> The public suffix list is yet another incomplete workaround for the security flaw in the same origin policy (that "same origin" isn't a concept that can be cl

> The public suffix list is yet another incomplete workaround for the security flaw in the same origin policy (that "same origin" isn't a concept that can be clearly defined). Origins are very clearly and rigorously defined[0]. It's just that people have a tendency to group multiple applications/users on the same origin. Now, would it be nice to optionally allow servers to be more restrictive? Sure. There are a few privacy implications there, but I could easily see someone making a case for that. I think I'd possibly support an HTML directive that allowed you to have a stricter same-origin policy (ie, restrict to current URL, or restrict to parent path). At the same time, setting up subdomains that point to static directories is really stinking easy. And I am skeptical that any web host that refuses to use subdomains is going to care enough about security to opt-in to an even more aggressive scheme. A website that is hosting 3rd-party sites via userdirs is a website that will ignore or circumvent any security model you propose. > The public suffix list is yet another incomplete workaround for the security flaw in the same origin policy No, the opposite. The public suffix list is a workaround for the flawed security model of cookies. In your focus on Javascript, you are missing the much bigger problem. See below: > there is however still a caveat with this: Unfortunately the same origin policy does not apply to all web technologies and particularly it does not apply to Cookies. The same-origin policy is (overall) fine, the problem is that the old web security model didn't have it. So we are trying to retroactively build a modern security model based on strict, on-by-default isolation on top of a flawed security model that assumed every single domain would be owned by a single entity. Cookie "contexts" are a lot broader than modern definitions of "origins". They can be inherited from parent domains, they can be trivially shared across domains without user consent. And they also aren't by-default isolated across userdirs. This has all turned out to be, broadly, a bad idea. While I don't think the same-origin policy is perfect, it's pretty obviously better than what we were using before. This is why you're seeing movement from the Chrome team to turn on SameSite isolation by default for cookies. Because we look back at the original web security model and realize that opt-in SameSite and randomized form-submit tokens for security were always a mistake. All of this is dancing around that you mention that userdir URLs pre-date Javascript. To be clear, userdir URLs were inherently insecure from the moment they were conceived. You should not have been hosting websites this way, even before Javascript existed. To the extent that people got away with this kind of thing before Javascript, it was only because userdir websites were so ridiculously limited that they often didn't have any serverside capabilities to respond to form submissions, or to run any kind of logic at all. To the extent that people weren't widely phished on userdir-hosted sites by fake forms with hidden fields that sent logic to parent origins or to other sites they were already logged into, it's only because the web was so young and so tiny that we were able to get away with bad security -- the same way that in a rural area I can get away with leaving my garage unlocked. I'm not exactly happy with every decision modern browsers are making about the direction of web security, but I would challenge anyone to look at the history of CSRF mitigations and then say that the same-origin policy is not a universally better security model for Javascript to adopt. [0]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Same-origin_policy https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Same-o...