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I don't understand the point this piece is trying to make. > Could a part-time programmer like my father write small-business software today? Could he make it
by thaumasiotes 7y ago
I don't understand the point this piece is trying to make.
> Could a part-time programmer like my father write small-business software today? Could he make it as safe and productive as our LAN was? Maybe. If he was canny, and stuck to old-fashioned desktops of the 90s and physically isolated the machines from the internet. But there is no chance you could get the records onto a modern phone safely (or even legally under HIPPA) with the hours my father gave the project.
Sure.
> We can have the LAN-like experience of the 90’s back again, and we can add the best parts of the 21st century internet. A safe small space of people we trust, where we can program away from the prying eyes of the multi-billion-person internet. Where the outright villainous will be kept at bay by good identity services and good crypto.
> The broader concept of virtualizing networks has existed forever: the Virtual Private Network. New protocols make VPNs better than before, Wireguard is pioneering easy and efficient tunneling between peers. Marry the VPN to identity, and make it work anywhere, and you can have a virtual 90s-style LAN made up of all your 21st century devices. Let the internet be the dumb pipe, let your endpoints determine who they will talk to based on the person at the other end.
OK, but we have VPNs now. The problem with keeping your medical records on a modern computer isn't that your modern computer isn't connected to your other computers. The problem is that it is! It's connected to your other computers just like it's connected to everybody else's computers. Your simulated LAN is not safe in the way the old LAN was until -- as the article already noted -- you disconnect it from the internet so it's an actual LAN.
So Tailscale has diagnosed the problem and recognized the solution. And they propose... to do something different. It's not clear what. How does their proposed solution address what they say is the problem?
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Side note:
> (or even legally under HIPPA)
The relevant regulation is actually named HIPAA. I've always pronounced this as "hee-pah", which would make sense given the spelling. But that is not normal usage. People in medical fields universally seem to pronounce it as if were spelled "hippa". It's interesting to see that circle back the other way.
There's something strange about the flow "I don't know how to pronounce this. I'll pronounce it as if it were a different word." -> "This spelling is inappropriate. I'll spell it like it's pronounced." You end up with a spelling and a pronunciation that are both completely unrelated to the word you're notionally using. Eventually people will start to ask "how does HIPPA stand for Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act?".
It's like when people ask "what does wifi stand for?" and I have to tell them "high fidelity".
- mixmastamyk 7y agoWe used the internet here in California in the 90s from our LAN, at some point a firewall was installed to keep out the growing mischief. I’m also unclear on the problem definition and solution. With the exception that web apps are too hard to build. Wonder how the anvil product (a potential solution) is doing?
- tprynn 7y agoI enjoyed the post and like the idea of Tailscale[^1], but agreed. As long as there's some path to the Internet, you can't trust your LAN. I mean, that's kind of the whole point of modern network security: even on a trusted network, you can't trust the endpoints. Consider a modernized example of the business app in the story: let's say this is an internal-facing webapp with no security features implemented. With tailscale you can implement network security controls that only allow access from specific endpoints (tied to user or service identities), but the point is that you don't trust those endpoints. Of course they could be phished/compromised, but they could also easily use a boundary-crossing attack like CSRF/SSRF to attack your insecure app. So no matter what, you need to implement standard web app security features. [^1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22644357 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22644357
- apenwarr 7y ago(I'm from Tailscale) You've nailed the problem statement, but we are trying to find a better solution. The current "zero trust networking" trend is actually not about distrusting the endpoints; it's about distrusting the network, and securing the endpoints. Tailscale lets you distrust the network and allow only trusted endpoints, which is a step. You're right that more steps are needed before we can also prevent CSRF/SSRF attacks on internal-private services, but that ought to be done at a higher level, not in every single app. The latter is just too error prone, as we see over and over.
- tprynn 7y agoCurious what the higher-level solution to CSRF/SSRF is? I’m struggling to think how it could be prevented except at the browser level (for CSRF). And for SSRF if there’s a legitimate need for a network path between two services but one has an SSRF issue, how can you stop that?