5 ms·

Every time this intriguing subject comes up on Hacker News, which is a lot, I end up with the distinct impression that the spectrum of reported condition is mor

by hanoz 7y ago

Every time this intriguing subject comes up on Hacker News, which is a lot, I end up with the distinct impression that the spectrum of reported condition is more a function of our inability to convey and compare the inner experience, than of variation in the inner experience itself.

lonelappde 7y ago
Why not both? Why would internal invisible thought processes be the same but all visible processes be different?
ken 7y ago
This article may not be the best example, but there's good evidence that inner experiences differ, based on our actual capabilities, e.g., Feynman's/Tukey's experiment that one could count time while reading but not talking, and the other could count time while talking but not reading.
yen223 7y ago
I've always wondered if there are people out there without an inner experience at all. How would you even tell?
- Terr_ 7y ago
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
  - brandmeyer 7y ago
    > Since such a world is conceivable, Chalmers claims, it is metaphysically possible, which is all the argument requires. That's not an argument, its just imagination! (with apologies to Monty Python).
Terr_ 7y ago
Alternately, individual humans function totally differently on the inside, but the language-adapter provides a comfortable illusion of consistency :P I admit that improving objective measures, like brain-scanning techniques, indicate that isn't so likely.
- the_af 7y ago
  > individual humans function totally differently on the inside My completely uninformed guess is that this is unlikely to be true. I expect with roughly the same biological equipment we are more or less the same, with some minor differences, some surprising innate exceptions, and of course cultural/upbringing differences. And of course, some visible biological differences which cause behavior/thought differences. Like the parent post guesses, I think at least some of the reported differences with aphantasia come from people reporting their inner experiences differently, and that they are probably more alike than we think. But of course, I also believe there are some real differences, too.
  - everdrive 7y ago
    It's hard to have this conversation without having a specific way to talk about the inner workings of the mind. For example, a biologist could (possibly) say that a person who couldn't visualize things had a mind that was almost identical a person who could. A psychologist might say that nonetheless this represents a large difference in function. Both would be right in their own way, but you'd need to define the internal thought process in a specific and uniform way before you could qualify it was a "different" or "similar."
    - the_af 7y ago
      Yes, agreed. It's very hard to have this conversation! I guess I'm just saying it's very unlikely (to me) that any given two people function "totally differently" internally. I agree there must be differences, some of them astonishing, but I have a hard time believing those two people are totally different. It's the same biological hardware supporting the same kind of software -- maybe one is Windows and the other is Linux though ;) Nothing of what I'm saying is scientific or definitive, just my gut feeling. I'm aware of the dangers of comparing people to hardware/software, and I know it's a flawed analogy.
rustybolt 7y ago
This probably accounts for some of the variation between people. I notice that I can't really tell if I have aphantasia or not. I know that in my younger years (say, up to 15) I drew a bit. I remember that, for simple shapes, I could my 'mental eye' to come up with an image and trace it on the paper. However, I stopped drawing at about 15 or 16, and did a lot of programming and math. I find it really hard to come up with a mental image of anything. Even if I think about the face of my girlfriend I can only give particular features without really having a sharp image of her face. So my impression is that it is trainable (and the skill fades if not used).
mcphage 7y ago
> I end up with the distinct impression that the spectrum of reported condition is more a function of our inability to convey and compare the inner experience, than of variation in the inner experience itself. Interesting idea—which do you think is the universal inner experience, then: do you think that everybody can visualize images, just some people don't realize it, or that nobody can visualize images, and just some people are confused into thinking they can?
- the_af 7y ago
  The second alternative can't be right: I know I can visualize images and I'm not confused about it :) I can picture the face of my relatives, or an animal, or my house, down to the colors. I could draw them or paint them from memory (and in fact, I'm pretty good at drawing).
  - mcphage 7y ago
    Similarly, the first alternative can't be right, either: I know I can't visualize images, and I'm not confused about that, either. I can't do any of those things you're describing.
mannykannot 7y ago
I imagne that is a large part of the issue, but the article begins with someone who noticed a difference in his own experiences, following a candidate triggering event (an unspecified minor surgical procedure.) This is not proof of anything, but it suggests that in some cases, there is something to the idea beyond just mis-communication. In this case, there is also the physical evidence from brain scanning. I would guess that some proportion of those self-reporting as aphantasic would be indistinguishable from the general population by such measures.
ghusbands 7y ago
There's an easy test. Ask someone to visualise the face of a friend and then ask about some detail that isn't one people normally note, like how thick the person's eyebrows are. Those with the ability to visualise will be able to see it and relate the information. Those without, like me, will not.

by hanoz 7y ago

lonelappde 7y ago

Why not both? Why would internal invisible thought processes be the same but all visible processes be different?

ken 7y ago

This article may not be the best example, but there's good evidence that inner experiences differ, based on our actual capabilities, e.g., Feynman's/Tukey's experiment that one could count time while reading but not talking, and the other could count time while talking but not reading.

yen223 7y ago

I've always wondered if there are people out there without an inner experience at all. How would you even tell?

