5 ms·
The anti-correlated behaviour of these two networks, and even their default mode vs. attention functions, reminds of the attention schema theory of consciousnes
by naasking 7y ago
The anti-correlated behaviour of these two networks, and even their default mode vs. attention functions, reminds of the attention schema theory of consciousness [1].
Specifically, the attention schema theory posits that some constant back and forth signal switching between internal and external models of the world results in the illusion of subjective awareness, in an analogous manner to how task switching provides the illusion of parallelism on single-core CPUs.
[1] https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00500/full https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.0050...
- hirundo 7y agoSo psuedo basic for the consciousness algorithm: 10 look at world 20 look at my reaction to world 30 goto 10 Which generates consciousness like frames per second generates motion. Or like the colored lines over this black and white photo generate a color image: https://twitter.com/SteveStuWill/status/1248000332027715584/photo/1 https://twitter.com/SteveStuWill/status/1248000332027715584/...
- goatlover 7y agoExcept without the frames and colored lines. Lines 10 and 20 don't provide the experiences. They're just behavior. Somehow all the sensations have to be added in when looking at the world and looking at one's reaction to the world.
- hateful 7y agolet experience$ = INKEY$
- AndrewKemendo 7y agoTaking this further, I suppose you could consider persistence of vision [1] as analogous to consciousness. It's an artifact of the limitations of the system. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persistence_of_vision https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persistence_of_vision
- anticensor 7y agoPersistence effect has to exist in one way or another to get real-time self awareness; if it were not an input alternation, it would exist at the reasoning level.
- _red 7y ago> 20 look at my reaction to world who is the "my" you are referring to? you have an 'a priori' conflict.
- KhoomeiK 7y agoBy "my" I guess he's referring to an internal state that has been built up over previous interactions with the external world? So more like: 10 receive information from world 20 do operations on information 25 update state based on operation result 30 goto 10
- visarga 7y agoI think it's more like: 10 receive information about the world, body and reward signals 20 evaluate the current situation and possible actions 30 act 40 goto 10 Emotion results in step 20 when we judge situations and actions in the context as good or bad. In this step two subsystems cooperate: 1. a system for fast reaction - works best when there is no time to reason, or when the action is repetitive, or when available information is uncertain 2. a system for slow, reasoning based reaction - works when we can build a mental model and imagine possible outcomes, is especially necessary when we encounter novel situations and have the concepts necessary to reason about it System 1 is based on instinct and system 2 is learned. They are both essential as they are specialised in different situations. Using system 2 all the time would be too expensive and probably impossible, we need to rely on instinct which in turn relies on evolution to be fine tuned. Learning happens through the reward signal. We reevaluate situations and actions based on outcomes. Emotion is just a synonym for the value we assign to our current state with regard to our goals and needs. Our goals include adapting to the environment in order to assure the integrity and necessities of life - the primary goal, then as secondary goals - being part of a social group, learning, mastery, conceiving children, curiosity and a few other instincts. We are born with this goal-program which is in turn evolved.
- goldenshale 7y agoYeah, this "perception-action cycle" has been well known and taught in neuroscience for a long time. What's new, at least since I studied it, is the anti-correlated tick-tock of these two key networks that seems to be happening. Amazing how similar to a game engine consciousness seems to be panning out.
- boxfire 7y agoI would say the kalman filter is quite appropriate where the state is our model of the world, the 'page flip' as a state update based on observation. Also the same as a Bayesian model update: > state = kalman(state, observation)
- chasd00 7y agowith a kalman filter the model always stays the same and is used to pick which sensor is reporting most accurately. changing the model would change everything, maybe that's why changing your worldview has such an impact on the way you "see" things.
- ryeights 7y agoI can see how that would lead to an illusion of continuous subjective awareness, but I don't think it supports the notion that subjective awareness is entirely illusory. I think therefore I am, the existence of qualia [1], etc. [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia
- naasking 7y ago"I think therefore I am" assumes the conclusion. "This is a thought, therefore thoughts exist" is the valid, non-circular version. The attention schema theory addresses the specific problem of how we apparently infer first-person subjective facts when no such concept exists in physics, the latter of which consists entirely of third-person objective facts. The answer is that we erroneously conclude that the facts we perceive are first-person, but this perception is a sensory trick, similar to an optical illusion. The question of qualia is larger than this specific question, but subjectivity was probably an important problem to overcome for a materialist explanation of consciousness. Dennett has long held that what we call "consciousness" is very likely a bunch of distinct phenomena that all get muddled together, and the fact that we have started to pick it apart hints suggestively that he was right.
