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>"I think therefore I am" assumes the conclusion. But the thought is self-referential. The thought is about itself thinking, and so the thought instantiates th

>"I think therefore I am" assumes the conclusion. But the thought is self-referential. The thought is about itself thinking, and so the thought instantiates the sufficient case for a subject. And so there is no question-begging. >The answer is that we erroneously conclude that the facts we perceive are first-person But as long as these facts are presented or represented as being first-person, the sufficient case for first-person acquaintance has been established. Whether these first-person facts are ultimately grounded in third-person descriptions or phenomena doesn't make them illusions.

naasking 7y ago
> But the thought is self-referential. The thought is about itself thinking, and so the thought instantiates the sufficient case for a subject. You just assumed the existence of a subject again. Where is the proof that a thought requires a subject? One that isn't vacuous or doesn't just assume its own conclusion? > Whether these first-person facts are ultimately grounded in third-person descriptions or phenomena doesn't make them illusions. It does for the technical purposes of the consciousness debate. The terminology we're using, like "illusion", has a technical meaning for the debate between materialists and antimaterialists, wherein antimaterialists argue that a first-person fact cannot be reduced to third person facts, even in principle. Obviously even materialists speaking informally would still use first person language and speak normally about their experiences.
- hackinthebochs 7y ago
  >Where is the proof that a thought requires a subject? I'm not sure what you're asking. If the thought is self-referential, then the subject is inherent in the self-reference of the thought, namely the thought itself. I am not assuming some kind of conscious subjectivity here. Merely that the content of the thought is instantiated in the case of self-reference. If this were not the case, then the thought could not self-reference. >has a technical meaning for the debate between materialists and antimaterialists I'm familiar with the usual suspects in this debate (e.g. Dennett, Frankish), and I don't find their usage of illusion particularly "technical". They use it to mean that phenomenal consciousness doesn't exist or isn't real. But its this very usage that I take issue with.
  - naasking 7y ago
    > If the thought is self-referential, then the subject is inherent in the self-reference of the thought, namely the thought itself. [...] If this were not the case, then the thought could not self-reference. What property of self-reference do you think entails the properties of a "subject"? Does a self-referential term in a programming language also have a subject? I suspect you would deny they do, so why does a self-referential thought entail a subject when self-reference in other domains does not? Because the only answers I can come up with either amount to special pleading on behalf of thoughts, or admitting a superfluous concept into every self-reference that makes no useful distinctions and conveys no useful properties that I can see. > They use it to mean that phenomenal consciousness doesn't exist or isn't real. And what do you think they mean by "isn't real" or "doesn't exist"? Because in this setting, such a claim to me means that phenomenal consciousness is not ontologically fundamental. That's a pretty technical meaning. Dennett certainly didn't mean that phenomenal consciousness doesn't exist as a concept deserving a philosophical or scientific explanation; clearly it does or he wouldn't have written about it.
    - hackinthebochs 7y ago
      >so why does a self-referential thought entail a subject when self-reference in other domains does not? I have a feeling you're taking "subject" to be a far more substantial concept that I am. A subject at its most austere is merely a distinct target of alteration. That is, it is subject to change from external or internal forces. So to have a self-referential thought is to say you are subject to change: from not having a thought to having a thought, thus you are a subject of some sort (the thinking sort). Although a thought itself does not necessarily imply a subject, recognizing one is having a thought (a self-referential thought) entails subject-hood on its bearer. But to address the specialness of thought: thoughts have content. For example, a thought about an apple intrinsically picks out an apple. The thought somehow contains the semantics of the object of its reference. This is in contrast to, say, a bit that gains meaning from the context in which it is used (e.g. night/day, heads/tails, etc). And so a self-referential thought intrinsically contains the necessary structure to entail subject-hood. Self-reference in other contexts do not have this intrinsic content requirement. >Because in this setting, such a claim to me means that phenomenal consciousness is not ontologically fundamental. Frankish is very clear that he is eliminativist about phenomenal consciousness. He is not intending to simply be reductive about phenomenal consciousness, i.e. that it is "real" but reduces to physical structure and dynamics. His claim is that we misrepresent non-phenomenal neural structures as being phenomenal. This can be cast as a sort of reduction as your referring to. But he is clear that this is not what he intends. As far as Dennett goes, he seems to endorse Frankish's project so I would take him to also be eliminativist about phenomenal consciousness. But reading is own work he's a lot more slippery about whether he's eliminativist or not so I'm not sure where he actually lands.

