3 ms·

> The bank isn't creating anything either, they're just moving money around and playing social engineering games with society How would you react to a situatio

> The bank isn't creating anything either, they're just moving money around and playing social engineering games with society How would you react to a situation in which small companies discovered new drugs for ~$10 million, building on public research, and then were purchased by larger pharma companies for ~$300 million, and in which the large pharma companies aimed to earn ~$1-5 billion before the patents on the small company's invention expire?

s1artibartfast 7y ago
I would say that there is a common misunderstanding of: A) the viability initial drug discovery and subsequent development costs, and B) The time value of money. For A) success rates of 5000:1 are not uncommon. Discovery is at the very beginning of this process [1],which can take 12–15 years and cost in excess of $1 billion [2] B) A 1 to 5 billion dollar return on a 300 million acquisition is likely a loosing proposition for most pharma companies due to risk and the time value of money. If you have a 300m acquisition, 700m additional dev costs, a 50% time discount, and a 50% chance of success, you are already up to 4 billion in revenue needed to break even. This article [3] provides a balanced overview of the finical aspect and is written by a scientist trying to give away a cure for his terminal wife. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hit_to_lead https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hit_to_lead [2] https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3058157/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3058157/ [3] http://www.cureffi.org/2019/04/29/financial-modeling-in-rare-disease/ http://www.cureffi.org/2019/04/29/financial-modeling-in-rare...
- ejstronge 7y ago
  I agree with your comment in general, but I would just underline that the discovery component of a drug is often not paid for by the eventual vendor of the drug, but is instead paid for by taxpayers, other granting agencies, and venture capitalists. Thus the eventual vendor of a drug won't necessarily have 5000:1 odds, but instead will be able to review and purchase the most promising candidate drugs based on data generated by other companies. It's definitely true that companies also attempt to make new drugs in-house, but I can't readily recall a recent blockbuster drug made in this way. The expensive part of bringing new drugs to market is testing in humans. Perhaps the US could bear some of these costs while, in exchange, shortening or eliminating patent protections.
  - s1artibartfast 7y ago
    >I agree with your comment in general, but I would just underline that the discovery component of a drug is often not paid for by the eventual vendor of the drug, but is instead paid for by taxpayers, other granting agencies, and venture capitalists. In the case of the taxpayers and grants, i think it is important to keep in mind that these are explicitly given without strings attached or rights reserved because society decided that we want to encourage private research. It is fair to argue that perhaps we should change the model moving forward, but I find it fairly offensive when folk claim a retroactive ownership on this basis. >Thus the eventual vendor of a drug won't necessarily have 5000:1 odds, but instead will be able to review and purchase the most promising candidate drugs based on data generated by other companies. I wholeheartedly agree. the long >5000:1 is at discovery, i.e. the basic research that is often publicly funded. Once drugs have gone through enough screening to be used, the probability of approval is up to about 10:1 [1]. A lot of the bigger sales take place between phase 1 and 2, which probability of approval is up to perhaps 25%. Research institutions and early developers get paid based on the potential value and risk, and are not taken advantage of. The fact that companies often outsource early develop doesn't invalidate the their claim to their profits. >The expensive part of bringing new drugs to market is testing in humans. Perhaps the US could bear some of these costs while, in exchange, shortening or eliminating patent protections. This is an interesting idea. Two additional options that you may want to consider that wouldn't stifle development are expedited approval and government manufacture of generics. Due to the time value of money, faster approval increases the profitability of new drug development and without increasing prices to consumers. For generics, drug profits after loss of exclusivity are so far out that they don't significantly weigh in on the decision to develop a product or not.

s1artibartfast 7y ago

I would say that there is a common misunderstanding of: A) the viability initial drug discovery and subsequent development costs, and B) The time value of money. For A) success rates of 5000:1 are not uncommon. Discovery is at the very beginning of this process [1],which can take 12–15 years and cost in excess of $1 billion [2] B) A 1 to 5 billion dollar return on a 300 million acquisition is likely a loosing proposition for most pharma companies due to risk and the time value of money. If you have a 300m acquisition, 700m additional dev costs, a 50% time discount, and a 50% chance of success, you are already up to 4 billion in revenue needed to break even. This article [3] provides a balanced overview of the finical aspect and is written by a scientist trying to give away a cure for his terminal wife. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hit_to_lead https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hit_to_lead [2] https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3058157/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3058157/ [3] http://www.cureffi.org/2019/04/29/financial-modeling-in-rare-disease/ http://www.cureffi.org/2019/04/29/financial-modeling-in-rare...

ejstronge 7y ago
I agree with your comment in general, but I would just underline that the discovery component of a drug is often not paid for by the eventual vendor of the drug, but is instead paid for by taxpayers, other granting agencies, and venture capitalists. Thus the eventual vendor of a drug won't necessarily have 5000:1 odds, but instead will be able to review and purchase the most promising candidate drugs based on data generated by other companies. It's definitely true that companies also attempt to make new drugs in-house, but I can't readily recall a recent blockbuster drug made in this way. The expensive part of bringing new drugs to market is testing in humans. Perhaps the US could bear some of these costs while, in exchange, shortening or eliminating patent protections.
- s1artibartfast 7y ago
  >I agree with your comment in general, but I would just underline that the discovery component of a drug is often not paid for by the eventual vendor of the drug, but is instead paid for by taxpayers, other granting agencies, and venture capitalists. In the case of the taxpayers and grants, i think it is important to keep in mind that these are explicitly given without strings attached or rights reserved because society decided that we want to encourage private research. It is fair to argue that perhaps we should change the model moving forward, but I find it fairly offensive when folk claim a retroactive ownership on this basis. >Thus the eventual vendor of a drug won't necessarily have 5000:1 odds, but instead will be able to review and purchase the most promising candidate drugs based on data generated by other companies. I wholeheartedly agree. the long >5000:1 is at discovery, i.e. the basic research that is often publicly funded. Once drugs have gone through enough screening to be used, the probability of approval is up to about 10:1 [1]. A lot of the bigger sales take place between phase 1 and 2, which probability of approval is up to perhaps 25%. Research institutions and early developers get paid based on the potential value and risk, and are not taken advantage of. The fact that companies often outsource early develop doesn't invalidate the their claim to their profits. >The expensive part of bringing new drugs to market is testing in humans. Perhaps the US could bear some of these costs while, in exchange, shortening or eliminating patent protections. This is an interesting idea. Two additional options that you may want to consider that wouldn't stifle development are expedited approval and government manufacture of generics. Due to the time value of money, faster approval increases the profitability of new drug development and without increasing prices to consumers. For generics, drug profits after loss of exclusivity are so far out that they don't significantly weigh in on the decision to develop a product or not.