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Who is "you" in this scenario? I want to be able to secure my computer (an ATM, say) against people with physical access to it. A root of trust (that the origi
by derefr 7y ago
Who is "you" in this scenario?
I want to be able to secure my computer (an ATM, say) against people with physical access to it. A root of trust (that the original purchaser of the device controls) allows for that.
Or, to be slightly more dark, I, as an enterprise IT administrator, don't want the employees fucking around with the hardware I deploy, even when they have all day to poke and prod around. I'm the root user of those workstations, not them. I need to be able to enforce enterprise security policies on them, and I can't do that if they can "jailbreak" the company's computers. (They want to run arbitrary code for personal reasons? They can do it on their own arbitrary personal devices, then, for which I have conveniently provided them a partitioned-VLAN guest network to join.)
- tenebrisalietum 7y agoWith the way things are set up currently, Intel is your root user, not you.
- derefr 7y agoAnd in a monarchy, businesses exist at the behest of a writ from the monarch saying they can. That doesn't mean that the business doesn't "own" stuff. It just means that the king can capriciously revoke their asset-ownership, in much the same way that a tornado can capriciously revoke their building. It's a rare natural disaster that you insure against.
- zymhan 7y agoI really like that analogy, but I do have to point out that many countries have come to realize a monarchy robs people of their freedom, just as the untrustable trust module does.
- K0SM0S 7y agoI'm confused, are you claiming it's OK that my x86 Intel platform (and whatever data passes through it) exists in a "monarchy" of sorts (along with other phone-home drones), and that I should find it acceptable? ("I" being a business, or individual, any proxy for society at large) The fact that a tiny few human beings had the power of a "tornado" over others' lives ended fairly abruptly in some circumstances, with apparently good enough reason that it stayed that way. Note: you're referring to absolutism, which is a mode of monarchy (also found in totalitarianism, dictatorship). By contrast, most monarchies still 'alive' today operate more in "symbolism" mode, in the constitution of their country.
- derefr 7y agoI mean, monarchy wasn't really a key element of what I was saying. You don't have "root" on your own body in a rule-of-law democracy, either. You can't just decide to not go to jail, if a court says you must. This is kind of a recapitulation of the argument that forked Ethereum into Ethereum Classic: • There was a system, partially founded on a guiding principle of its participants having final say in what happens in their in-system interactions, through contracts they enter into the system. Those contracts were each supposed to "have root" over all state-changes made to their own private storage. • Something went wrong with a contract, in a way that corrupted its private storage and made things worse for pretty much everybody, since it was a very popular contract. The maintainers of the system decided to violate the guiding principle in the name of making things better for everybody, by just reaching in and overriding the rules of the popular contract, so that it would retroactively have done the "right" thing, and not gotten corrupted. • Some people thought that there shouldn't be any entity (consortium or otherwise) with power to override the rules of their contracts, even if those changes are "to the good", so they left and started their own alternative system, mostly the same other than the guarantee that they'd never violate the guiding principle. • The market decided that the alternative system has about 1/10th the economic value of the original system. Most developer effort, userbase, etc. sided with the original system, and with the concept of there being a political entity with the power to overrule individual contracts. The contract creators themselves seem to want the "safety net" implied by this entity having the power to overrule them. Interesting, no?
- jancsika 7y ago> You don't have "root" on your own body in a rule-of-law democracy. Maybe if you live on that Face/Off prison where everyone wears metal boots on a magnetic grid. But in the real world rule-of-law is quite fragile because everyone has "root" over their own bodies. The obvious benefit is an ability of the public to revolt against a corrupt regime. Regardless, it's a fatuous metaphor because nobody is advocating for mandatory metal boots nor the little Harkonnen heart plug thingies from Dune. Some people are, however, quite vehemently demanding that all software/hardware be designed by law to give root to a trusted third party. That's fatuous and dangerous and therefore requires different metaphors.
- to11mtm 7y ago> I want to be able to secure my computer (an ATM, say) against people with physical access to it. A root of trust (that the original purchaser of the device controls) allows for that. Unless you're running something like a Raptor Talos II, You don't really have the root of trust. You have a branch off of the manufacturer's root. That may be better for some enterprises, but in this modern age is that really enough? Consider how the PLA was involved in the hacking of Experian/Equifax. Until you can review the code yourself and verify the binaries, you don't really have the root of trust. Someone else does. (I'm barring other types of shenanigans here, but it's the next logical step.)
- derefr 7y agoI mean, for the kind of highly-trusted "ruggedized" scenario represented by an ATM, one would hopefully get their hardware from a manufacturer that exists under a political regime they have no enmity with, or are perhaps even allegiant to. (That's half the reason many US government officials and contractors used Blackberries: the US government could—given the political realities of the time they live in—trust a device whose chips were verifiably made in Canada.) For the workstation scenario, though, you don't really care who has the "ultimate" root, just so long as you can get whoever that is to help you to stop a particular class of attacker (e.g. your own employees, contractors, and any "visitors" in the building) from getting root. It's fine if the PLA has root on the boxes, because the boxes aren't actually storing trade secrets or anything; the point of having pseudo-root on the boxes is, in fact, to enforce a security regime that ensures your employees don't store any trade secrets on the boxes! See also: being an "organization owner" in an enterprise SaaS service. Sure, I can't stop Google from snooping my GSuite data—but I'm also paying them to host that data for me, and e.g. selling it would be a violation of the contract. Even though they can, in theory, do it, they're economically incentivized against doing so (and doubly so, because if they did it once and got found out, they'd never make any GSuite money again.) > Unless you're running something like a Raptor Talos II, You don't really have the root of trust. Mind you, there are "multiply-descendant root-of-trust" setups that are quite common these days. In modern Apple devices, you've got an Intel processor doing most stuff, but then the Apple-controlled T2-chip domain doing encryption stuff, with its own boot chain completely isolated from the Intel one.
- Stierlitz 7y ago> I want to be able to secure my computer (an ATM, say) against people with physical access to it. A root of trust (that the original purchaser of the device controls) allows for that. Why not generate a unique key for each device on first boot? isn't it a fact that the original purchaser does not have control of the trusted computer platform. Trusted as in the OEMs trust they can control your computer.
- tinus_hn 7y agoBetter not use a computer with Thunderbolt, FireWire or pcie ports then. This kind of protection is mostly smoke and mirrors.