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It's true that you need an out-of-band verification to determine who the other party is in an end-to-end encrypted system. But it is not true that the absence o
by tialaramex 7y ago
It's true that you need an out-of-band verification to determine who the other party is in an end-to-end encrypted system. But it is not true that the absence of such a verification means you don't have end-to-end encryption.
It means only that you don't know for sure who the other party is. You are only put at risk if there is an active MITM attack in progress.
Depending on your threat model that's an enormous change.
- snarf21 7y agoAdditionally, just because you have o-o-b verification, that still doesn't mean that it is e2ee. Until you can view the source and build it yourself, who knows what back doors could exist. But this is the challenge, how do you balance security and convenience? People, by and large, aren't building source and side loading. They are going to have to take a leap and trust someone. It is a very hard problem to solve. Generally, no one cares until the one bad thing happens, then they care immensely. I've said that it is hard to get people to care about privacy when they live stream and share pictures of their life every 30 minutes already.
- upofadown 7y agoJust semantics at this point. A system that distributed the keys to all participants in the clear from a central server is still encrypted end to end in some sense. As pointed out by someone else in this comment section, the expression "end to end encryption" comes from the early day of PGP. PGP specifically protects against MITM with a fairly sophisticated web of trust system. So it is entirely legitimate to assume that e2e encryption includes MITM protection as a hard requirement.
- tialaramex 7y agoPGP's "Web of trust" doesn't actually scale and so it doesn't meaningfully improve upon just doing out-of-band verification with a handful of your closest peers and nothing for everybody else. Web of trust can give an illusion of scaling because it uses sleight of hand to persuade you to accept transitivity of trust. If you see someone who took this seriously you'll find that almost all contacts show as "unverified" (when I've had PGP setups in the past that's what happened). If they just click blindly along accepting trust transitivity then everything is "verified" but based on trust beliefs that have no basis in reality. The sleight of hand goes like this. You trust Alice. Alice says this is Bob and she trusts Bob. The correct inference is that this is indeed Bob (Alice says so and we trust her) but we still don't trust Bob. PGP tries hard to persuade you that you in fact now trust Bob. Bob says another contact is Carol, and he trusts Carol. The correct inference is null, we don't trust Bob so we don't care what Bob says. But PGP encourages us to accept that this is Carol and we should trust Carol too.
- upofadown 7y agoHow stupid the WOT may or may not be affects my point about what the phrase "e2e encryption" means not at all.