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Your view of the incentives argument is too narrow. In my experience, the people who actively try to game the system are rare. The majority of the problem is pe
by _hxy4 7y ago
Your view of the incentives argument is too narrow. In my experience, the people who actively try to game the system are rare. The majority of the problem is people and ideas being filtered out by the system. This comment by Daniel Lakeland on Andrew Gelman's blog says it better than I could: https://statmodeling.stat.columbia.edu/2018/05/17/think-research-research-criticism-research-criticism-criticism-research-criticism-criticism-criticism/#comment-737732 https://statmodeling.stat.columbia.edu/2018/05/17/think-rese...
> The way the incentives play out is that they create a survivorship bias. You can’t do science today without at least basically paying your own salary, either through grants (many biomed researchers have to pay a large component of their salary directly through their grants) or through making “having you in the university” make sense for the university so that it pays your salary. That again basically means either grants, or adding substantially to the university prestige and the ability to charge money for tuition and get high quality students etc.
> So, anyone with tenure in academia today has spent say 5 to 10 years minimum creating a “brand” that somehow enables them to pay their salaries, and/or funds for lab work etc. If the primary kind of “brand” that universities respond to is a “fake sciencey hypey overconfident, bullshit brand” then the primary content of academia today is people who survived that cutoff…
> It’s not so much that individuals see the incentives and change their own behaviors to fit it (though this happens to some extent) it’s more just that lots of people go into the filter, and the ones that come out are enriched for that particular behavior.
> Also note that this mechanism doesn’t require the individual scientists to be primarily money-driven. It’s sufficient for the MBAs running the dean/provost/president offices to be primarily money driven, which they definitively are.
I would recommend reading chapter 4 of the book "Disciplined Minds" by Jeff Schmidt (a physics PhD). While I disagree with a large fraction of the book (in particular, I don't think the problem is inherently political), I think chapter 4 is mostly right and shows how a researcher can feel self-motivated while actually being under strong external influences.
http://disciplinedminds.tripod.com/ http://disciplinedminds.tripod.com/
I can give examples from my own experience in academia if anyone is interested.
- djaque 7y agoYes, yes, I understand your point. What I'm trying to say is that the PIs in my department (the ones who made it through the filter, that is) don't seem to have the “fake sciencey hypey overconfident, bullshit brand” that you're talking about. I might just be really lucky to be in a clean department, but Machiavellian researchers accumulating in academia by filtering or otherwise just isn't my experience, sorry. I'm interested in hearing your experience though because it sounds like it's very different. I'm studying accelerator physics by the way, an extremely applied sub-field of physics. It may be that it's easier to weed out the people that don't pull their weight here.
- _hxy4 7y agoTo be clear, I'm not thinking specifically about hyped-up research that doesn't pan out. Low quality research in general is what I'm thinking about. And I see the vast majority of academics as well-intentioned and not manipulative. (And that includes my advisor, who, despite the disagreements we have as described below, has good intentions.) Academics are incentivized to publish papers in recognized journals and bring in external funding. I'll focus specifically on publishing here for simplicity. I could write about funding if desired. The source of many problems I have with the current system is that I want to do high quality research, but the current system doesn't make that easy. The most important research I've done so far has been to make a large data compilation and use this to test different models and hypotheses in my subfield. But my advisor never liked this, and mostly discouraged me from doing this research. He would have preferred instead that I stick to the more established path of skimming the literature for a problem some review article called open, doing a naive experiment about that, and then publishing the experiment. (Yes, I am being facetious, but unfortunately this characterization is accurate in my experience.) My experience is that review articles are far from comprehensive and frequently contain misinformation. It's important to actually assemble a large amount of data to see where the real gaps are, not just what a review article called a gap. This sort of data compilation is very rare in my experience. It really was clearly about getting publications as quickly as possible. My advisor repeatedly pointed out to me what others recently published in my field and exclusively what he pointed out to me I'd call naive. His point was "This is good enough to get a publication" and my point is "So what? Just because other people do a bad job doesn't mean that I should." To him, other people are getting publications when he's getting nothing! He didn't seem concerned that I thought most of these papers weren't making a contribution. That's not to say that he doesn't care at all about quality, but in practice he's more concerned about getting publications than quality. (He might not see the two as in conflict.) In the end, I think I am making several large contributions, even if the "gestation" time was longer than people would like. To get tenure, you need to publish often and regularly, but a lot of valuable research takes longer than people would like to get results. The data compilation took a long time. I started this data compilation in roughly Jan. 2017. I had a conference presentation on it in Nov. 2017. I published a conference paper based in part on it in May 2018, and it wasn't until December 2019 that I submitted two journal papers using the data. (I prefer to take my time to perfect an article rather than rush it.) This sort of delay isn't acceptable in the current system, regardless of the value of the work at the end. In terms of total publications, I think I'm actually coming out ahead of most PhD students in my department, but by now I'm seen as unproductive by my advisor so that doesn't matter. At this point, I'm waiting for one of my papers to be accepted because my advisor won't allow me to graduate until I have a paper accepted at a peer-reviewed journal. My original plan was to publish a few years after my PhD. I've been told multiple times by professors that the basic purpose of a PhD is to learn how to publish in peer reviewed journals, and they'll let you graduate once you've demonstrated that you can do that. And this does actually seem to be the crux in my case. Doesn't seem to matter that nowhere in my department's rules does it say that peer-reviewed publication is required. It would have been much easier to just pump out a naive paper every year. I would have been done my PhD years ago if that were the case, and science wouldn't have advanced much if at all. Also, don't mistake my advisor's position as "the incentives say to publish papers so that's what we should do". No, his position is something along the lines of "publishing papers is part of the point of a PhD". He's not thinking about incentives. He genuinely believes that publishing tons of papers is a good thing. The incentives selected him; he is not responding to the incentives as far as I can tell.