- hackinthebochs 7y ago>"I think therefore I am" assumes the conclusion. But the thought is self-referential. The thought is about itself thinking, and so the thought instantiates the sufficient case for a subject. And so there is no question-begging. >The answer is that we erroneously conclude that the facts we perceive are first-person But as long as these facts are presented or represented as being first-person, the sufficient case for first-person acquaintance has been established. Whether these first-person facts are ultimately grounded in third-person descriptions or phenomena doesn't make them illusions.
- naasking 7y ago> But the thought is self-referential. The thought is about itself thinking, and so the thought instantiates the sufficient case for a subject. You just assumed the existence of a subject again. Where is the proof that a thought requires a subject? One that isn't vacuous or doesn't just assume its own conclusion? > Whether these first-person facts are ultimately grounded in third-person descriptions or phenomena doesn't make them illusions. It does for the technical purposes of the consciousness debate. The terminology we're using, like "illusion", has a technical meaning for the debate between materialists and antimaterialists, wherein antimaterialists argue that a first-person fact cannot be reduced to third person facts, even in principle. Obviously even materialists speaking informally would still use first person language and speak normally about their experiences.
- goatlover 7y agoDoes this mean the experience of pain, sound, color, etc. are illusions?
- LASR 7y agoWhat does it mean to be an illusion?
- naasking 7y agoThey are an illusion in precisely the same way your car or your day job are illusions: we don't admit any notion of qualia/cars/day jobs into our ontology of physics, and of qualia must ultimately be explained by appealing only to our ontology.
- hackinthebochs 7y ago>the same way your car or your day job are illusions But what work is calling these things illusions doing for you? That they're not fundamental units of the furniture of the universe doesn't mean they don't exist or play necessary causal or explanatory roles.
- naasking 7y ago> But what work is calling these things illusions doing for you? It serves to help distinguish that which is reducible to more fundamental ontological entities, from that which is irreducible and thus ontologically fundamental. I agree that these concepts certainly fulfill useful causal and explanatory roles. Whether they are "necessary" has some room for debate.
- codeulike 7y agoFascinating, an actual idea about consciousness that I havent heard before
- voxl 7y agoCalling it an illusion is not interesting. We define consciousness and subjective experience to match the very experience we understand. There is literally no way for it to be an illusion, the definition itself precludes it. No matter how consciousness and subjective experience are implemented in the hardware of our brains, it is still a concept that we use to describe the experience, and the experience is real no matter what.
- Trasmatta 7y agoConsciousness is basically the only thing we can conclusively say is NOT an illusion, right?
- cscurmudgeon 7y agoExactly! The illusion argument (let us call it ArgIllusionCons) that applies to consciousness can be applied with just a few extra steps to everything we perceive, including ArgIllusionCons itself.
- naasking 7y agoNo, you can safely assume that your thoughts exist in the moment that you have them. Consciousness is more than simple thoughts.
- incompatible 7y agoPerhaps, but there's no guarantee that it's anything more than a transient state, that lasts at most until you next lose consciousness. The consciousness that you have today may have no relation to that of yesterday or tomorrow, apart from running on the same brain "hardware" and having access to the same memories.
- naasking 7y ago> No matter how consciousness and subjective experience are implemented in the hardware of our brains, it is still a concept that we use to describe the experience, and the experience is real no matter what. What does it mean for something to be "real"? Physics says your car is not actually real. There is no "car" particle or field in the physics ontology, there is no physical experiment we can run to definitively test whether something is a car or is not a car, such that aliens that evolved on another planet would agree perfectly with your assessments. If physics is our best theory of what actually exists, then your car doesn't really exist. Analogously, this is the crux of the hard problem of consciousness: is the qualitative experience of consciousness actually real, or is it reducible to third-party objective facts, like every other phenomenon we've encountered, and so the irreducible properties it seems to have are actually an illusion that is reducible to non-conscious particles and fields? Given the way you've phrased your post, that the brain "implements" consciousness, I expect you might agree that such a reduction is ultimately possible. In that case, you too might be an eliminative materialist, which asserts that consciousness does not really exist. That said, all materialists agree that phenomenal experience requires an explanation, it's just that they assert that explanation will come from neuroscience. Antimaterialists assert that no such explanation is possible.