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Does Zoom use end-to-end encryption?
- jtxt 7y agoAt least we can go self hosted now: https://jitsi.org/ https://jitsi.org/
- kardos 7y agoHas Jitsi received any serious security scrutiny? Are they also making rookie mistakes?
- jamesaepp 7y agoIf only people had this type of mindset and attitude _before_ they selected a communications platform.
- kardos 7y agoConsidering/selecting Jitsi due to the self-hosted option shows evidence of a privacy/security oriented mindset. But I agree -- it's not sufficient.
- tyingq 7y agoI imagine a lot of these decisions were pretty rushed this year. There are a ton of Universities, businesses, etc, that hadn't previously done any large scale video conferencing. They didn't have much time to do a thoughtful selection. Zoom is under scrutiny largely because it's a suddenly a highly popular choice. All the hoopla incented skeptics to take a closer look.
- jamesaepp 7y agoThe fact is that almost none of the communications we use on a daily basis are end-to-end encrypted. What response would you get if you told staff, partners, executives, support personnel, etc that the new standard was based on GPG web-of-trust or hierarchical S/MIME emails and that all plain text emails (or any not digitally signed) were going to be binned at the mail servers? For that, I don't blame organizations for doing what they had to do - it's perfectly reasonable. But the discussion that results from this is mostly healthy. Zoom will suffer from the PR but I think that will give us better options as a result going forward.
- bplatta 7y agoThis is a bit of shameless plug, but seems relevant as its about providing end to end encryption for Jitsi. My company provides a VPN product (really a full-fledged API driven SDN) that you can plug containers into. So a network edge that supports plugins. We just spun up a Jitsi plugin. All packets run over the encrypted overlay network for VPN clients. We'll post a little blog post on it soon. PM me if it sounds interesting. vpn: https://www.cohesive.net/workforce-service-edge https://www.cohesive.net/workforce-service-edge network edge plugins: https://docs.cohesive.net/docs/network-edge-plugins https://docs.cohesive.net/docs/network-edge-plugins edit: And we're offering expanded free licenses during the pandemic, https://www.cohesive.net/blog/helping-business-teams-stay-connected-in-response-to-coronavirus https://www.cohesive.net/blog/helping-business-teams-stay-co...
- jamesaepp 7y agoShort answer: No.
- wenc 7y agoOf all the Zoom articles I've seen over the past few days, I think this is one of the more even-keeled and explanatory (vs the hyperbolic and emotional commentary on HN). I think a level-headed, focused technical discussion (sans incendiary language) does more to advance the conversation than snarky, emotional outbursts. From the article: "Are we being unfair to Zoom? I want to close by saying that many people are doing the best they can during a very hard time. This includes Zoom’s engineers, who are dealing with an unprecedented surge of users, and somehow managing to keep their service from falling over. They deserve a lot of credit for this. It seems almost unfair to criticize the company over some hypothetical security concerns right now. But at the end of the day, this stuff is important. The goal here isn’t to score points against Zoom, it’s to make the service more secure. And in the end, that will benefit Zoom as much as it will benefit all of the rest of us."
- fossuser 7y agoI also found this one to be pretty good: https://citizenlab.ca/2020/04/move-fast-roll-your-own-crypto-a-quick-look-at-the-confidentiality-of-zoom-meetings/ https://citizenlab.ca/2020/04/move-fast-roll-your-own-crypto... It was submitted to HN, but got less attention (ironically maybe because it's more technical?)
- seemslegit 7y agoHow does that even remotely vindicate Zoom if it shows they bungled even the non-end-to-end encryption ?
- fossuser 7y agoIt doesn't? I just thought it was a high quality article going over some of the actual technical detail (rather than high-level anti-zoom articles about nothing, like the Facebook SDK). Two things can be true, Zoom can still be comically better than the alternatives like Cisco/Webex which are universally terrible, but they can also have serious security concerns. Hopefully this attention will cause them to fix it (though it may be hard to fix the Chinese development shop concerns). I have some hope that Zoom can improve their security posture, but I have no hope that Cisco can make a good product.
