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In summary: make Linux roughly as annoying as Catalina. e.g. constantly having to allow applications access to files outside the initial default sandbox. e.g.
by PaulDavisThe1st 7y ago
In summary: make Linux roughly as annoying as Catalina.
e.g. constantly having to allow applications access to files outside the initial default sandbox.
e.g. constantly having to grant permissions applications that need "unusual" system capabilities (e.g. raw I/O)
It also seems clear that this concept ultimately heads towards signing application binaries, like macOS.
Maybe this is a win for some set of Linux users (maybe even most); it's far from clear that it's appropriate for all.
- Wowfunhappy 7y ago> Maybe this is a win for some set of Linux users (maybe even most); it's far from clear that it's appropriate for all. ...and that's okay. What really bothers me about these security conversations is the attitude that hardening has to be enforced on all users. That's ridiculous—everyone has their own threat models. The problem with the prompts in Catalina isn't that they exist or even that they're the default setting, but that they're mandatory for everyone.
- saagarjha 7y agoI mean, there are ways to get rid of them…
- Wowfunhappy 7y agoHow? Please share, because I would very much like to turn them off!
- saagarjha 7y agoI think disabling SIP does it? I'm not completely sure. Either that or GateKeeper.
- Wowfunhappy 7y agoThat's the thing, it doesn't. I had both SIP and Gatekeeper turned off. Presumably, without SIP you could in theory either edit the tcc database directly or patch the checks in memory, but implementing that kind of hack is beyond my skill level. And a hack shouldn't be required—there should be at minimum a command line switch for SIP-disabled machines.
- saagarjha 7y agoI'm not sure, then; I know I don't see them…
- zrm 7y ago> e.g. constantly having to allow applications access to files outside the initial default sandbox. Any system that has ordinary users trying to do this for ordinary software will fail. Things like apparmor can work well because the author or distributor of a package knows that it shouldn't ever do a particular thing, so if it attempts to, that is a bug and it should be refused. The user shouldn't even have to be aware that this is the case because the program shouldn't even attempt to do the thing the author/distributor asserted it will never do. > It also seems clear that this concept ultimately heads towards signing application binaries, like macOS. Linux has had that for years already. Packages are signed by the distributor. Nobody complains about it there because the device owner can authorize additional parties to sign packages for their machine, as it should be. Have a look at the install instructions for Signal Desktop for Debian on signal.org -- "sudo apt-key add" etc. You can also install binaries outside the package manager, and then the filesystem executable bit serves a similar purpose -- disabled by default but the user can override it.
- PaulDavisThe1st 7y agoI'm the original/lead author of a large cross-platform application that runs on Linux, macOS and Windows. Trust me when I say that there is no such thing as application signing on Linux. We don't care what Linux distributions do - we would prefer if they didn't package our application, because 99% of them are incapable of doing it right. We can't stop them, because GPL. The situation on Catalina is completely different, and cannot be compared with the executable bit.
- zrm 7y agoPackages have signatures on Linux. They're validated during install rather than execution, but validating them on execution wouldn't cause meaningful problems as long as the device owner can install additional signing keys. Not being able to do so is what causes your consternation with Catalina. Whether the applications are well-packaged is a different matter, and that's the place where apparmor does get into trouble as well. In theory the packager describes things the application should never do, but if they're sloppy then it actually requires some privileges they didn't grant it, and then you have users mashing every available button to turn off all the security because their application isn't working. This is the constant battle in security. You have false positives and false negatives. You can't err on the side of false positives or people will stop using your system because it constantly gets in their way. You can do a lot of hard work to reduce both false positives and false negatives, but that's a lot of hard work. Or you can err on the side of false negatives, which is nice and easy and doesn't interfere with people using the system, except that it's insecure and then systems eventually get compromised. This turns out to be the one that people tend to prefer in practice. Oops.
- 29athrowaway 7y agoWith SELinux or AppArmor you can achieve that. But you have to specify such permissions. And btw, SELinux is maintained by NSA, it is secure.
- saagarjha 7y ago> SELinux is maintained by NSA, it is secure. I’m not sure I see a correlation.
- michaelmrose 7y agoThey employ smart people who know how to write secure software as well as break others insecure software. They just prefer that you keep running insecure software unless you are uncle Sam.
- 29athrowaway 7y agoI would say they would like you to run "secure enough" software, that can only be broken by possessing strategic knowledge and computing assets. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NOBUS https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NOBUS https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ulg_AHBOIQU https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ulg_AHBOIQU
- twsted 7y agoCatalina is not annoying by my standards, at all.
- danieldk 7y agoAgreed, I don't really see the problem. It's not like Catalina is bugging you over and over again with permissions. The first time you start e.g. Skype, it will request access to the mic and camera, you either allow it or deny it, and that's pretty much it. Both alternatives, 1.do not give applications any access at all; 2. give applications access to everything, suck much more. (1) makes a system unusable, (2) makes a system insecure. I'd rather know if an application wants to start using the mic or webcam.