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Don't hate to say it. It's a reality of the web that usability trumps security. And those who disagree should unplug their computer now, because it's not secure
by swombat 18y ago
Don't hate to say it. It's a reality of the web that usability trumps security. And those who disagree should unplug their computer now, because it's not secure.
This is really missing the forest for the trees though. If you log in via a plain text form, who cares that your password gets sent in a plain text email? There are easier ways to get people's passwords than to sniff plain text emails - phishing, for example, or social engineering, both of which are much easier to implement than an email-sniffing man-in-the-middle server.
- jaf656s 18y agothe problem isn't entirely with sending a plain text password in an email. It is that the passwords are being stored in plain text in the database. This is just an SQL injection away from gaining an email-password list of all members of the site. Couple this with the fact that many people use the same password for other accounts, including email, and you have a definite security problem for the users.
- swombat 18y agoHow do you know they're stored in plain text in the db? I have that same functionality in my start-up, but we encrypt the passwords in the db. We just don't one-way-hash them.
- jeremytliles 18y agoExactly. It seems that about 75% of the commenters here and on CodingHorror are making this leap from "System can send password to user" to "System is storing password in clear text." Maybe Jeff's next post should be focused on how many "hackers" are unable to perform simple logical analysis. I believe the flaw here is that it sends your existing password rather than sending you an email link to create a new one. Not really worth a post (and all the ensuing discussion).
- ajross 18y agoNo, no, no, no. What you are describing is just obfuscation. It's the same thing web browsers do with the password list on the local machine, and it DOES NOT provide protection against theft. It just makes that theft slightly harder. If the key isn't in the database, it's in the code somewhere, probably in one or several utility script on the same box containing the database. Yeah, that's really going to slow an attacker down. Guys, this stuff was known and very well understood 30 years ago. Please, please, please stop trying to do security architecture if you don't understand it. This is the reason web security is as bad as it is. If you aren't 100% sure you understand the thread model perfectly, just follow the advice you read from trusted sources on the web. I'm not aware of anyone sane that is recommending storing unhashed/recoverable passwords.
- swombat 18y agoAs I said in my original post, usability trumps security. Also, it may sound defeatist, but I think that if a determined, highly skilled and competent hacker wants to fuck you up and steal the passwords, they will. Even if you salted and hashed all your passwords, there's always brute force, sniffing, etc. If they're on your servers reading your code, you're pretty screwed already.
- jcl 18y agoHow exactly is keeping the passwords more "usable" than keeping only hashes?
- swombat 18y ago1) When the user forgets their password, you can send it back to them instead of them having to come up with a new one again 2) When you send emails to a user who hasn't logged in for a while, you can include their details so they're that much more likely to actually log in Not being able to do these things costs users.
- ajross 18y agoSorry, but the very fact that you're arguing that (1) "brute force" is a plausible attack against a salted, SHA-1 hashed password, or (2) "sniffing" a hashed password on the network from a HTTPS transaction (!!) are plausible attacks shows your level of misunderstanding. Look, just read a book or two on the subject. You don't have to believe me, but please stop arguing about stuff you clearly don't understand.
- xirium 18y agoWhy are you not performing a one way hash on passwords?
- xirium 18y agoSending passwords via plain text forms and plain text emails are both bad practices. However, plain text email is distinctly worse because the data can linger for months or years in less secure systems. A credit card number sent over unencrypted HTTP may only be vulnerable for a brief period. However, a credit card number sent over SSL and forwarded as a plain text email may be vulnerable until the credit card expires.