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Encouraging companies to lie by just writing it off when they're caught is an under-appreciated problem. If I'm honest and I'm working on a video conferencing
by tialaramex 7y ago
Encouraging companies to lie by just writing it off when they're caught is an under-appreciated problem.
If I'm honest and I'm working on a video conferencing platform, a potential customer asks "Do you have End-to-end encryption?". I say honestly "No". The customer goes to Zoom because they lied and said they do. Any outcome where Zoom keeps even _some_ of the resulting customers and money rewards deceit and ensures you'll get worse products in future because a worse product was given a leg up by lying. That's where we are today.
Silence detection (and a bunch of related problems) should be solved by using Constant Bitrate (CBR) encoding. The analysis linked says SILK was used, which was conceived as primarily a Variable (VBR) encoding but it doesn't go into enough depth to be sure whether VBR is in play here, though it's hard to give Zoom benefit of the doubt.
On the video side you can play sensor noise off against video codec optimisations. If you're sure the bottom 1-2 bits on a video conference camera feed is noise, the people writing the optimised live video encoder probably agree and aren't sending those bits anyway (you can synthesise noise perfectly well without sending it), so it's a wash.
And also though I agree it's not where you'd start do not rule out attackers controlling the plaintext - the "virtual pub" I attended a few hours ago with friends had a third party video playing, and sometimes people share their slide decks by video in corporate or government environments. It's definitely more practical to sneak deliberately watermarked video into someone's Zoom conference than to, as we worried about for disk encryption, get them to stash megabytes or gigabytes of carefully watermarked files on a drive.
- tptacek 7y agoI've read this comment a couple times and am not clear whether or where you see the potential for useful leaks through repeated aligned plaintext blocks to occur, either in VBR AAC or in H264 video. I am spitballing and would welcome specific feedback on this if you have it; if you're speculating, can you force your speculation to the form of a test case we can go implement? We don't have to use Zoom; a reasonable model of the codecs Zoom uses would suffice for discussion's sake.
- tialaramex 7y agoInformed speculation is all I have. I will say in passing that it's weird to keep picking VBR AAC in your examples, the document says they used SILK, which would make sense because SILK was designed (by Skype many years ago) for this application. AAC is from a different era (it turns out we were trying to be too clever back then) and targets a different application. This bothers me because even if ECB was good enough here, which we're both agreed it isn't, encrypted SILK VBR is anyway specifically known to be vulnerable to the same approach they demo'd in "Spot Me if You Can" and similar papers: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4531143 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4531143 Keep in mind that even without any cryptographic work, we know the exact length in bytes (just like in that paper) of every SILK frame on the wire. As to the cryptography: I think the first thing I'd do if I was trying to turn this into an attack would be to send gibberish to Zoom's intermediary servers and see if they care (thus function as a potential Oracle).
- tptacek 7y agoEverything that isn't authenticated (like CTR mode, which is what was supposedly "recommended" here) admits the potential of an oracle attack, so what's interesting to me here is what's distinctively bad about ECB in this setting. And: I'm not saying ECB is OK in this setting. I'm saying "it's not PenguinVision simple" and "what makes it not OK is probably interesting". You know more about the codec situation here than I do. So, you tell me! What should I be looking at?
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- tialaramex 7y ago> CTR mode, which is what was supposedly "recommended" here Where are you getting this recommendation? Who recommended it - to Zoom? And when? > You know more about the codec situation here than I do. So, you tell me! What should I be looking at? If you're prepared to be at least slightly interested in problems even if ECB only contributes rather than blowing them wide open, then maybe you should look at H.264 I-frames first. An I-frame stands on its own. For example the WebP image format is essentially just one I-frame from VP8. If the scene is literally unchanged from one I-frame to the next, all the exact same image data must be re-encoded, and logically (if the codec is at all efficient) that means the same bytes. [ If you just don't use I-frames then all loss becomes unrecoverable and people will stop saying your product "Just works". In products like a DVD or Netflix I-frames are needed to make it "seekable". This is obviously not a necessity in a video conference, but the ability to handle network glitches and to add/ remove participants seamlessly is a requirement ] So with ECB for I-frames clearly we can tell if nothing changed. Maybe an artificially lit meeting room with nobody in it, a desk left unmanned. Or a screen share left showing an unchanging desktop. Is that a "useful" thing for eavesdroppers to learn? Do you think Zoom users would be surprised that eavesdroppers can tell their colleagues took a coffee break? But because codecs like H.264 are oriented around square blocks I suspect we can do better. They're not deliberately trying to have these blocks encode to exactly 16 bytes and so mostly they won't, but of course one chance in 16 isn't nothing and we get to try every I-frame. Probably not to the point of getting a blocky outline of a moving person on a stream (which is sad because I'm pretty sure that, like the Penguin, would make the point viscerally) but enough to have some idea which parts of a scene (or a slide deck) are changing.