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I recommend everybody to look at the whitepaper which discusses this type of protocol extensively: https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/DP3T%20White%

I recommend everybody to look at the whitepaper which discusses this type of protocol extensively: https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/DP3T%20White%20Paper.pdf https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/DP3T%20White%... A lot of the arguments against this were rehashed the last few weeks over and over. As an passive participant to such discussions I can't express how tiring it is to see new people drop into these conversations without reading up on what already has been discussed beforehand.

jka 7y ago
Could you help address this lack of awareness by searching for and upvoting that project in HN post submissions and/or submitting it if not found?
hartator 7y ago
Which part guarantee it won’t be repurposed later to track if you have been in contact with a terrorist or not? I understand this is already possible with current tech. However not sure why we should empress to make it things even easier. Specially if the only thing that protects you if the absence of mandatory uploads of your daily hashed list. It seems super easy to switch that on.
- IAmEveryone 7y ago
  It’s totally useless for tracking “contacts with terrorists”, especially compared to phone records or chat metadata. Location data is far more valuable for a surveillance state, and it is already recorded in several places, including servers that are easier to get to (legally) than your phone.
  - hartator 7y ago
    It might be useless or it might not. And it’s not like the NSA has not been collecting in the past “useless” data for the sake of it.
  - johnbellone 7y ago
    There’s an argument for it being more useful than location data. If you are actively watching a target you do not need their location. But what is useful are the ability to track the movements of their social network, who they interact with, etc.
    - SlowRobotAhead 7y ago
      Exactly. This is better than many existing surveillance because you are now using other people as sensors and the meta data is higher than ever before. X and Y were connected to the same tower at 12:52... vs X and Y were feet from each other and Z who we didn’t even know about from 12:50.430 to 12:55.001
    - joshuamorton 7y ago
      But you can't identify anyone in the social network, because the identifiers you get aren't tied to any individual unless the individual chooses to reveal them. So unless you're tracking a terrorist and their social network comes down with Coronavirus and you subpoena the hospital they were tested at for records, you aren't able to tie the IDs to individuals.
FartyMcFarter 7y ago
I agree that people should be reading the paper. Crucially, the whitepaper explains why it doesn't preserve privacy. For example, section 5.4 (design trade-offs) says that individuals who have declared themselves as infected can be retroactively tracked and identified. Tracking only requires a bluetooth receiver which is aware of its own location - government agencies could easily do this.
- xorfish 7y ago
  Is it really worth it to track 0.1-1% of the population for a few days? I don't really see how this level of investment is worth it. I'm also not sure as to how widespread it has to be, with the 2. proposal from DP-3P, you won't be able to link EPIDs, so you would need to infer the new infected epids from the last known position. That seems only feasible if there are sensors everywhere.
- sudosysgen 7y ago
  Obviously. I think having your location tracked for a few days, if you are infected, is not a serious concern. In fact, there is absolutely no way I can see that can get around that.
  - SlowRobotAhead 7y ago
    Where is the “few days” coming from? Once a system like this exists, you can plan on it being a feature that doesn’t disable at some point. Great intentions, but no thanks.
    - sudosysgen 7y ago
      Because the keys, from my understanding, change every day. So if someone is infected, you can only track them for the relevant days because those are the keys they would give you. You could simply set it up to delete your own keys after 14 days, for example.
      - SlowRobotAhead 7y ago
PiMaker0 7y ago
There is some psychology to this. A person's instinct is to fear and, as if a predator were stalking them, fear of being watched. In the digital age, that means fear of how their data is being used/watched. That isn't to say they are doing anything wrong, per se, but the act of being watched instills fear. Thus, even though they don't read the article, they respond instinctively with skepticism. The reality of how this data is used is probably not as dire as is feared. Even though fear is a useful tool, it should be used to push us to investigate (e.g. read the paper). Fear should inform some objective discussion. In this case, I think that the fear is relevant due to how companies have notoriously failed in preserving anonymity. I think in order for us to usefully data mine people's lives and actions (which is what we're talking about), we need to come up with better ways of ensuring that the data can't be used for draconian purposes by those in power (whether state, media or other). We need some way to assuage the fear to get the benefits of the data. After all, this isn't a technology problem. It's a people problem.
riedel 7y ago
As long as issues as https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/issues/37 https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/issues/37 are open things stay problematic even if discussed before.
- the_mitsuhiko 7y ago
  DP-3T proposes cuckoo filters to improve privacy here. The general sense however is that this is inherent to these systems.
deleted 7y ago
[deleted]
jka 7y ago
I'm not sure if you'll read this; but I replied a bit curtly and unusefully earlier today, and want to apologize for that. It's stressful seeing messages that appear negative in a situation like this because the stakes are potentially so high. Unfortunately I didn't do a great job of making my own message and tone more positive. Thanks for sharing the whitepaper link here and leading a lot more folks to discover it that way.
casefields 7y ago
But that's how every policy discussion goes. Nothing anyone says at a town hall meeting is novel or unique to the staffs/politicians your talking to. It doesn't mean a person shouldn't speak their mind on topical issues. If you only want to have a discussion once, then only partake when in the company of actual power, or within rule-making bodies.

jka 7y ago

Could you help address this lack of awareness by searching for and upvoting that project in HN post submissions and/or submitting it if not found?

hartator 7y ago

Which part guarantee it won’t be repurposed later to track if you have been in contact with a terrorist or not? I understand this is already possible with current tech. However not sure why we should empress to make it things even easier. Specially if the only thing that protects you if the absence of mandatory uploads of your daily hashed list. It seems super easy to switch that on.

