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> But fundamentally what these attacks enable are super old & well known, with multiple existing mechanisms that fulfill similar roles. It still has to be publ
by avianes 7y ago
> But fundamentally what these attacks enable are super old & well known, with multiple existing mechanisms that fulfill similar roles.
It still has to be published.
The article doesn't claim to break all the isolation mechanisms of the processor like Spectre/Meltdown.
Why should we compare this paper with Spectre/Meltdown?
> Is there something particularly unique or severe about "Take A Way" other than techchrunch's bad reporting of it?
Yes, there are at least three things in "Take A Way" which is interesting:
- These side-channels are harder to detect because it doesn't require a very intensive use of the cache (no flush / filling all cache ways / etc.). A single collision is enough to evict a targeted cache line.
- It allows to set up a covert channel that can transfer up to 588.9 kB/s.
- They did a reverse engineering job on a processor mechanism and its undocumented hash function.
- kllrnohj 7y ago> The article doesn't claim to break all the isolation mechanisms of the processor like Spectre/Meltdown. Why should we compare this paper with Spectre/Meltdown? That was sort of my point, we shouldn't be making that comparison but further up in the comment chain that's exactly what was being done. The paper itself is great and definitely should exist. But it's not a counter-argument to "yet another Intel attack surfaces" either.