3 ms·
seL4 does very little, but it provides the fundamental pieces that a secure system can be built on; The capability model maps very well to this problem space.
by snvzz 7y ago
seL4 does very little, but it provides the fundamental pieces that a secure system can be built on; The capability model maps very well to this problem space.
Trying to build a secure system on a kernel that is not secure is a hopeless effort. An example such kernel is Linux, with over a million LoC running in supervisor mode. There's no use trying to make that secure. It only takes a single bug in Linux's code to compromise the whole.
- panpanna 7y agoLinux is not running millions lines of code, this is a very dishonest statement! The Linux core is very small. The millions lines are mainly drivers and support for different architecture. You can compile a minimal Linux kernel (there is even a kernel configuration for that) and put certain drivers in user-space. Still not as small as sel4 but quite close to it's commercial siblings.
- snvzz 7y agoEven after configuring and building a linux kernel for your hardware, it's going to be over one megabyte object code. What's dishonest is pretending it can be compared with a microkernel's, nevermind seL4, size.
- indolering 7y ago> Linux is not running millions lines of code ... the millions lines are mainly drivers and support for different architecture. But it's pretty easy to reach into the kernel and access buggy drivers and plenty of other non-essential kernel code (file systems, networking, SMB, etc). > You can compile a minimal Linux kernel (there is even a kernel configuration for that) and put certain drivers in user-space. Still not as small as sel4 but quite close to it's commercial siblings. But it still means that any exploit in driver code == total system compromise.