- kryogen1c 7y agowhat is there to even say at this point. everyones mad at zoom; we hit critical volume for mob mentality and now no amount of discussion or reason matters. should they have marketed it is e2e when sometimes its not? of course not, theyre wrong. do you fucking care? do you need more than one hand to count the number of products that are e2e encrypted? if you use the definition of e2e in the article, nothing apple does is e2e either. does anyone else that's not in tech even understand what encryption is at all, much less e2e? they use a shitty encryption scheme when they do e2e? theyre wrong and should do better. do you care? your threat model is that someone knows your meeting, is in place beforehand, intercepts the encryption, decodes it, and then spys on your conference? this couldn't be more of a penny-wise, pound-foolish scenario. why are we still talking about this. please stop
- jamesaepp 7y agoThe problem for the mob rests on the fact that they advertise the system as being e2e, when it is not - at least with the definition I use for e2e. https://zoom.us/security https://zoom.us/security My rule-of-thumb (NOT A LITMUS TEST) for e2e is as follows: If you have exchanged the public or pre-shared key(s) with the partner(s) out-of-band OR you had your public key signed by a NEUTRAL (key word) third party who is mutually trusted, then yes - you are likely using e2e. If Zoom generated the keypairs, signed them, and transported the public keys themselves without an external independent library - I don't consider that e2e because they are the middle man every step along the way. Should we treat other companies the same way if they claim they use e2e but don't? Yes, absolutely. This situation is bittersweet, it's (a bit) unfair to Zoom, but hopefully this will spark healthy discussions around what e2e is and more importantly, what it is not.
- endorphone 7y agoYour post seems a little over the top. Millions are still using Zoom. Its shares are still trading at an enormous premium. The technical discussion is something altogether different, and people are allowed to have that, regardless of your consternation. And hopefully a better product comes out of it. "if you use the definition of e2e in the article, nothing apple does is e2e either" This bit of sad whataboutism is technical nonsense, though. No, Apple, and a number of other vendors, actually do this right. I honestly think Zoom's engineers, who have made a number of rudimentary serious technical blunders, thought "end-to-end encryption" meant "it's encrypted during every stage of transport". I've seen a number of companies make this mistake.
- crazygringo 7y agoNow, I don't think Zoom should have been advertising E2EE when it isn't. But I think some people are still missing the general point that E2EE is fundamentally incompatible with general-purpose business/educational videoconferencing. It works for Facetime which is designed for small groups exclusively using a Facetime app. But the second you allow phone dial-in (virtually always a hard requirement), the second you allow cloud recording (which the article acknowledges), E2EE becomes meaningless, because the server itself necessarily becomes another endpoint. For >99.9% of people this is fine. For the <0.1% who might be the hand-selected targets of government spying, industrial espionage, or crime enforcement, then no, you shouldn't be using Zoom. But if that's a top priority for you, you weren't already using Zoom anyways -- I assume you'd be using auditable open-source encryption. You wouldn't have trusted Zoom marketing terms in the first place.
- kardos 7y ago> The second you allow cloud recording (which the article acknowledges), E2EE becomes meaningless Not sure I agree with this one. Assuming a design where the server is just jockeying around encrypted streams because it doesn't have the keys, it could store the encrypted stream upon instructions from the client. The client would need to keep the key so it can retrieve and decrypt the recording later.
- khc 7y agooften time meetings are recorded so they can be played back later for people who didn't attend the meeting.
- jwr 7y ago> But the second you allow phone dial-in (virtually always a hard requirement) I'm really curious about this one — I've noticed that indeed in the US people tend to expect to be able to dial-in using the PSTN. Why would people do that? I haven't seen this happening much in Europe, and the Whereby (https://whereby.com/ https://whereby.com/) conferencing tool doesn't even offer dial-in, which isn't a problem. Why is dialing in using the PSTN a thing?
- dpwm 7y agoIs E2E encryption desirable for video chats with >2 participants? Let's say I'm talking with two other people: is there a way to do E2E encryption without having to send out the same stream twice? edit: Just realised a common key would allow this. But I am still interested in schemes for deriving a key amongst multiple parties using a middleman without the middleman knowing the key. It seems like a rather hard problem.
- endorphone 7y agoYou can send a single stream with E2E, just as your can send a PGP message to multiple recipients. Each packet/bundle/whatever has the decrypt key encrypted against each of the recipient keys.
- dpwm 7y agoThanks, I hadn't realised that. Looking into it, it seems PGP creates a shared symmetric key and then shares that key using public-key, which does seem like the most obvious way to do it. [0] https://superuser.com/questions/554513/pgp-encrypt-single-message-for-multiple-recipients https://superuser.com/questions/554513/pgp-encrypt-single-me...