IAmEveryone 7y ago
It’s totally useless for tracking “contacts with terrorists”, especially compared to phone records or chat metadata. Location data is far more valuable for a surveillance state, and it is already recorded in several places, including servers that are easier to get to (legally) than your phone.
- hartator 7y ago
  It might be useless or it might not. And it’s not like the NSA has not been collecting in the past “useless” data for the sake of it.
- johnbellone 7y ago
  There’s an argument for it being more useful than location data. If you are actively watching a target you do not need their location. But what is useful are the ability to track the movements of their social network, who they interact with, etc.
  - SlowRobotAhead 7y ago
    Exactly. This is better than many existing surveillance because you are now using other people as sensors and the meta data is higher than ever before. X and Y were connected to the same tower at 12:52... vs X and Y were feet from each other and Z who we didn’t even know about from 12:50.430 to 12:55.001
  - joshuamorton 7y ago
    But you can't identify anyone in the social network, because the identifiers you get aren't tied to any individual unless the individual chooses to reveal them. So unless you're tracking a terrorist and their social network comes down with Coronavirus and you subpoena the hospital they were tested at for records, you aren't able to tie the IDs to individuals.

FartyMcFarter 7y ago

I agree that people should be reading the paper. Crucially, the whitepaper explains why it doesn't preserve privacy. For example, section 5.4 (design trade-offs) says that individuals who have declared themselves as infected can be retroactively tracked and identified. Tracking only requires a bluetooth receiver which is aware of its own location - government agencies could easily do this.

xorfish 7y ago
Is it really worth it to track 0.1-1% of the population for a few days? I don't really see how this level of investment is worth it. I'm also not sure as to how widespread it has to be, with the 2. proposal from DP-3P, you won't be able to link EPIDs, so you would need to infer the new infected epids from the last known position. That seems only feasible if there are sensors everywhere.
sudosysgen 7y ago
Obviously. I think having your location tracked for a few days, if you are infected, is not a serious concern. In fact, there is absolutely no way I can see that can get around that.
- SlowRobotAhead 7y ago
  Where is the “few days” coming from? Once a system like this exists, you can plan on it being a feature that doesn’t disable at some point. Great intentions, but no thanks.
  - sudosysgen 7y ago
    Because the keys, from my understanding, change every day. So if someone is infected, you can only track them for the relevant days because those are the keys they would give you. You could simply set it up to delete your own keys after 14 days, for example.
    - SlowRobotAhead 7y ago

PiMaker0 7y ago

There is some psychology to this. A person's instinct is to fear and, as if a predator were stalking them, fear of being watched. In the digital age, that means fear of how their data is being used/watched. That isn't to say they are doing anything wrong, per se, but the act of being watched instills fear. Thus, even though they don't read the article, they respond instinctively with skepticism. The reality of how this data is used is probably not as dire as is feared. Even though fear is a useful tool, it should be used to push us to investigate (e.g. read the paper). Fear should inform some objective discussion. In this case, I think that the fear is relevant due to how companies have notoriously failed in preserving anonymity. I think in order for us to usefully data mine people's lives and actions (which is what we're talking about), we need to come up with better ways of ensuring that the data can't be used for draconian purposes by those in power (whether state, media or other). We need some way to assuage the fear to get the benefits of the data. After all, this isn't a technology problem. It's a people problem.

riedel 7y ago

As long as issues as https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/issues/37 https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/issues/37 are open things stay problematic even if discussed before.

the_mitsuhiko 7y ago
DP-3T proposes cuckoo filters to improve privacy here. The general sense however is that this is inherent to these systems.

deleted 7y ago

[deleted]

jka 7y ago

I'm not sure if you'll read this; but I replied a bit curtly and unusefully earlier today, and want to apologize for that. It's stressful seeing messages that appear negative in a situation like this because the stakes are potentially so high. Unfortunately I didn't do a great job of making my own message and tone more positive. Thanks for sharing the whitepaper link here and leading a lot more folks to discover it that way.

casefields 7y ago

But that's how every policy discussion goes. Nothing anyone says at a town hall meeting is novel or unique to the staffs/politicians your talking to. It doesn't mean a person shouldn't speak their mind on topical issues. If you only want to have a discussion once, then only partake when in the company of actual power, or within rule-making bodies.