn 7y agoI think passing in a static key (password) via a url fragment is what their demo is doing already. However, I get the impression the intention is to verify the keys of who's actually in the room, rather than just trusting a static key which will inevitably leak. They're presumably also planning to re-key via a ratchet to avoid a single leaked key compromising the whole conference recording.
- sigwinch28 7y agoYes, my comment w.r.t. the hash is that it's inherently a bad final implementation because it's visible to the server via malicious Javascript. I really hope that it can be as simple as "share a password with someone"/"send an invite link to someone" because as the parent effectively said, this would be a complete UX nightmare.
- cheald 7y agoI'm having trouble envisioning how you could possibly put together a solution where the encryption key wouldn't be visible to Javascript, malicious or otherwise. How would that work?
- lucb1e 7y agoSo what you're saying is that all end to end encryption is futile and we might as well get rid of it? Let's not build this in, even opportunistically, for nobody because very few people use it? Because saying "individual users don't want to be arsed to self-manage their encryption keys" + that service providers could keep your keys but then you might as well not have e2ee in the first place + that the UX is "impossible" to solve, is exactly that.
- shadowgovt 7y agoI'm not saying precisely that (I don't think the UX is impossible to solve; merely hard), but you've just given the kind of argument a product manager would give on prioritizing feature sets for a commercial application: by the logic you've laid out, centralized key management provided by the service provider likely attracts more users and is the feature "we" should implement first. ... which is why we see a lot more people using Zoom than using something else, and we see few solutions available that offer any client-side e2e encryption support at all (and if they offer it, it's almost always in addition to their server-managed key options).
- BrowserMeeting 7y agoYou have to give them an “A” for effort. They are coming out in front of the encryption wars, even if it’s a half baked approach.