- coder543 7y ago> But I am still interested in schemes for deriving a key amongst multiple parties using a middleman without the middleman knowing the key. It seems like a rather hard problem. This is exactly what happens when your browser establishes an HTTPS connection. There are many middlemen between you and the web server, but it still manages to negotiate a shared symmetric key (the session key) that can be used for the bulk of the encryption. The difference is that there is no certificate authority vouching for each participant in a video call's identity, so you would need to do independent identity verification if you want to ensure that the call is secure, which some people would do by reading the public keys of each participant aloud, and people verifying that everything matches what they see.
- dpwm 7y ago
- jwr 7y agoI wish somebody verified the encryption claims of other companies (like Whereby or GoToMeeting). Zoom is getting scrutiny because it became The Popular Thing, but it's not the only tool.
- nix0n 7y agoThat's part of it, but it's also because E2E is a specific security guarantee which most cloud meeting providers (including in most cases Zoom) don't provide. Contrast with Gotomeeting's claims[0] that data transmitted between their servers and their users are encrypted using TLS. This is a weaker claim. [0]https://www.gotomeeting.com/meeting/resources/hipaa-compliant-video-conferencing https://www.gotomeeting.com/meeting/resources/hipaa-complian... (third table)
- ken 7y ago> It indicates that the Zoom client — meaning the actual Zoom software running on a phone or desktop computer — is capable of encrypting audio/video data to other Zoom clients in the conversation, without exposing your sensitive data to Zoom servers. Maybe I’m bad at English, but I had exactly the opposite interpretation. When someone says they “don’t” do something, that implies to me that they are able to, but choose not to. Otherwise, they’d just say they “can’t”.
- unreal37 7y agoRelevant to say Zoom has responded to this. https://blog.zoom.us/wordpress/2020/04/01/facts-around-zoom-encryption-for-meetings-webinars/ https://blog.zoom.us/wordpress/2020/04/01/facts-around-zoom-... "In light of recent interest in our encryption practices, we want to start by apologizing for the confusion we have caused by incorrectly suggesting that Zoom meetings were capable of using end-to-end encryption." And "To be clear, in a meeting where all of the participants are using Zoom clients, and the meeting is not being recorded, we encrypt all video, audio, screen sharing, and chat content at the sending client, and do not decrypt it at any point before it reaches the receiving clients." As others have said, the moment you have to interact with the public phone system, decryption has to happen before the "end".
- basch 7y agoI asked this the other day >Am I misunderstanding the product, or are the streams not being merged on the server into a single feed? Are they not recompressing streams depending on the receiving device? I find that somewhat unbelievable? Its interesting if what they say is true. Each device encodes their feed exactly once, and then when you are on a call with 50 people, you are receiving 50 separate encrypted feeds, which your client all decrypts separately? With one common key for the whole meeting, and the server has the ability to decrypt for ptsn and recordings, it just chooses not to when those features are not used?
- bad_user 7y agoNo, that's not a clarification. What the TFA is saying is that the decryption key is generated by their servers and even passed through China, even if none of the people in the conversation are in China. That's NOT end-to-end encryption, Zoom never does end-to-end encryption because they have the decryption keys. And with that clarification they keep deceiving their users.
- herf 7y agoI think building an iMessage-style PKI might be a wasted effort for them. They would need to immediately and silently inject server "participants" that listen in to every conversation (for dial-in or recording), so the permission model is not much better than a shared ephemeral key. To some extent, the difference depends on logging--if you log the ephemeral key or throw it away (or similarly, if you throw away the made-up participant private key or keep it). Maybe they should allow small groups to establish on-the-fly OTR-style conversations when they can.
