7 ms·
Legitimate question: what is bad about this? I've read all the comments and still don't see a convincing explanation. Code signing just says you can trust that
by crazygringo 7y ago
Legitimate question: what is bad about this? I've read all the comments and still don't see a convincing explanation.
Code signing just says you can trust that the software you clicked on came from the actual developer.
It doesn't say anything at all about what the software does. Of course signed software can do whatever it wants. It's not like there's supposed to be some chain of trust that it's only allowed to run further signed code. It's free to run a Python script or shell command or whatever it wants. And installers certainly run scripts.
And as other comments here state, to do anything that requires root privileges, it pops up to ask for your admin password, so it's not getting around that.
I see references to this being a "malware pattern" but no explanation of why or what that means specifically. Zoom is commercial software (not malware) and I don't see how this is a vulnerability (something malware could take advantage of) so I'm not getting it.
Can someone explain what the problem is here? Or is there no problem?
- criddell 7y agoIf a script is signed, then there's a high probability that the script is going to do what it's supposed to do. If the binary runs an unsigned script, then that script could be modified to do something malicious. Signing isn't difficult or expensive so why not insist on it?
- INTPenis 7y agoBut isn't this an issue in the OS security system? Zoom is only using a loophole, just like any malware would. Same with the recent story on UNC links in Zoom chat. That's an issue in Windows. Why is windows sending your password out on the internet willy nilly? In this climate, 2020, Microsoft should know better.
- ghostpepper 7y agoOne could argue that legitimate software acting like malware is an issue in and of itself.
- UncleMeat 7y agoBut how could it be modified? What is the threat model? An evil network? TLS solves that. Evil code on the local machine? You are boned anyway and probably lose to TOCTOU problems when validating the signature on the script.
- buckminster 7y agoI agree that a dumb signature validation will have TOCTOU problems but the solution is better validation, not to abandon signatures.
- UncleMeat 7y agoI'll ask again. What is the threat model? To me, all this looks like people knowing that signing is somehow good and demanding it in a context where it isn't clear that it makes sense. And given that the top post in this thread is about skeevy domains, how the heck would signing scripts achieve anything? Even the reposted tweet says "don't think you could weaponize".
- lordlimecat 7y agoThe threat model is a malicious entity has limited access and can swap out the intended script for a malicious one, and have it run in a root context. This is equivalent to not having signatures on your repository packages and saying "no biggie, we rely on transport encryption". Might work in most cases, but there's a reason good security uses layers. A failure at any point-- TLS downgrade attack, repo compromise, proxy compromise, DNS poisoning-- can result in your preflight script executing malicious code. Requiring code signing with a pinned cert would solve this issue, but would be terribly out of character for the company that brought us a hidden local REST API to bypass OSX security prompts.
- droopyEyelids 7y agoredistribute the modified zoom installer from your own domain. Send meeting invites with a link to the modified zoom installer. You get the zoom signed package installing your unsigned code.
- thu2111 7y agoYou're right. Consider that any Mac app that: * Supports plugins that aren't signed by Apple * Executes scripts or macros from a file would technically have the same "problem". That's a heck of a lot of apps. On iOS Apple do insist on a full chain of security, which is why only Apple's own browser app can JIT code. It's an extremely perverse and serious limitation that has no real security justification: consider that Android manages just fine without it. As far as I can tell, Zoom is currently the target of a witchhunt. People are digging for dirt and blowing stuff well out of proportion.
- lukeschlather 7y agoThere are a lot of people blowing things out of proportion who don't know what they're talking about. However these things are newsworthy and probably worth Zoom fixing. (I think to a certain extent if I say something like "It's dumb that Zoom doesn't have real e2e encryption and they should fix it." That sounds harsh and I mean it. That said I'm still going to use Zoom unless something with equivalent UX and e2e encryption comes along. (Someday there will be a solid cross-platform native p2p video client with e2e encryption.)
- ptlu 7y agoFaceTime? It probably doesn't work at conference scale but it is E2E. > We designed iMessage and FaceTime to use end-to-end encryption, so there’s no way for Apple to decrypt the content of your conversations when they are in transit between devices. https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT209110 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT209110
- kryogen1c 7y agoi was about to write the same comment. id bet the percentage of HN readers running 100% signed code is damn close to 0. the zoom witchhunt is really something. zoom may or may not be a witch (im no China apologist, i yell at all my friends for using tiktok), but if we get the answer right it will be based on luck and emotion, not logic and reason.
- Angostura 7y agoI'd bet the number of Mac users running 100% signed code is well over 50%
- virgilp 7y agoI bet it's close to 0%, and I think I can prove it too. How much do you want to bet?
- cdolan 7y agoI’m genuinely curious how you could prove anything that is applicable to all Mac users (lets say OS 10.5.x through the current version). Is there an unsigned app/package included with all Mac OS X installs?
- virgilp 7y agoDid you even have signed apps (typically) installed in Leopard? Anyway, it depends on the standard of proof. But for the parent comment, it's fairly easy to get most reasonable people to agree that it's false. As a reminder, the claim is about: > the number of Mac users running 100% signed code You just have to ask yourself: - what percent of Mac users run Javascript code - what percent of Javascript code is signed.
- Twisell 7y agoObviously OP meant outside of sandboxed environment. There might be exploit out there that exit the sandbox, but they are unintended. But here zoom is intentionaly widening an exploit by being reckless. So thanks to zoom we might now expect even more drastic sandboxing in next MacOS release.