> So at the time this argument applies, you have provided them readable information and the doctrine would apply. Ah, yes, that tracks. Basically: The custome

> So at the time this argument applies, you have provided them readable information and the doctrine would apply. Ah, yes, that tracks. Basically: The customer doesn't have a strong 4A argument because for the customer to be impacted the provider is already looking at your data, so the third-party doctrine applies. The company probably doesn't have a strong 4A argument because they are making the choice (albiet a potentially coerced one) to eliminate end-to-end encryption. The company itself isn't suffering any undue search or seizure. Thanks for explaining! With that clarification I'm totally with you. I agree that the 4A argument that the coercion is sufficient to treat the service provider as an extension of the state is colorable, but much less strong than the 1A argument.