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To a large extent it was realised that the cold war preparedness was collective madness: In retrospect we know that the Soviet leadership in many respect were p
by vidarh 7y ago
To a large extent it was realised that the cold war preparedness was collective madness: In retrospect we know that the Soviet leadership in many respect were posturing because they were terrified of a Western first strike. Reagan wrote about his realisation after Able Archer 83 that the Soviets genuinely seemed to think NATO was a threat, rather than see it as a defense; both sides saw it as inconceivable that their side would start a war.
The point being that even at the height of the cold war, the threat was massively overblown, largely because of lack of understanding of how the other side was thinking.
The threat of Russia today is much smaller - for all of Russia's threats to some countries, it is contained to a threat against countries with Russian minorities, and there's no realistic scenario where Russia is suicidal enough to attack an EU country.
And this kind of preparedness was a massive economic drain. Now one can certainly argue that some of the civil defense in terms of field hospitals etc. ought to have been kept up, for a tiny fraction of the cost, and that would be a separate issue.
I grew up in Norway during the cold war, with similar levels of preparedness; air raid siren tests on a regular basis, bomb shelter at our school etc.. The assumption that there was a real threat of invasion was there until Gorbachev, basically, and then it evaporated as the increasing openness and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union showed that the threat assessments throughout the cold war had been completely wrong, and vast amounts of resources that could have gone to e.g. better healthcare had basically been thrown away.
EDIT: This is from Reagans memoirs (taken from [1]), regarding his realisation of the Soviet view of the US:
"Three years had taught me something surprising about the Russians: Many people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and Americans. Perhaps this shouldn't have surprised me, but it did...During my first years in Washington, I think many of us in the administration took it for granted that the Russians, like ourselves, considered it unthinkable that the United States would launch a first strike against them. But the more experience I had with Soviet leaders and other heads of state who knew them, the more I began to realize that many Soviet officials feared us not only as adversaries but as potential aggressors who might hurl nuclear weapons at them in a first strike...Well, if that was the case, I was even more anxious to get a top Soviet leader in a room alone and try to convince him we had no designs on the Soviet Union and Russians had nothing to fear from us."
Likewise the West kept posturing on the basis of a belief that the Soviet Union might well decide to attack. The regular air raid siren tests in Norway were not for fun. The regular NATO exercises were not for fun. There was a genuine fear. Only, as it turns out both sides were certain the only party that would be evil enough to strike first was the other side.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Able_Archer_83#American_reaction https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Able_Archer_83#American_reacti...
- jacobush 7y agoIt was madness, yet for Sweden and Norway to prepare that way was a local optimum and a rational choice. (Not the only choice, but not a crazy choice.) Nobody wanted to start a great war, but at least during a couple of incidents things came to close to start by accident. And once started, war takes on a life of its own.
- vidarh 7y agoIt was a rational choice based on a totally flawed understanding of the other side, is the point. When you believe the other side is out to destroy you, then yes, that is how you respond. But that belief was driven on both sides by an underlying belief on both sides that they were the good guys and the other side were cartoonish villains. Neither side questioned the belief that the other side were war mongerers with a crazy willingness to sacrifice to expand, and both sides saw proxy wars as evidence of that while they saw their own involvement as protecting themselves by building alliances and creating buffers. We see this up to and including Reagan describing the Soviet Union as an "evil empire", only to then get reality thrown in the face by the Soviet response to Able Archer 83 in particular (and I generally have little respect for Reagan, but he does deserve credit for actually coming to that understanding and acting on it in what was one of the biggest foreign policy about faces in modern history). It was understandable, though, in that both sides had seen the nazis, and both sides saw the nazis as a model for the other side - the Soviets seeing the nazis as not fundamentally different from capitalist imperialists, and the West seeing the Soviets as not fundamentally different from nazi authoritarianism. But it was nevertheless in retrospect terrifyingly flawed. It stands as one of the biggest foreign policy fuck-ups in human history that the world for half a century was shaped by the two biggest blocks fundamentally misjudging the intentions and motivations of the other side, despite the vast amount of "intelligence" both sides believed they had about each other. It makes me terrified to think about, because of the implications it has for what stupid mistakes we're probably still perpetuating when we try to infer the motivations of the major powers.
- jacobush 7y agoI agree, but also want to add more of the outsider perspective. Norway was part of NATO. Sweden was not. Even if Sweden would have had insight into that both NATO and Soviet had mistaken beliefs about each other, it would still had made sense for Sweden to prepare for total war. If these two sides fought, Sweden better have been prepared. And there is some indication that Sweden actually had a slightly more nuanced perspective. Olof Palme wanted a nuclear free zone in the Baltic Sea. This was seen in NATO as a conceit to the Soviets, and maybe the other way around in Soviet command.