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> Your case of the treaties of Westphalia is an excellent example of why trying to draw a sharp line between transformational and other changes is unhelpful, as

> Your case of the treaties of Westphalia is an excellent example of why trying to draw a sharp line between transformational and other changes is unhelpful, as the treaties were at most a ratification of a series of connected changes that had been building over long periods. That's the point of a paradigm shift. It isn't a singular event. Momentum builds, a little here and a little there and then we have a systematic change. There is a world before westphalia and there is a systematically different world after. Lots of little changes and momentum before and during westphalia treaties. > The pre-war powers that you list (USA, Britain and Russia) were either incapable of or unwilling to exercise their alleged dominance over the Axis powers; What? Russia controlled germany via resources. Also, britain forced germany to pay a lot of reparations. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Versailles https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Versailles France took over german territory https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupation_of_the_Ruhr https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupation_of_the_Ruhr The US controlled Japan via resources. Not only that when Japan beat Russia, we forced Japan to return territory to Russia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Portsmouth https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Portsmouth We told japan how many warships they could build. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington_Naval_Treaty https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington_Naval_Treaty The idea that the pre-ww2 powers didn't enforce their dominance is factually incorrect. > Russia was, for the first time, globally influential Once again, you are fixated on a single nation. The international world order still remained the same. Whether a nation grows influence within it doesn't matter. Japan rose to become the #2 economy in the world and became "influential". So what? The world order remained. China is or will be the #1 economy in the world. The international world order still remains. China seems to be starting to create institutions to maybe one day challenge the international world order and if they do and they are successful, then a paradigm shift will have occurred. If they choose to get wealthy within the western world order like japan, taiwan, korea, etc, then no matter how rich china gets, no transformational change happens. It's significant change for china, but not for the world order. I don't know how better to explain it so I'll leave it at that. > By the way, some of your posts in this thread have been downvoted, and I just want to make it clear that it is not me. I don't care about downvotes. Especially on a forum. But thanks anyways.

mannykannot 7y ago
> That's the point of a paradigm shift... There are a couple of points that can be made about this paragraph alone. Firstly, let me remind you that it was you who presented the treaties of Westphalia as a paradigmatical paradigm shift, yet now you are backtracking, but not so far as to reach the logical conclusion, which is that this allegedly paradigmatical event was not causal at all; rather, it was caused by the changes that had already occurred. Ironically, you are beginning to acknowledge that it is usually an over-simplification to look for paradigm changes in single events in isolation. This would be a reasonable counter to the thesis of the original article, but it is not the argument you are making here. To consider some other specific claims: > What? Russia controlled germany via resources. That is an unconventional use of the word 'controlled', given what happened in June of 1941. > Also, britain forced germany to pay a lot of reparations. ... to the point where, in 1938, Chamberlain could claim he had secured "Peace in our time". > France took over german territory. And yet did not respond to the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, an event that Hitler himself regarded as a great gamble, but it really was not, given the state of France. > The US controlled Japan via resources. To such effect that Japan expelled the US from the Philipines and was bombing Darwin, Australia, by 1942 - not to mention Pearl Harbor. > Not only that when Japan beat Russia, [the US] forced Japan to return territory to Russia. Of what relevance to WW2 is that? There were some significant events between 1905 and 1941. The non-response to the fate of the USS Panay and the destruction of Nanking is more emblematic of the situation pre- WW2. > [The western powers] told Japan how many warships they could build. Which they ignored, as did the rest of the Axis. > The idea that the pre-ww2 powers didn't enforce their dominance is factually incorrect. See the above. >Once again, you are fixated on a single nation. Of course, if you quote me out of context, you can make it look like I am fixated on one thing, but if you consider it in its proper context it is just one of a number of changes that amount to a truly global transformation -- and, furthermore, to a global situation in which the USSR was not just one more of many nations. >So what? The specifcs of the immediate post-WW2 situation were unimagined in 1939. The world of 1950 was even less so. The rest of that paragraph essentially just asserts that nothing that followed from WW2 could meet your idiosyncratic standards for being a paradigm change, which brings us back to one of the first points I made in this thread. Having said all that, I think there is an overlap in our positions, in that I don't think we can take any single event, even one as large as WW2, independently of the events that led up to them. I agree that the (re)development of the nation-state was a paradigmatical historical change, but I do not attribute it to a single event. I suspect that significant changes occurred in the first half of the 20th century, and those of and around WW2 were as significant as many of your paradigm changes (I notice that you are silent on the issue of the emergence of the nuclear standoff), but only time will tell for sure.

mannykannot 7y ago

> That's the point of a paradigm shift... There are a couple of points that can be made about this paragraph alone. Firstly, let me remind you that it was you who presented the treaties of Westphalia as a paradigmatical paradigm shift, yet now you are backtracking, but not so far as to reach the logical conclusion, which is that this allegedly paradigmatical event was not causal at all; rather, it was caused by the changes that had already occurred. Ironically, you are beginning to acknowledge that it is usually an over-simplification to look for paradigm changes in single events in isolation. This would be a reasonable counter to the thesis of the original article, but it is not the argument you are making here. To consider some other specific claims: > What? Russia controlled germany via resources. That is an unconventional use of the word 'controlled', given what happened in June of 1941. > Also, britain forced germany to pay a lot of reparations. ... to the point where, in 1938, Chamberlain could claim he had secured "Peace in our time". > France took over german territory. And yet did not respond to the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, an event that Hitler himself regarded as a great gamble, but it really was not, given the state of France. > The US controlled Japan via resources. To such effect that Japan expelled the US from the Philipines and was bombing Darwin, Australia, by 1942 - not to mention Pearl Harbor. > Not only that when Japan beat Russia, [the US] forced Japan to return territory to Russia. Of what relevance to WW2 is that? There were some significant events between 1905 and 1941. The non-response to the fate of the USS Panay and the destruction of Nanking is more emblematic of the situation pre- WW2. > [The western powers] told Japan how many warships they could build. Which they ignored, as did the rest of the Axis. > The idea that the pre-ww2 powers didn't enforce their dominance is factually incorrect. See the above. >Once again, you are fixated on a single nation. Of course, if you quote me out of context, you can make it look like I am fixated on one thing, but if you consider it in its proper context it is just one of a number of changes that amount to a truly global transformation -- and, furthermore, to a global situation in which the USSR was not just one more of many nations. >So what? The specifcs of the immediate post-WW2 situation were unimagined in 1939. The world of 1950 was even less so. The rest of that paragraph essentially just asserts that nothing that followed from WW2 could meet your idiosyncratic standards for being a paradigm change, which brings us back to one of the first points I made in this thread. Having said all that, I think there is an overlap in our positions, in that I don't think we can take any single event, even one as large as WW2, independently of the events that led up to them. I agree that the (re)development of the nation-state was a paradigmatical historical change, but I do not attribute it to a single event. I suspect that significant changes occurred in the first half of the 20th century, and those of and around WW2 were as significant as many of your paradigm changes (I notice that you are silent on the issue of the emergence of the nuclear standoff), but only time will tell for sure.