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That's a great point you bring up. Of course one of the assumptions, which may be wrong, is that Google is a desirable place to work. If you are a highly desir
by orijing 16y ago
That's a great point you bring up. Of course one of the assumptions, which may be wrong, is that Google is a desirable place to work.
If you are a highly desirable employee, you would likely get an offer at Google and have your application fee paid back in multiples--the point of the revenue neutrality is to encourage "highly desirable employees" to apply, not to discourage them. But I can see how it's hard to get over the psychological hurdle of paying to apply.
- sardonicbryan 16y agoI think it's not whether Google is a desirable place to work, it's whether it's more desirable a place than other places that do not require an application fee. Or, to be more pedantic about it, whether the marginal value of applying to Google is worth the cost. My hypothesis is that for most good candidates, working at Google is not highly differentiated vs, say, Facebook, Apple, hot startup, etc. It might be for some subset of applicants (potentially those with big interest in search, or people who live right next to a Google office). Of course, those people would have applied anyway. My instinct is that many more desirable applicants would just think, "I'll just apply to Facebook and Apple instead and see what happens." Pulling out your credit card is just such a big conversion barrier that I can't see this being a good idea.
- orijing 16y agoYea, the conversion barrier is a big one. The argument rested solely on the "expected value" of applying versus not, where E[applying] = E[marginal value] - E[marginal cost] = Pr(Will get a job and take it) * $4166 - $100. So if Pr(Will get a job and take it) >= 100/4166, then it would make sense to apply. Of course, most people would not think like that, which is the problem.