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Regardless of the technical issues with this, I think the "prank" issue Moxie brings up is much more serious. We've already seen the phenomenon of "Zoom bombing
by hn_throwaway_99 7y ago
Regardless of the technical issues with this, I think the "prank" issue Moxie brings up is much more serious. We've already seen the phenomenon of "Zoom bombing", I can imagine "tracer bombing" would be a much more serious issue. The only way I could see this working is that if when you enter a positive result you have to enter some sort of secret key from the testing authority, but that's totally not tenable given a lot (most?) testing these days is from private providers.
- krcz 7y agoDon't these providers need to be registered somewhere? It should be easy to reach them and provide with either code generator software or even printed one-time codes for database addition.
- Reelin 7y agoWhy use a centralized model? Allow users to subscribe to a data source so that any entity can push their own dataset. This is also important because it keeps the framework usable under a variety of adverse and unusual circumstances. An aid organization operating in a disaster zone or impoverished area could make use of such a framework without needing permission from a higher authority or even reliable internet access to the outside world.
- lasdfas 7y agoBecause it can abused. The easier you make it upload, it also allows bad actors to upload invalid data to cause people to go into quarantine unnecessarily. It only works well if you can trust the data, so I think it should error on the side of validating the data instead of openness.
- Reelin 7y agoIn an open model, the extent to which abuse is possible would be determined entirely by the authentication requirements (or lack thereof) imposed by the entity operating the server the user selected. That being said, another commenter linked to a set of specifications (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22836871 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22836871) which seem to indicate that (at least on iOS) the data source is determined entirely by an app that the user chooses to run on top of the framework.
- VectorLock 7y agoLooking at the Google doc it looks like they're going to restrict it to some "medical authorities" "In order to be whitelisted to use this API, apps will be required to timestamp and cryptographically sign the set of keys before delivery to the server with the signature of an authorized medical authority."
- JMTQp8lwXL 7y agoIt also assumes that if you get a notification of having been near a COVID positive individual that you'll be prudent enough to self isolate.
- sneak 7y agoIt doesn’t need to be everyone involved in opting in to tracing, or everyone notified to comply with the self-isolation recommendations to reduce the r0. It works even with only partial penetration of the populace.
- Reelin 7y agoWhy wouldn't the patient provide their framework info (if they so chose) at the time of sample collection? Then the medical authority could report it to the local government on the patient's behalf in the event of a positive test. Other end users then decide which (if any) "reporting authorities" to pull data from and check against. This also seems to address Moxie's concern about public location data being necessary (unless I've missed something). If I only pull all the positive tests from my local county or state, that should hopefully be a small enough dataset to be manageable even on fairly resource constrained low end devices.
- ehsankia 7y agoMy understanding too was that there was a middleman involved in collecting and distributing the keys, to avoid people spamming the system. You want to be 100% sure it's a positive, and not put the trust in the user. Otherwise random people could just say they have it. The local government would have to submit the keys as you mention and act as moderators for that region.
- Reelin 7y ago> The local government would have to submit the keys as you mention and act as moderators for that region. There's a big difference between a centralized and decentralized model here. * Centralized, there's a single (or only a few) worldwide APIs that you need approval to work with. This also hinders interoperability of different end-user app implementations. * Decentralized, anyone can set up a distribution server and require whatever authentication they'd like for it. A local government, a hospital, the Red Cross, etc. The framework becomes nothing more than a decentralized protocol that can potentially even be repurposed for other novel uses. For the decentralized approach, bear in mind that there's nothing preventing a third party from hosting and managing a distribution server on behalf of someone else. So (for example) the CDC could host a server (and handle authentication) for a state or county government that didn't feel up to the task. Another example, say the local hospital has their own database (possibly hosted by the state or Google or whoever). They can feed their (authenticated, locally collected) data to a local authority (the city or county), which only needs to accept data from trusted institutions (ie all the hospitals in the area). They can in turn feed this inherently trustworthy data to a state system, and so on. If each entity in this hierarchy makes their dataset publicly available, then users can independently decide which datasets are relevant to them (perhaps they traveled recently?) and check them on a daily basis.
- awinter-py 7y agosingapore centralized the reporting with TraceTogether / bluetrace, and call out fraud risk in their whitepaper
- tastroder 7y agoMany of the issues moxie brings up either don't apply universally or are unrelated to the part this specification touches upon. Maybe it helps to bring up a non US perspective here: in Germany, like many other European countries, this becomes a non-issue. We have central authorities that can greenlight a positive test result or invalidate wrong results, immediately making the prank argument completely hypothetical. The question as to why this should be centralised is easy, because it already is. I'd honestly expect the reporting chain in the US not being to dissimilar from this, at least at the state level. It's also important to note that all of this only supplements the existing, regularly manual, workflow of contact tracing. A very laborious and error prone task, especially in regions with a large number of infections. These techniques take a massive load off of a certain part of the health system that is notoriously underdeveloped because it's not really needed in this quantity in normal times.
- krisoft 7y ago> in Germany, like many other European countries, this becomes a non-issue. What do you mean by that? The protocol, as published, doesn’t have a role for the central authority. Even if the German state knows that mrSick tested positive and mrPrankster did not, how would the diagnosis server reject the keys published by mrPrankster? They are by design resistant to de-anonymization. In fact the German state can’t even know if a specific key reported as positive for covid belongs to a german resident or not.
- tastroder 7y agoMy main point is that the protocol as published is completely unrelated to the prank scenario, that's simply out of scope. The protocol does not prescribe who is able to report certain Diagnostic Keys that have tested positive. In a centralised deployment, that is likely under the current German reporting chain for infectious diseases, mrPrankster has no capability to falsely report a positive test result. You have a trustworthy central stakeholder that can provide a ground truth. At the very least it could be designed to be revocable (a step that would be necessary for false positive test results anyway).
- fabian2k 7y agoThe media reports about the german version of this include getting a one-time code from the health authorities that you have to enter into the app to mark yourself as infected. As far as I understand, the proposal from Google and Apple is about the underlying framework, but you can set up additional controls a level above in the app and the server infrastructure. So it's likely by design that it doesn't address the issue as the solutions to ensuring only verified cases can trigger alerts must be specific to the local circumstances.