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You're comparing a vehicle at the start of development with a vehicle that was supposedly undergoing final testing.

gamblor956 7y ago
You're comparing a software error (Boeing) to a hardware error (SpaceX). Boeing's hardware is effectively finalized, but the control software is still undergoing testing with the finalized (i.e., "frozen") hardware specs.
- gpm 7y ago
  Boeings most recent mission was supposed to be a demonstration that they were ready to fly crew to the station. Both hardware and software was supposed to be effectively finalized. This is compared to Starship where no one even really knows what the final hardware or software will look like yet and they are trying out manufacturing techniques in a field. The tests being performed are experiments, to see what does and doesn't work. Comparing the two failures is completely ridiculous. Not only was Boeing software supposed to be effectively finalized, but Boeing hardware also appears to have failed on that test. The thrusters experienced issues, and the antenna that were contractually required to provide end to end connectivity failed to do so. Moreover on the second most recent demonstration (pad abort) Boeing suffered a parachute failure.
  - bumby 7y ago
    Pretty good assessment. I couldn’t tell from your wording but I think the understanding is the thruster and comm issues were software related while the parachute issue was not?
    - gpm 7y ago
      Sorry, I guess I should have been more clear. The thruster and comms issues were also examples of hardware related issues. I can't say for certain that the comms issue couldn't be fixed in software, but it seems unlikely. The thruster issue was related to overuse and is arguably mitigated by "not doing that (via software changes and training for human pilots)", but it really shouldn't have been an issue in the first place. The software issues were the more serious issues that grabbed more headlines. The capsule incorrectly grabbing a time value from the rocket. The control logic for whatever reason didn't understand something was wrong, but instead "proceeded as normal" as if it was further ahead in the mission. Finally there was some other error that was caught before it happened but was something related to the thruster control logic and could have caused the loss of the capsule during re-entry.
      - bumby 7y ago
        Ah, ok thank you for clarifying. I thought you were originally talking about the thruster mapping issue that was another example of software issues
        gpm 7y ago
        Not sure why this is being downvoted. I appreciate both the thanks, and that you identified the source of the confusion. I also appreciate that you made it clear that you know what you're talking about and that I didn't really need to write such a long answer for you.
    - greglindahl 7y ago
      "the understanding" ought to be that the incident review isn't done.
      - bumby 7y ago
        Can you elaborate on what you mean? The understanding I was referring to comes from publicly available information corroborated by NASA
        greglindahl 7y ago
        My apologies. I was remembering all of the people claiming that the facts were known before the initial investigation was done, but the initial investigation finished 3/6. There is a second investigation currently ongoing, an "organizational root cause assessment".
        bumby 7y ago
        No worries. And yes, I remember how much people jumped to all kinds of conclusions after the event first happened. I think what you mean is the "organizational safety assessment" (OSA) which will occur later this year.[1] Germane to my previous comment, this will focus more on the organizational culture that may have contributed to the failure (e.g., decision making in the presence of heavy schedule pressure). https://blogs.nasa.gov/commercialcrew/category/boeing/ https://blogs.nasa.gov/commercialcrew/category/boeing/
        greglindahl 7y ago
        I was quoting a news article about the "organizational root cause assessment". Sorry you were confused.
        deleted 7y ago
        [deleted]
        bumby 7y ago
  - gamblor956 7y ago
    https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/02/07/boeing-starliner-software-problems/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/02/07/boeing-... It's definitely a software problem per NASA and Boeing. But thanks for pretending that you know more than the people actually investigating.
    - bumby 7y ago
      Please abide by the guidelines in your comments. > Be kind. Don't be snarky. Have curious conversation; don't cross-examine. Comments should get more thoughtful and substantive, not less, as a topic gets more divisive. When disagreeing, please reply to the argument instead of calling names. "That is idiotic; 1 + 1 is 2, not 3" can be shortened to "1 + 1 is 2, not 3." Please respond to the strongest plausible interpretation of what someone says, not a weaker one that's easier to criticize. Assume good faith.
    - gpm 7y ago
      Here are some official sources for you on there also being hardware problems > The review team also is continuing its investigation of the intermittent space-to-ground forward link issue that impeded the flight control team’s ability to command and control the spacecraft. The team has identified the technical root cause as radiofrequency interference with the communications system. While the team has recommended specific hardware improvements already in work by the company, the full assessment and resulting recommendations will continue through March. https://blogs.nasa.gov/commercialcrew/category/boeing/ https://blogs.nasa.gov/commercialcrew/category/boeing/ and > The NASA source said eight or more thrusters on the service module failed at one point and that one thruster never fired at all. > In response to a question about thruster performance, Boeing provided the following statement to Ars: "After the anomaly, many of the elements of the propulsion system were overstressed, with some thrusters exceeding the planned number of burns for a service module mission. We took a few cautionary measures to make sure the propulsion system stayed healthy for the remainder of the mission, including re-pressurizing the manifold, recovering that manifold’s thrusters. Over the course of the mission we turned off 13 thrusters and turned all but one back on after verifying their health." https://arstechnica.com/science/2020/01/nasa-and-boeing-are-closely-looking-at-starliners-thruster-performance/ https://arstechnica.com/science/2020/01/nasa-and-boeing-are-...

