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I feel like this is a fairly narrow view of the situation. In theory the CA "System" ought to be much bigger than just web traffic since a globally distributed
by Spivak 7y ago
I feel like this is a fairly narrow view of the situation. In theory the CA "System" ought to be much bigger than just web traffic since a globally distributed hierarchical database of certs is neat and could be used for all sorts of stuff.
The fact that browsers have so much say in how the CAs operate that database makes me think that the public CA system is actually a wildly successful failure. If the public CA system has no other use than to allow someone to securely connect to one of a handful of web browsers then why all the fanfare over just having letting the companies stewarding the browsers run the show entirely?
- tptacek 7y agoPeople say this a lot. But where are the examples of all the "stuff" that would benefit by being linked into a single global PKI? Many of the most important public key crypto tools people actually use --- Signal, SSH and SSH CAs, U2F and WebAuthn, OAuth2 --- have little or no PKI at all.
- strbean 7y agoI think the lack of standardization for a general purpose PKI is the biggest barrier, and the reason why Joe Schmo has no idea what a key pair is.
- tptacek 7y agoYou're not really answering my question. Assume the standardization falls into place, and it's all JSON instead of X.509 so that Javascript developers will actually use it. What gets better? What thing out there was just begging to be encrypted by a giant tree shared by the whole Internet?
- pvg 7y agoWhat gets better? What thing out there was just begging to be encrypted by a giant tree shared by the whole Internet? The Nine Planes of the Internet would be connected. Níðhöggr, Dáinn, Dvalinn, Duneyrr and Duraþrór would be in their ordained places, no longer roaming lost in endless Violation of the Layers.
- strbean 7y agoIt would also be much easier to transfer your data to Fólkvangr / Valhöll after you die a hero's death on the battlefield.
- strbean 7y agoFirst thing that comes to mind is official emails from organizations to individuals. Wouldn't such a system basically squash most fishing?
- toast0 7y agoPlease walk us through how a PKI would help against phishing emails?
- strbean 7y agoCompanies sign official correspondence, and email clients give blaring sirens/red flags for unsigned correspondence (or send it straight to the spam folder) similar to how browsers now handle http vs. https traffic? It would also be very easy to detect any misrepresentation. Email contains a link to a domain that isn't on your cert? Alarms / no clickable links / etc.
- toast0 7y agoScammers are capable of setting up signing and getting certificates for their domains. It's an extra hurdle, but, like setting up https, it's not a big hurdle. No cross domain links would disrupt a lot of current emails, but most senders would likely setup in-domain redirectors to carry on their current mailing patterns. Unfortunately, some of those would probably be open redirectors (because it's easy to make an open redirector and it "solves" the immediate problem), leading to some amount of security issues.
- Avamander 7y ago> But where are the examples of all the "stuff" that would benefit by being linked into a single global PKI? Estonia's national system and its e-services are a local example of a single central PKI. Provided services and systems seem to be far ahead of basically all other countries. Identity theft, identification, authentication, signing etc. have been solved for nearly two decades now and I have to say the way the rest of the world does stuff looks stone-age to me. For example I loathe how I've been asked to do identity verification by foreign companies "send us a picture of your ID", WTF. Sentences like "Use SMS 2FA to protect your account", "e-mail us the bill" and "come to our office to sign {x}" make me shudder, it's absolutely dogs*.
- pvg 7y agoIt's not an example of a global PKI and worse, Estonia had to invalidate/patch everyone's e-ids once already. A hassle somewhat mitigated by the fact that fewer people live in Estonia than in the Bronx.
- Avamander 7y agoWhat is one relatively trivial patch compared to the plethora of other worse issues you have, the time and money you waste?
- akerl_ 7y agoHaving to patch a country’s worth of deployed hardware tokens doesn’t sound like a trivial effort to me.
- jkachmar 7y agoNot GP, but: I think the point is more that even the (massive) concentrated effort it takes to patch the IDs will be less than the collective impact of not having those IDs at all (in terms of the convenience it would add to peoples’ lives) OR having the IDs without the patches at all.
