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I see you've never personally experienced the US military... Kidding aside, while many service members do uphold their oath honorably, there's plenty of non-co
by bumby 7y ago
I see you've never personally experienced the US military...
Kidding aside, while many service members do uphold their oath honorably, there's plenty of non-compliance and outright malfeasance without accountability.
And to the grandparent, the military does run reactors outside of ships (but typically for research as far as I know)
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- pdonis 7y ago> I see you've never personally experienced the US military I see you haven't bothered to actually look at the record. The U.S. Navy has decades of operating many nuclear reactors on ships and submarines with no incidents. > there's plenty of non-compliance and outright malfeasance without accountability Not in the U.S. Navy's nuclear program. Even what would be considered minor infractions in other parts of the military are grounds for immediate dismissal. I saw that happen once while I was in the Navy and stationed at a shipyard. A minor administrative irregularity got the reactor officer of a ship fired; he was off the ship the same day and never came back.
- bumby 7y agoI don't know if you took that personally, but it was an obvious tongue-in-cheek comment. If you look at one of my earlier replies, I acknowledged the relatively good (but not pristine) record of Navy warships but also linked to a list of a surprising number of military mishaps (both facility and weapons related). To be fair, the list dwindled as the timeline became more recent.
- Ididntdothis 7y agoThe Navy has the advantage that they don’t have the same cost pressure a civilian reactor has. I am pretty sure their MW/$ cost is much higher than would be acceptable for a nuclear power plant.
- toomuchtodo 7y agoWhich is why commercial reactors cannot exist. The MW/$ delta between a military and commercial reactor is the risk premium for safe operation.
- pdonis 7y ago> The MW/$ delta between a military and commercial reactor is the risk premium for safe operation. No, it isn't, since we also have many, many civilian reactors that have operated for decades safely. What's more, even if we take into account all of the harm done by all the nuclear accidents that have ever happened, including Chernobyl and Fukushima, the harm done by nuclear energy per unit of energy generated is still orders of magnitude less than the harm done by fossil fuel energy per unit of energy generated. And that is only actual harm that has already occurred--it doesn't take into account potential future harms (such as climate change--I personally don't think that's a very significant component of the harm done by fossil fuels, but I'm not arguing that point here, because what I've said is true even if any such potential harm is ignored--any potential future harm to the climate from fossil fuels just makes them look even worse than they already do). The price premium paid by the military for nuclear power is for operational flexibility, not safe operation. The Navy's capital ships need to be able to steam anywhere in the world without having to worry about fuel. The Navy's submarines need to be able to operate submerged and undetectable for months at a time. Nuclear power is a necessary enabler for those operational capabilities, so the Navy simply can't tolerate any deviation from proper procedures since it would jeopardize those capabilities. The fact that this approach also leads to much increased reactor safety is a benefit, to be sure (and in the early days of Navy nuclear power, when much less was known about reactor safety than is known now, this benefit was indeed a key selling point for allowing the Navy to operate nuclear ships and subs), but it's not the primary purpose. If the greatly increased operational capability had not been there, the Navy wouldn't have bothered with nuclear power in the first place.
- catalogia 7y agoI suspect size requirements have relatively much more influence over the design and construction of naval reactors.
- selimthegrim 7y agoWhat was the Thresher, SeaLab 1963? Rickover couldn’t throw everyone else under the bus fast enough after.
- pdonis 7y ago> What was the Thresher, SeaLab 1963? Those were what the Navy calls subsafe incidents, not nuclear incidents. There was no problem with the reactor. The problem was what one of my Navy instructors called "water in the people tank"--a flaw in the welds that seal the interior of the ship or structure against water pressure from the outside. The Navy took major steps to improve the QA on those welds as a result of these incidents; when I was in the Navy we did three different types of nondestructive tests and a single flaw, no matter how minor, meant you had to redo the entire weld.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- selimthegrim 7y agoBut wasn’t scramming the reactor too quickly a crucial part of the incident? The procedures were inadequate
- pdonis 7y ago> wasn’t scramming the reactor too quickly a crucial part of the incident? Scramming and then having no procedure for a rapid restart, yes. But that's not a reactor safety incident.
- bumby 7y agoThe original comment was about the "US military" and not just the Navy. I'm assuming you're speaking from personal experience and that's why you mention the Navy specifically. The Navy does a great job, especially as it pertains to complex industrial systems. However, each branch and each unit has a unique culture and from my personal experience, the closer one gets to combat arms, the less bureaucratic and more "flexible" people tend to get with procedure. Maybe your criteria is different for what constitutes a mishap, but the Navy has had what I think from a safety engineering standpoint would count as mishaps or at the very least close-calls. From just one decade: December 12, 1971 – New London, Connecticut, US – Spill of irradiated water During the transfer of radioactive coolant water from the submarine USS Dace to the submarine tender USS Fulton 500 US gallons (1,900 l; 420 imp gal) were spilled into the Thames River (USA). 1975 – location unknown – Contamination Radioactive resin contaminates the American Sturgeon-class submarine USS Guardfish after wind unexpectedly blows the powder back towards the ship. The resin is used to remove dissolved radioactive minerals and particles from the primary coolant loops of submarines. October 1975 – Apra Harbor, Guam – Spill of irradiated water While disabled, the submarine tender USS Proteus discharged radioactive coolant water. A Geiger counter at two of the harbor's public beaches showed 100 millirems/hour, fifty times the allowable dose. May 22, 1978 – near Puget Sound, Washington, United States – Spill of irradiated water A valve was mistakenly opened aboard the submarine USS Puffer releasing up to 500 US gallons (1,900 l; 420 imp gal) of radioactive water Maybe you were only considering nuclear reactor incidents? I can understand that perspective even if it probably doesn't meet safety engineering principles. The numbers are greater if we use the OP's scope of "US military" and greater still if we count National Laboratories doing military funded work. I don't say this to disparage the military's competence, I actually think they are very good at managing complex systems. My main point is that I'm not convinced it's necessarily a byproduct of organizational structure of "chain of command" as the OP said.
- pdonis 7y ago> The original comment was about the "US military" and not just the Navy. Yes, but it was about the military in the context of handling nuclear reactors and nuclear materials, and the US Navy is the only service that does that. (The Army did during WWII because it ran the Manhattan Project, but that was a one-time event and not representative of long-term practice.) So the Navy is the only relevant service. > I'm assuming you're speaking from personal experience Yes, as I've mentioned several times in various posts in this discussion (not all in response to you). > Maybe your criteria is different for what constitutes a mishap I was speaking specifically about reactor incidents, which is what Fukushima was. If you include releases of radioactive material that do not involve any issue with a reactor, yes, there have been incidents, some of which you note. A similar statement to the one I made about reactor incidents also holds for those: the total harm done by all such incidents involving radioactive materials is orders of magnitude less than the total harm done by releases of materials connected with fossil fuels (oil spills, coal ash, chemical spills, etc.; coal ash, btw, is more highly radioactive than many types of radioactive waste from nuclear reactors). > I'm not convinced it's necessarily a byproduct of organizational structure of "chain of command" I think the primary factor is simple unwillingness to tolerate any deviation from proper procedures. The existence of a military chain of command might not be essential for that, but it certainly makes it a lot easier. It would be very difficult for a civilian organization to justify summarily firing a high-level official over a single administrative error, as I saw done with a Navy officer (I mentioned this in another post elsewhere in this discussion).