naasking 7y ago

> But the thought is self-referential. The thought is about itself thinking, and so the thought instantiates the sufficient case for a subject. You just assumed the existence of a subject again. Where is the proof that a thought requires a subject? One that isn't vacuous or doesn't just assume its own conclusion? > Whether these first-person facts are ultimately grounded in third-person descriptions or phenomena doesn't make them illusions. It does for the technical purposes of the consciousness debate. The terminology we're using, like "illusion", has a technical meaning for the debate between materialists and antimaterialists, wherein antimaterialists argue that a first-person fact cannot be reduced to third person facts, even in principle. Obviously even materialists speaking informally would still use first person language and speak normally about their experiences.

hackinthebochs 7y ago
>Where is the proof that a thought requires a subject? I'm not sure what you're asking. If the thought is self-referential, then the subject is inherent in the self-reference of the thought, namely the thought itself. I am not assuming some kind of conscious subjectivity here. Merely that the content of the thought is instantiated in the case of self-reference. If this were not the case, then the thought could not self-reference. >has a technical meaning for the debate between materialists and antimaterialists I'm familiar with the usual suspects in this debate (e.g. Dennett, Frankish), and I don't find their usage of illusion particularly "technical". They use it to mean that phenomenal consciousness doesn't exist or isn't real. But its this very usage that I take issue with.
- naasking 7y ago
  > If the thought is self-referential, then the subject is inherent in the self-reference of the thought, namely the thought itself. [...] If this were not the case, then the thought could not self-reference. What property of self-reference do you think entails the properties of a "subject"? Does a self-referential term in a programming language also have a subject? I suspect you would deny they do, so why does a self-referential thought entail a subject when self-reference in other domains does not? Because the only answers I can come up with either amount to special pleading on behalf of thoughts, or admitting a superfluous concept into every self-reference that makes no useful distinctions and conveys no useful properties that I can see. > They use it to mean that phenomenal consciousness doesn't exist or isn't real. And what do you think they mean by "isn't real" or "doesn't exist"? Because in this setting, such a claim to me means that phenomenal consciousness is not ontologically fundamental. That's a pretty technical meaning. Dennett certainly didn't mean that phenomenal consciousness doesn't exist as a concept deserving a philosophical or scientific explanation; clearly it does or he wouldn't have written about it.
  - hackinthebochs 7y ago
    >so why does a self-referential thought entail a subject when self-reference in other domains does not? I have a feeling you're taking "subject" to be a far more substantial concept that I am. A subject at its most austere is merely a distinct target of alteration. That is, it is subject to change from external or internal forces. So to have a self-referential thought is to say you are subject to change: from not having a thought to having a thought, thus you are a subject of some sort (the thinking sort). Although a thought itself does not necessarily imply a subject, recognizing one is having a thought (a self-referential thought) entails subject-hood on its bearer. But to address the specialness of thought: thoughts have content. For example, a thought about an apple intrinsically picks out an apple. The thought somehow contains the semantics of the object of its reference. This is in contrast to, say, a bit that gains meaning from the context in which it is used (e.g. night/day, heads/tails, etc). And so a self-referential thought intrinsically contains the necessary structure to entail subject-hood. Self-reference in other contexts do not have this intrinsic content requirement. >Because in this setting, such a claim to me means that phenomenal consciousness is not ontologically fundamental. Frankish is very clear that he is eliminativist about phenomenal consciousness. He is not intending to simply be reductive about phenomenal consciousness, i.e. that it is "real" but reduces to physical structure and dynamics. His claim is that we misrepresent non-phenomenal neural structures as being phenomenal. This can be cast as a sort of reduction as your referring to. But he is clear that this is not what he intends. As far as Dennett goes, he seems to endorse Frankish's project so I would take him to also be eliminativist about phenomenal consciousness. But reading is own work he's a lot more slippery about whether he's eliminativist or not so I'm not sure where he actually lands.