- 7y ago
- comex 7y agoOAuth2 relies on HTTPS and thus the Web PKI to prevent anyone from MitMing either the login page itself or API requests made using the OAuth token. SSH's trust-on-first-use system is only secure under the assumption that you "usually" aren't being MitMed; this ought to be improved. For the typical server administration use case, I'd prefer a design that doesn't involve PKI – like encoding a hash of the key into the SSH command – but domain validation based on Web PKI could still be better than nothing. (Perhaps using some subdomain owned by the hosting provider, as opposed to the public-facing domain(s) for the server.) Domain validation would also be ideal for use cases where you're connecting not to your own server but to some known entity's, such as SSHing to GitHub. As for SSH CAs... I've never heard of them before. :) Looking it up, I see that some organizations use them, but I'm not sure their design is a good fit for the kind of non-organization-internal use cases I'm thinking of. As it stands today, Signal's public key system is largely security theater since nobody bothers to check authentication codes. Even when people do check them, you always have an excuse for changing your code out of the blue (got a new phone, had to reset my phone, etc.), which an attacker can take advantage of. The latter could be fixed by having a better way to transfer trust between devices, but Signal could still have a better story for initial authentication than trusting the phone system. Now, I don't think a traditional PKI would help. But I do like what Keybase is doing here, bootstrapping trust off of a collection of signed attestations on social media accounts. I'd argue this amounts to a PKI in its own right, one where social media providers (unknowingly) play the role of CAs.
- thu2111 7y agoSure a pki could help Signal. Carriers are the ultimate arbiters of who owns a phone number and have direct access to the hardware that checks that ownership. For many people they also do ID verification. Carriers could provision phones with certificates and that would decentralise the Signal key database enormously.
- tialaramex 7y agoA few things are going on. Firstly you often don't need a PKI, and when you do need a PKI (which as I said is less often than people think) you often don't need a public one. Take EMV ("Chip cards"). There's public key crypto securing your payment card transaction. There are multiple organisations involved. So we've got a PKI, but does it need to be a public PKI? Why not just let EMVco run everything, probably badly, and have them and their members (the banks and other big financial firms) eat it when inevitably they do a bad job? So that's what happens. If a CA in the EMV ecosystem does a bad job your bank will end up eating the cost of that, or maybe your country, the headline won't be "Obscure CA misissues certificate" it'll be "Huge Bank loses $500Bn in IT catastrophe" or something. Secondly, the thing a PKI does relies upon is a common naming scheme. The standard actually used in the Web PKI, X.509 was designed for a world with a global directory of everything, the X.500 global directory system. That directory does not exist. What common naming schemes are there that we'd want digital certificates for? The IETF published RFCs from the PKIX working group, defining how X.509 can be used for the Internet's names. That is, mostly ipAddresses, dnsNames, and emailAddresses. The Web PKI concerns itself de facto with the first two. You could and some people do use IP addresses or DNS names in a context outside the Web PKI, but mostly they don't. "Don't roll your own". Even the successor to TCP, QUIC, was re-designed to have it just envelop TLS and thus depend upon the Web PKI, rather than inventing a new shiny public key crypto technology and associated PKI. So the only use case we actually care about that didn't end up happening was email, S/MIME is what was attempted and... I have no doubt Thomas Ptacek can explain at considerable length how unlikely it is that anybody can get that to do what you'd expect it to do and deliver you any meaningful security if you're interested. It should definitely give you pause when you see a system which really seems like it could only be secured by a PKI and it isn't the Web PKI. Is it a private PKI? Who has oversight? Or are they just going through the motions and the security is illusory? The answer is the latter pretty often. Stakes are often thought to be very low until they aren't...
- inetknght 7y ago> In theory the CA "System" ought to be much bigger than just web traffic since a globally distributed hierarchical database of certs is neat and could be used for all sorts of stuff. Honestly I would love it if my password manager would also act as a personal certificate authority.
- tylerl 7y agoPKIs are a much more general system, but this is a very specific PKI that was built specifically for web browsers. You can use others, you can even build your own. The fact that the this PKI was first, means that some people depend on it who probably shouldn't. But its still by the browsers, for the browsers.