- bgentry 7y agoThe linked CitizenLab report (titled "Move Fast & Roll Your Own Crypto") is worth reading on its own for more technical details: https://citizenlab.ca/2020/04/move-fast-roll-your-own-crypto-a-quick-look-at-the-confidentiality-of-zoom-meetings/ https://citizenlab.ca/2020/04/move-fast-roll-your-own-crypto... Its key findings: -Zoom documentation claims that the app uses “AES-256” encryption for meetings where possible. However, we find that in each Zoom meeting, a single AES-128 key is used in ECB mode by all participants to encrypt and decrypt audio and video. The use of ECB mode is not recommended because patterns present in the plaintext are preserved during encryption. -The AES-128 keys, which we verified are sufficient to decrypt Zoom packets intercepted in Internet traffic, appear to be generated by Zoom servers, and in some cases, are delivered to participants in a Zoom meeting through servers in China, even when all meeting participants, and the Zoom subscriber’s company, are outside of China. -Zoom, a Silicon Valley-based company, appears to own three companies in China through which at least 700 employees are paid to develop Zoom’s software. This arrangement is ostensibly an effort at labor arbitrage: Zoom can avoid paying US wages while selling to US customers, thus increasing their profit margin. However, this arrangement may make Zoom responsive to pressure from Chinese authorities.
- dang 7y agoThat article is being discussed here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22768494 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22768494. It's not clear to me whether the threads should be merged, or—if we're to have only one on the front page—which thread should be the one.
- zenexer 7y agoI appreciate seeing multiple articles on the front page. It’s an important issue right now, and some of the articles can be dense. I like reading multiple presentations of the same information to see what different authors emphasize.
- boring_twenties 7y agoHow the fuck does one even arrive at the possibility of using ECB mode? Even knowing nothing about encryption, I know enough not to do that.
- bad_user 7y agoZoom is lying in their marketing AND in their recent clarification. As the article is saying, they always have the decryption key on the server side, so they always have the capability to decrypt the stream. Given the current state of affairs I wouldn't have minded Zoom not being end-to-end encrypted, but by lying about it, my trust in Zoom plummeted.
- kemonocode 7y ago> I want to close by saying that many people are doing the best they can during a very hard time. This includes Zoom’s engineers, who are dealing with an unprecedented surge of users, and somehow managing to keep their service from falling over. They deserve a lot of credit for this. It seems almost unfair to criticize the company over some hypothetical security concerns right now. I'll have all the sympathy for Zoom's employees who are probably having mandatory overtime in order to keep things running smoothly and to patch things up in response to all the (very legitimate) concerns being brought up, but at the end of the day, Zoom is a for-profit company, not a charity. A for-profit company with links to China [0] that's in a very unusual situation right now and potentially coming in contact with a lot of sensitive information as a great deal of people have come to rely on them. I don't think they deserve to be cut any slack and honestly, the more people find and use other alternatives, preferably open source ones (Jitsi Meet [1], BigBlueButton [2], Jami [3], among others) the better. [0] https://citizenlab.ca/2020/04/move-fast-roll-your-own-crypto-a-quick-look-at-the-confidentiality-of-zoom-meetings/ https://citizenlab.ca/2020/04/move-fast-roll-your-own-crypto... [1] https://meet.jit.si/ https://meet.jit.si/ [2] https://bigbluebutton.org/ https://bigbluebutton.org/ [3] https://jami.net/ https://jami.net/
- petergatsby 7y agoArticle dances around and equivocates. Simple answer is "no". Whole purpose of E2EE is to assume server is untrusted, but build a secure system anyway. Zoom can watch & read your content whenever they want to. Full stop.
- m3kw9 7y agoAll your cell phone calls can be heard at the providers servers too
- surround 7y agoOne thing I don’t understand is why Zoom is more popular than Jitsi. Zoom charges a subscription fee for meetings longer than 40 minutes, where Jitsi is free for unlimited use. What does Zoom offer that Jitsi doesn’t?
- jedberg 7y agoI feel bad for Zoom right now. They had a great product that people loved, and now all of a sudden they are having an explosion in usage and scrutiny. And the worst part is that all of this scaling work will be for only a temporary increase. Once everyone gets called back to the office and people can see their friends in person, their traffic will go back down. Usually if you have an explosion of popularity like this you at least know that your work will be going towards continued growth and revenue. Having been on the other side of explosive growth, I can empathize with the engineers at Zoom who have to deal with this. To their credit, they seem to have built a system that can scale pretty well given how well the product has just kept working.
- rhizome 7y agoPeople might not get called back to the office for a long time.
- dang 7y agoIt seems like the root node of this article graph is https://citizenlab.ca/2020/04/move-fast-roll-your-own-crypto-a-quick-look-at-the-confidentiality-of-zoom-meetings/ https://citizenlab.ca/2020/04/move-fast-roll-your-own-crypto..., which is being discussed here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22768494 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22768494 The Intercept article on it has a discussion here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22767807 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22767807