5 ms·
...in other words, they attacked the horribly user-hostile anti-feature whose real practical purpose is DRM, and so I certainly think nothing of value was lost.
by userbinator 7y ago
...in other words, they attacked the horribly user-hostile anti-feature whose real practical purpose is DRM, and so I certainly think nothing of value was lost.
https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/right-to-read.en.html https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/right-to-read.en.html
- saagarjha 7y agoThere’s been a couple of non-DRM uses of SGX, which I’m sure you’ve seen. And regardless of what it’s being used for, I think you know it’d be more productive to talk about the attack rather than potential uses of what they’re attacking.
- baby 7y agoIs SGX actually used by DRMs? I read that TPMs were designed for DRMs as well and ended up being used for whole different purposes (secure boot, disk encryption)
- dnautics 7y agoI read somewhere that Netflix drm runs in sgx and they're basically the only ones.
- tedunangst 7y agoI read that Netflix doesn't use SGX.
- achamayou 7y agoThere are many interesting uses for enclaves, most of which have nothing to do with DRM. A good example is Signal’s secure value recovery mechanism: https://signal.org/blog/secure-value-recovery/ https://signal.org/blog/secure-value-recovery/
- fulafel 7y agoReally interesting use of SGX. It says at the time of writing that they haven't decided if they'll use it in Signal yet, are there updates?
- achamayou 7y agoNot that I know, I suspect a limiting factor is that there aren’t many cloud providers with good support for SGX at the moment.
- trasz 7y agoIt is interesting and useful as a workaround for existing situation, ie running under untrusted OS. It’s not useful as a proper solution (as opposed to a hack/workaround). Except for DRM.
- achamayou 7y agoWhy not? An OS is a large beast, it’s a massive TCB. Much easier to audit a small amount of code running in an enclave with few dependencies.
- trasz 7y agoBecause, as shown by SGX, it doesn’t work. And if it did work, it would lead to a whole new magnitude of the malware problem - malware protected from you by hardware. The right way to do it is the other way round: have a trusted hypervisor and run your untrusted OS in it. See TrustZone for example.
- achamayou 7y agoI’m not sure why you think that SGX shows hardware enclaves “don’t work”. I also don’t see why you think enclaves “protect the malware from you”. Enclaves are created and started from host code, which can interrupt or terminate them at any time. The scheme you suggest, which isn’t typically how TrustZone is used, gives zero integrity and confidentiality guarantees for applications. I don’t know if it’s “the right way” for some threat model, but for the most typical TEE use cases which are trying to establish strong integrity and confidentiality guarantees in the presence of an untrusted host, it’s absolutely not right nor useful.
- matheusmoreira 7y agoNot sure why you're being downvoted. Software running on the user's machine has no business keeping secrets from the user. This "feature" is the antithesis of computing freedom as we know it. Trusted computing is at least salvageable. The issue is not the technology but who owns the keys. If users can install their own keys, the technology will empower them with increased security. SGX cannot be used to empower the user like this. It's specifically designed to protect software from the user.
- achamayou 7y agoNo, the user is still in control of what they execute on the machine, whether it is run in enclave or not. If anything, because it is deliberately unable to patch itself, software running in an enclave gives more control and auditability to a user who can know exactly what code they are running. Importantly, a user who does not fully trust the machine administrator can still maintain integrity and confidentiality over their computation. SGX memory encryption keys are ephemeral, they are generated at boot, and they do not need to be owned by anyone to be useful, on the contrary!