> Now, “falsification” itself is a silly/naive cartoon-ish framework for how to do science. It has its uses, but we mustn’t cling to it too much (which would be

> Now, “falsification” itself is a silly/naive cartoon-ish framework for how to do science. It has its uses, but we mustn’t cling to it too much (which would be cargo culting). We certainly have many other useful approaches as well. It seems to me scientific realism only worked as long as we kept falsifying things. The main example people point to is the moon landings, which was pretty long ago now. What other useful approaches do we have? I've studied philosophy of science--once the philosophers told scientists that falsification was cartoonish, it seems like they've moved onto more social means of demarcating science, but ultimately a scientific statement has an epistemal value on some spectrum. I'd say it's much more valuable when we are able to falsify--how else can we determine how true something is? The main progress in science has all come from engineering recently--we have fast computers so we can just throw the problem at the computer. That is ending now, or at least it will end at some point. Ultimately without a better scientific theory we can't give computers harder problems. I was taught logical positivism had failed, however I don't believe it really has failed. What successes has this new modern method of science really had? I don't see quantum mechanics really progressing that much beyond filling in the paradigm. Finding a new paradigm is where science really shines, and I think that tends to happen with methods of Popper and Ockham. Finding simpler, more predictive theories has a much larger effect on society versus finding theories which are extremely complex to only explain 0.0001% of the phenomena. If you think our current theories are necessarily complex, then you're a Platonist, eeek!