Terr_ 7y ago
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
- brandmeyer 7y ago
  > Since such a world is conceivable, Chalmers claims, it is metaphysically possible, which is all the argument requires. That's not an argument, its just imagination! (with apologies to Monty Python).

Terr_ 7y ago

Alternately, individual humans function totally differently on the inside, but the language-adapter provides a comfortable illusion of consistency :P I admit that improving objective measures, like brain-scanning techniques, indicate that isn't so likely.

the_af 7y ago
> individual humans function totally differently on the inside My completely uninformed guess is that this is unlikely to be true. I expect with roughly the same biological equipment we are more or less the same, with some minor differences, some surprising innate exceptions, and of course cultural/upbringing differences. And of course, some visible biological differences which cause behavior/thought differences. Like the parent post guesses, I think at least some of the reported differences with aphantasia come from people reporting their inner experiences differently, and that they are probably more alike than we think. But of course, I also believe there are some real differences, too.
- everdrive 7y ago
  It's hard to have this conversation without having a specific way to talk about the inner workings of the mind. For example, a biologist could (possibly) say that a person who couldn't visualize things had a mind that was almost identical a person who could. A psychologist might say that nonetheless this represents a large difference in function. Both would be right in their own way, but you'd need to define the internal thought process in a specific and uniform way before you could qualify it was a "different" or "similar."
  - the_af 7y ago
    Yes, agreed. It's very hard to have this conversation! I guess I'm just saying it's very unlikely (to me) that any given two people function "totally differently" internally. I agree there must be differences, some of them astonishing, but I have a hard time believing those two people are totally different. It's the same biological hardware supporting the same kind of software -- maybe one is Windows and the other is Linux though ;) Nothing of what I'm saying is scientific or definitive, just my gut feeling. I'm aware of the dangers of comparing people to hardware/software, and I know it's a flawed analogy.

rustybolt 7y ago

This probably accounts for some of the variation between people. I notice that I can't really tell if I have aphantasia or not. I know that in my younger years (say, up to 15) I drew a bit. I remember that, for simple shapes, I could my 'mental eye' to come up with an image and trace it on the paper. However, I stopped drawing at about 15 or 16, and did a lot of programming and math. I find it really hard to come up with a mental image of anything. Even if I think about the face of my girlfriend I can only give particular features without really having a sharp image of her face. So my impression is that it is trainable (and the skill fades if not used).

mcphage 7y ago

> I end up with the distinct impression that the spectrum of reported condition is more a function of our inability to convey and compare the inner experience, than of variation in the inner experience itself. Interesting idea—which do you think is the universal inner experience, then: do you think that everybody can visualize images, just some people don't realize it, or that nobody can visualize images, and just some people are confused into thinking they can?

the_af 7y ago
The second alternative can't be right: I know I can visualize images and I'm not confused about it :) I can picture the face of my relatives, or an animal, or my house, down to the colors. I could draw them or paint them from memory (and in fact, I'm pretty good at drawing).
- mcphage 7y ago
  Similarly, the first alternative can't be right, either: I know I can't visualize images, and I'm not confused about that, either. I can't do any of those things you're describing.

mannykannot 7y ago

I imagne that is a large part of the issue, but the article begins with someone who noticed a difference in his own experiences, following a candidate triggering event (an unspecified minor surgical procedure.) This is not proof of anything, but it suggests that in some cases, there is something to the idea beyond just mis-communication. In this case, there is also the physical evidence from brain scanning. I would guess that some proportion of those self-reporting as aphantasic would be indistinguishable from the general population by such measures.

ghusbands 7y ago

There's an easy test. Ask someone to visualise the face of a friend and then ask about some detail that isn't one people normally note, like how thick the person's eyebrows are. Those with the ability to visualise will be able to see it and relate the information. Those without, like me, will not.