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As an alternative to ssh certs, we lookup keys in an LDAP Cluster. Each approach has pros/cons. SSH certificates are decentralized and resilient against failure
by exabrial 7y ago
As an alternative to ssh certs, we lookup keys in an LDAP Cluster. Each approach has pros/cons. SSH certificates are decentralized and resilient against failure, but revocation of a breached certificate isn't instantaneous. Keys-in-LDAP offers less resiliency, but offers instant key revocation. It's also simpler and offers a familiar experience to most devs.
The most important thing is to look at your attack surface realistically and plan accordingly. Just blinding putting in an SSH cert authority of an unsecured-non-redundant ldap cluster is worse than no key management at all.
- closeparen 7y ago1) Programmatically issue certificates with short lifetimes after authenticating against your IdP. This way if a user is deactivated in LDAP their access will expire on its own after a few hours. 2) Firewall off all but a few bastion hosts and ProxyCommand through those. Immediate revocation can be assured by updating the CRLs on those specific hosts.
- Spivak 7y agoBuy why go through the extra effort compared to just having your servers ask the IdP for the user's keys?
- cbhl 7y agoIf your IdP goes down, how will you SSH in to fix it?
- exabrial 7y agoCurrently we use the root "physical" console. Generally we avoid IDP outages by keeping our LDAP servers clustered and geographically diversified. Because LDAP is 99.999% of the time reads, not writes, this makes clustering pretty simple.
- webvictim 7y agoHaving been on the rough end of this during a huge LDAP outage, I can confirm that LDAP is great until such time as it isn't.
- sytringy05 7y ago+1 this is no fun.
- webvictim 7y agoThis is definitely the premise of what I was going for with the post. I'm a firm believer in the idea that short-lived certificates which expire by default are one of the best ways to provide access to infrastructure, and enforcing that access comes from a limited list of bastions gives you an easy choke point to withdraw access as desired when you need to.
- sytringy05 7y agoIsn't there a netflix ssh CA that does this?
- V-eHGsd_ 7y agoyes, it's called bless. https://github.com/Netflix/bless https://github.com/Netflix/bless there's also cashier https://github.com/nsheridan/cashier https://github.com/nsheridan/cashier
- jturpin 7y agoWe do both and it seems to work well - normal users do LDAP, and machine users generate certificates out of Vault that are extremely short lived, 10-30 minutes for CI jobs.
- jldugger 7y agoHow about asymmetric kerberos?
- vbezhenar 7y agoI think that you can use intermediate proxy server. So everyone logs into that proxy server and logs into other server using key from proxy server. Key is protected with passphrase and unlocked with ssh-agent by someone after reboot. If you need to revoke access, you can just revoke access in the proxy server.
- x3haloed 7y agoWhat is your opinion on using a secret management system? https://learn.hashicorp.com/vault/secrets-management/sm-ssh-otp https://learn.hashicorp.com/vault/secrets-management/sm-ssh-...
- inshadows 7y agoHow is the communication between servers lookup up keys and LDAP protected? Does it run over TLS?
- chupasaurus 7y agoI think any modern LDAP client has TLS support, same goes for servers.