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> there are technical measures in place that allow you to verify the build you're using yourself. There are no technical measures for Signal in place that all

> there are technical measures in place that allow you to verify the build you're using yourself. There are no technical measures for Signal in place that allow anyone to verify the build all ends of said end-to-end encryption are running nor any technical measures to ensure the software they are running won't be updated with compromised end-to-end encryption by the vendor in the future. The measures I talk about address both points by removing trust from the vendor and distributing it across many independent entities. > if Signal was doing an active MITM attack against their own encryption, that would be eavesdropping which is a felony in the US. It's not just legal anywhere in the world, it's what a lot of software already does. Anyway, if end-to-end encryption requires the exact same level of trust as TLS, there is no point in it. It's only useful in truly open source messengers, not Signal, Whatsapp or other binary blob centralizedly controlled messengers.

maqp 7y ago
>There are no technical measures for Signal in place that allow anyone to verify the build all ends of said end-to-end encryption There is no technical measure in existence that allows that for any application. This is called a nirvana fallacy. > nor any technical measures to ensure the software they are running won't be updated with compromised end-to-end encryption by the vendor in the future. That applies to all software that requires automatic software updates, i.e. networked TCBs. You want something that doesn't require updating, you use stronger model like TFC. >The measures I talk about address both points by removing trust from the vendor and distributing it across many independent entities. And users are going to compare diffs of multiple vendors for every update to see nothing malicious was added? Give me a break. >It's not just legal anywhere in the world, it's what a lot of software already does. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proofs. >Anyway, if end-to-end encryption requires the exact same level of trust as TLS, there is no point in it. And this is the general whataboutism propaganda I run into all the time. "There is no perfect E2EE model, therefore using it doesn't matter". Forward secrecy and risk of legal trouble are two perfectly valid reasons to use just opportunistic E2EE, even if you don't authenticate the keys. May the rest of the community credit your "ideas" with the silence they deserve.

maqp 7y ago

>There are no technical measures for Signal in place that allow anyone to verify the build all ends of said end-to-end encryption There is no technical measure in existence that allows that for any application. This is called a nirvana fallacy. > nor any technical measures to ensure the software they are running won't be updated with compromised end-to-end encryption by the vendor in the future. That applies to all software that requires automatic software updates, i.e. networked TCBs. You want something that doesn't require updating, you use stronger model like TFC. >The measures I talk about address both points by removing trust from the vendor and distributing it across many independent entities. And users are going to compare diffs of multiple vendors for every update to see nothing malicious was added? Give me a break. >It's not just legal anywhere in the world, it's what a lot of software already does. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proofs. >Anyway, if end-to-end encryption requires the exact same level of trust as TLS, there is no point in it. And this is the general whataboutism propaganda I run into all the time. "There is no perfect E2EE model, therefore using it doesn't matter". Forward secrecy and risk of legal trouble are two perfectly valid reasons to use just opportunistic E2EE, even if you don't authenticate the keys. May the rest of the community credit your "ideas" with the silence they deserve.