You're comparing a software error (Boeing) to a hardware error (SpaceX). Boeing's hardware is effectively finalized, but the control software is still undergoing testing with the finalized (i.e., "frozen") hardware specs.

gpm 7y ago
Boeings most recent mission was supposed to be a demonstration that they were ready to fly crew to the station. Both hardware and software was supposed to be effectively finalized. This is compared to Starship where no one even really knows what the final hardware or software will look like yet and they are trying out manufacturing techniques in a field. The tests being performed are experiments, to see what does and doesn't work. Comparing the two failures is completely ridiculous. Not only was Boeing software supposed to be effectively finalized, but Boeing hardware also appears to have failed on that test. The thrusters experienced issues, and the antenna that were contractually required to provide end to end connectivity failed to do so. Moreover on the second most recent demonstration (pad abort) Boeing suffered a parachute failure.
- bumby 7y ago
  Pretty good assessment. I couldn’t tell from your wording but I think the understanding is the thruster and comm issues were software related while the parachute issue was not?
  - gpm 7y ago
    Sorry, I guess I should have been more clear. The thruster and comms issues were also examples of hardware related issues. I can't say for certain that the comms issue couldn't be fixed in software, but it seems unlikely. The thruster issue was related to overuse and is arguably mitigated by "not doing that (via software changes and training for human pilots)", but it really shouldn't have been an issue in the first place. The software issues were the more serious issues that grabbed more headlines. The capsule incorrectly grabbing a time value from the rocket. The control logic for whatever reason didn't understand something was wrong, but instead "proceeded as normal" as if it was further ahead in the mission. Finally there was some other error that was caught before it happened but was something related to the thruster control logic and could have caused the loss of the capsule during re-entry.
    - bumby 7y ago
      Ah, ok thank you for clarifying. I thought you were originally talking about the thruster mapping issue that was another example of software issues
      - gpm 7y ago
        Not sure why this is being downvoted. I appreciate both the thanks, and that you identified the source of the confusion. I also appreciate that you made it clear that you know what you're talking about and that I didn't really need to write such a long answer for you.
  - greglindahl 7y ago
    "the understanding" ought to be that the incident review isn't done.
    - bumby 7y ago
      Can you elaborate on what you mean? The understanding I was referring to comes from publicly available information corroborated by NASA
      - greglindahl 7y ago
        My apologies. I was remembering all of the people claiming that the facts were known before the initial investigation was done, but the initial investigation finished 3/6. There is a second investigation currently ongoing, an "organizational root cause assessment".
        bumby 7y ago
        No worries. And yes, I remember how much people jumped to all kinds of conclusions after the event first happened. I think what you mean is the "organizational safety assessment" (OSA) which will occur later this year.[1] Germane to my previous comment, this will focus more on the organizational culture that may have contributed to the failure (e.g., decision making in the presence of heavy schedule pressure). https://blogs.nasa.gov/commercialcrew/category/boeing/ https://blogs.nasa.gov/commercialcrew/category/boeing/
        greglindahl 7y ago
        I was quoting a news article about the "organizational root cause assessment". Sorry you were confused.
        deleted 7y ago
        [deleted]
        bumby 7y ago
- gamblor956 7y ago
  https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/02/07/boeing-starliner-software-problems/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/02/07/boeing-... It's definitely a software problem per NASA and Boeing. But thanks for pretending that you know more than the people actually investigating.
  - bumby 7y ago
    Please abide by the guidelines in your comments. > Be kind. Don't be snarky. Have curious conversation; don't cross-examine. Comments should get more thoughtful and substantive, not less, as a topic gets more divisive. When disagreeing, please reply to the argument instead of calling names. "That is idiotic; 1 + 1 is 2, not 3" can be shortened to "1 + 1 is 2, not 3." Please respond to the strongest plausible interpretation of what someone says, not a weaker one that's easier to criticize. Assume good faith.
  - gpm 7y ago
    Here are some official sources for you on there also being hardware problems > The review team also is continuing its investigation of the intermittent space-to-ground forward link issue that impeded the flight control team’s ability to command and control the spacecraft. The team has identified the technical root cause as radiofrequency interference with the communications system. While the team has recommended specific hardware improvements already in work by the company, the full assessment and resulting recommendations will continue through March. https://blogs.nasa.gov/commercialcrew/category/boeing/ https://blogs.nasa.gov/commercialcrew/category/boeing/ and > The NASA source said eight or more thrusters on the service module failed at one point and that one thruster never fired at all. > In response to a question about thruster performance, Boeing provided the following statement to Ars: "After the anomaly, many of the elements of the propulsion system were overstressed, with some thrusters exceeding the planned number of burns for a service module mission. We took a few cautionary measures to make sure the propulsion system stayed healthy for the remainder of the mission, including re-pressurizing the manifold, recovering that manifold’s thrusters. Over the course of the mission we turned off 13 thrusters and turned all but one back on after verifying their health." https://arstechnica.com/science/2020/01/nasa-and-boeing-are-closely-looking-at-starliners-thruster-performance/ https://arstechnica.com/science/2020/01/nasa-and-boeing-are-...