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Rickover has a case to answer for the Thresher: http://web.archive.org/web/20170514181829/http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/airchronicles/aureview/1983/jul-aug
by selimthegrim 7y ago
Rickover has a case to answer for the Thresher:
http://web.archive.org/web/20170514181829/http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/airchronicles/aureview/1983/jul-aug/schratz.html http://web.archive.org/web/20170514181829/http://www.au.af.m...
>Beneath the surface, however, was always the cold, unrelenting, ruthless workaholic, undermining the bureaucracy while creating his own. His was a management textbook for the inside operator, organized to the smallest detail, intolerant of error, devoting everything including his personal life to a cause, an obsession. Rickover established a constituency in Congress by superior salesmanship of his own product and skillful sowing of dissension and division in competing programs. Carefully slanting facts and covering up what he did not want disclosed, he skillfully manipulated his two bosses to become what the authors call "The Unaccountable Man." He destroyed any competing nuclear program within his own organization and any person likely to emerge as a competitor or successor. In time, he became increasingly conservative if not reactionary, putting space between himself and any responsibility for failure or accident. When the USS Thresher was lost in April 1963, he immediately phoned the Bureau of Ships to dissociate himself from any likelihood of failure of the nuclear plant in the incident. The bureau chief thought this action "thoroughly dishonest."
- selimthegrim 7y agoOn the subject of this thread: >The cult of personality produced other adverse side effects. Having achieved brilliant success with the pressurized water coolant system in the Nautilus installation, innovation in other types of plants was stifled. The USS Seawolf plant, developed in tandem with Nautilus, utilized liquid sodium as coolant, promising much smaller and more compact reactors. Because of limitations in metallurgy, the system was unsuccessful. The program was scrapped, and its obvious superiorities were never again reexamined, even after twenty years of further progress in nuclear technology. Rickover put the kiss of death on programs generated within the Office of Naval Research and elsewhere for smaller, lightweight reactors that could reduce the enormous size and cost of nuclear-powered ships. None saw the light of day; all were thwarted as interference in his work. When nuclear power was adapted to surface use for large combatants such as aircraft carriers and missile cruisers, new systems apparently were not examined. For instance, a smaller and more efficient combination of nuclear power for normal cruising plus an overdrive of conventional gas turbine plants for high speed use had been proposed but was not investigated further.
- brians 7y agoWe built one. It didn’t work then. He said it wouldn’t, and indeed it didn’t. He’s been dead for decades, and we haven’t built a working one now—but somehow it’s his fault!
- pdonis 7y ago> Rickover has a case to answer for the Thresher Why? The loss of the Thresher had nothing to do with any problem with its nuclear plant. It was a "subsafe" problem--inadequate QA on a pressure weld. The Navy responded with much stricter QA standards on pressure welds.
- selimthegrim 7y agoHe made that phone call before he knew that, immediately upon hearing of the incident.
- pdonis 7y agoIt doesn't appear to me that that affected the actual investigation or its conclusions, which, as I said, were that it was not a reactor issue but a subsafe issue. It's certainly relevant for the broader issue of how Rickover operated, but I don't see that it gives him anything to "answer" for the loss of the Thresher in particular.
- CamperBob2 7y agoCan you blame him? Because rest assured, a lot of people would have tried to.