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The pasteboard API is essentially the same in iOS as it is in macOS. Which means it's an api that was likely designed more than 20 years ago. Because of that, i

The pasteboard API is essentially the same in iOS as it is in macOS. Which means it's an api that was likely designed more than 20 years ago. Because of that, it was not designed for the user-hostile app world we live in, where developers will harness any api that can leak data about the user. A solution to this is to re-design this api so that it allows developers to query for specific matches, but requires user-action to unlock them I.e. I can passively ask "does the clipboard contain a photo?" or "does the clipboard contain a url in the *.facebook.com domain?" but in order to get the contents I have to prompt the user to manually paste. Probably this would require putting these queries in the info plist, so that they can be validated by app review and you don't get developers brute-forcing the contents with large numbers of generated queries. This is very similar to how apple solved apps detecting what other apps you have installed using `-[UIApplication canOpenURL:]`. Apple added rate limiting and an info-plist based whitelist, which essentially put a stop to this practice.

jcampbell1 7y ago
A stop gap solution is to add an api for “secure copy” that 1Password and the like can implement which makes it unreadable without a user initiated paste. This would take far less time to implement from Apple’s side.
- keanebean86 7y ago
  It's weird that apps can straight read from the clipboard at all. I would think the OS just hands the app a pointer to the data and maybe some meta data for type.
  - dwaite 7y ago
    It gives you a list of alternative content types and an API to get content - but pasting is an app-controlled activity, not an OS one.
saagarjha 7y ago
> A solution to this is to re-design this api so that it allows developers to query for specific matches, but requires user-action to unlock them I.e. I can passively ask "does the clipboard contain a photo?" or "does the clipboard contain a url in the *.facebook.com domain?" but in order to get the contents I have to prompt the user to manually paste. I fully expect apps to try to leak information bit-by-bit to the greatest possible extent.
- kennywinker 7y ago
  Addressed by the next bit in my post: force developers to list their queries in the info plist. Only allow those queries. Validate that the query list is not malicious during app review.

jcampbell1 7y ago

A stop gap solution is to add an api for “secure copy” that 1Password and the like can implement which makes it unreadable without a user initiated paste. This would take far less time to implement from Apple’s side.

keanebean86 7y ago
It's weird that apps can straight read from the clipboard at all. I would think the OS just hands the app a pointer to the data and maybe some meta data for type.
- dwaite 7y ago
  It gives you a list of alternative content types and an API to get content - but pasting is an app-controlled activity, not an OS one.

saagarjha 7y ago

> A solution to this is to re-design this api so that it allows developers to query for specific matches, but requires user-action to unlock them I.e. I can passively ask "does the clipboard contain a photo?" or "does the clipboard contain a url in the *.facebook.com domain?" but in order to get the contents I have to prompt the user to manually paste. I fully expect apps to try to leak information bit-by-bit to the greatest possible extent.

kennywinker 7y ago
Addressed by the next bit in my post: force developers to list their queries in the info plist. Only allow those queries. Validate that the query list is not malicious during app review.