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It's not clear to me from this thread whether those messages only become public if one of the parties to the messages then download the chat, or even when a thi
by 333c 7y ago
It's not clear to me from this thread whether those messages only become public if one of the parties to the messages then download the chat, or even when a third party downloads the chat. One seems more serious than the other.
- StrictDabbler 7y agoThe consensus appears to be that if Alice is talking "privately" to Charlie about Bob's stupid hair, and Alice is the person designated to save the minutes of the meeting and post them, then she may accidentally include the transcript of her Bob-mockery.
- meritt 7y agoCorrect. When a given user downloads chat history, it downloads everything they can see: public chat and their own 1:1 conversations. Zoom has plenty of security and privacy issues, but this is not one of them [1]. [1] https://support.zoom.us/hc/en-us/articles/115004792763-Saving-In-Meeting-Chat https://support.zoom.us/hc/en-us/articles/115004792763-Savin...
- kbenson 7y agoI wouldn't say it's not one, just that it's a very minor one. Mixing of privacy contexts is a common problem on the social side of security. If it warrants an alert notifying you that you are saving both private messages and public ones if it notes both when saving locally (and I think that is definitely warranted), then not doing so is a (minor, most likely) security UI problem (if you accept that actual people and their common behaviors need to be accounted for as threat vectors).
- thaumasiotes 7y ago> then not doing so is a (minor, most likely) security UI problem (if you accept that actual people and their common behaviors need to be accounted for as threat vectors) Yes, you want to account for people's actual behavior. This isn't going to rise above the level of "minor" if viewed from a security perspective, because it's a self-only attack -- nobody gets any powers they didn't already have, and Alice is hurting herself, not someone else. (She might inadvertently hurt Carl, if Carl was sending her messages making fun of Bob, but she was allowed to do that anyway.) A usability or operational perspective might object to the behavior here more strongly.
- kbenson 7y agoYou're assuming it's only used for interpersonal things. If Manager A requests a password regarding some system they are discussing from Manager B in a private chat which other Employees in the channel should not have access to, but inadvertently exposes it after downloading and sharing the channel chat, that is definitely a security problem. Any private channel of communication that is easily combined with a public channel of communication without warning is a security problem. It's not about hurting people's feelings, it's about information leakage. And to cut off anyone that says passwords shouldn't be shared in a private chat, that's irrelevant. Good infosec security practices in one place do not preclude criticism of bad practices elsewhere. Security is about layers or protection, so any layer with problems should be noted. If that layer happens to be a third party application that mixes private and public channels in some instances and if there isn't warning as to this happening, it deserves to be called out. Another way to look at it is that any minor information leakage can have a major impact if the information leaked is very important.
- thaumasiotes 7y ago> And to cut off anyone that says passwords shouldn't be shared in a private chat, that's irrelevant. Good infosec security practices in one place do not preclude criticism of bad practices elsewhere. It's not irrelevant. There are phone apps with no other purpose than to publicize your location. If you should happen to be a fugitive, using such an app would be a bad move. Does that make the privacy leak in the app a security problem? No, how could it? If you don't want your location publicized, the answer isn't to remove the only feature from a location-sharing app so you can run NOPs in peace. It's to stop using the app. Your misuse of a feature that performs exactly as advertised can't justify calling that feature a security problem. The people responsible for the feature don't know how you're using it. The use pattern is the security problem, and it needs to be addressed by people who (1) know what it is, and/or (2) are responsible for it. Zoom fulfills neither criterion.
- kbenson 7y ago> It's not irrelevant. ... the answer isn't to remove the only feature from a location-sharing app so you can run NOPs in peace. It's to stop using the app. That's clearly not the case here. It's irrelevant in that in the context of this specific discussion, which this application, which is marketed towards enterprises as secure, an argument that a sharing of private information accidentally though bad UI is the problem of the user for putting private information in that private channel is irrelevant. > Your misuse of a feature that performs exactly as advertised can't justify calling that feature a security problem. That depends on how we classify "exactly as advertised". If the overall claims of the product as to being secure are easily and often circumvented on accident through poor UI, then that may be a security or privacy problem. If that place it's advertised is not something that most users will encounter during normal usage, then how it's advertised is of little consequence. One extreme end of this would be something hidden deep in the EULA or privacy policy that advertised how this works, and the other extreme end would be an alert every time you use it that explains this. I think one is obviously a problem (to the point that it looks purposeful), and the other obviously isn't, but the only difference between them is where the information is placed or how assured you can be that the user has encountered and hopefully understood it. I think this clearly indicates that the problem is not whether certain behavior is advertised, but how aware users are made of how the application functions.
- ilikehurdles 7y agoOh, that's it? Am I missing something here or are the anti-zoom news of late blowing a whole lot of things out of proportion. I was under the mistaken impression that this would include one-on-one chats between the _non-host_ members of the meeting.
- bachmeier 7y ago"she may accidentally include the transcript of her Bob-mockery" According to my reading, she will by default include everything she typed and any messages sent to her. That's a horrible default if true.
- thoraway1010 7y agoThe host can allow or not allow bob mockery on business calls. Many business just allow public chat. So the host has to allow private chat, then someone chatting with someone has to download their chat and publish it. A fair number of use cases benefit from being able to see private chats - webinar replays it's nice to see the questions folks are asking, but usually host in a large webinar doesn't want to chat spam everyone by allowing 300 people to post to everyone. So they can set it host only, download, then edit and include to whomever cares what questions are getting asked.
- bentcorner 7y agoI don't use Zoom but it looks like someone verified that this is only the host involved with the private chat: > IMPORTANT: I can only find evidence that Zoom by default creates a log of private messages WITH THE HOST. This happens regardless of whether the session is recorded. It isn't a good design decision from a privacy perspective. But it's not the same as recording all* messages.* https://twitter.com/rcalo/status/1244404664260411392 https://twitter.com/rcalo/status/1244404664260411392 It's not super clear what a "host" is in Zoom parlance. Is it the meeting creator, or do they mean the host as in the person you were chatting with?
- ilikehurdles 7y agoOne person in the meeting can be (re)assigned the host role, which allows them to end, record, and let people into the meeting. Kind of like a meeting admin.
- drdaeman 7y agoAFAIK, Zoom meetings have a concept of "host", which is typically the person who creates the meeting, but I believe the role can be passed around (host can select another participant and make them a host). Hosts are privileged to have control over the meeting, e.g. can toggle recording or shut it down (so everyone gets disconnected and sees "was ended by host" or something like that), etc.
- anticensor 7y agoThey are public in the beginning, they do not appear in live stream but they are available in the downloaded record.
- 333c 7y agoMy comment asks the question: "Does the person downloading the log change the outcome?"
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]