4 ms·
All of your explanation (which is appreciated) just further describes the request smuggling, not how that ends up sending the slack cookies to the hackers serve
by JangoSteve 7y ago
All of your explanation (which is appreciated) just further describes the request smuggling, not how that ends up sending the slack cookies to the hackers server.
If you take all of this together, it's all leading to Slack's back-end server returning to the user's client a 301 response that tells the user's browser to send a new request to the hacker's domain. However, when the browser does this, it's to a different domain, so typically the slack cookies would not get sent with that request, unless I'm missing something.
The "Explanation of malicious request" section doesn't explain this, either. All it explains is that all this effort was to get Slack's server to send a 301 response to the user's browser pointing to the hacker's server, but then it glosses over any information about how the cookies are getting sent with a single sentence, "and all cookies (including 'd') get redirected there too.... :("
My question is, how?
Is something going on where Slack's back-end servers are explicitly setting response headers that allow their cookies to be sent to the hacker's domain? Is there some additional vulnerability that's allowing the browser to send the cookie across domains on a 301 redirect?
- justicz 7y agoIf you zoom in on the last image in the report, you see that the victim's client is not a web browser, but Slack's Electron-based client. Perhaps that client is willing to send Slack cookies cross-domain after a redirect for an auth'd request? Edit: looks like terom above me had the same idea before I did