2 ms·
> The attack was found merely 6 weeks before major browsers were supposed to ship with Let's Encrypt's public keys in their trust store. This is both wrong in
by tialaramex 7y ago
> The attack was found merely 6 weeks before major browsers were supposed to ship with Let's Encrypt's public keys in their trust store.
This is both wrong in a small way and misleading in a larger way.
The first big browser to add keys from "Let's Encrypt" (actually from ISRG, the Internet Security Research Group, a 501(c)(3) entity which exists to run Let's Encrypt) to their trust store in a shipping browser was Firefox, in November, rather more than six weeks away.
But that's misleading because even in say, Internet Explorer on Windows, which uses Microsoft's trust store (of course) and didn't trust ISRG until several years later of course a certificate from Let's Encrypt worked fine on the first day of production.
What makes your leaf certificate trusted is that it's signed by an Intermediate CA which is trustworthy, and while ISRG's Intermediates (at that time Let's Encrypt Authority X1 and Let's Encrypt Authority X2) were signed by ISRG they also had copies of more or less the same certificates (same public keys) signed by an existing trusted CA - DST Root CA X3, which was in most public trust stores for years and currently belongs to IdenTrust. Those copies are used (by default, you can swap in the ISRG versions if you want) today to give you a trusted path back to even quite old web browsers.
- agwa 7y agoThis is a pretty pedantic point and the inaccuracy doesn't detract from the rest of the post, though I will mention this to the author as accuracy is important. The accurate thing to say is that the attack was found 6 weeks before Let's Encrypt's keys were scheduled to be trusted by browsers (by way of IdenTrust's cross certificate). (Per https://letsencrypt.org/2015/06/16/lets-encrypt-launch-schedule.html https://letsencrypt.org/2015/06/16/lets-encrypt-launch-sched...)