8 ms·
The "trust" here is a complete misnomer. "Trusted computing" should be called "traitorous computing", where your computer has a module which might be controlled
by einpoklum 7y ago
The "trust" here is a complete misnomer. "Trusted computing" should be called "traitorous computing", where your computer has a module which might be controlled by (fundamentally antagonistic) remote third-parties. _They_ can trust your system to _betray_ you in their favor.
Traitorous computing should not exist and a pox be upon the heads of everyone who let such modules make it into our computers.
- lxgr 7y agoThis assumes the absence of a sandbox. Trusted computing can happen with our without a sandbox, much like "regular" computing. If your system is running unsandboxed, untrusted third party code, that's pretty bad, regardless of the presence or absence of a trusted platform. As an example: FLOSS systems are definitely capable of running malware. On the other hand, a reproducible build of open source software might well be what runs in (and relies on the attestation provided by) a trusted computing platform. I do see one practical concern with integrating trusted computing on a general purpose computer: If an implementation depends mostly on security through obscurity to achieve the desired attestation capabilities, this makes it much harder to audit it for vulnerabilities or backdoors. But I don't see how that is a fundamental property of a trusted computing system.
- sounds 7y agoA reproducible build is very different than cryptographically attesting the binary state of especially the kernel. If I can't produce a binary with the same "reproducible state" as the one you had because your _kernel_ was one that I don't run (especially because maybe I don't _want_ to run it), that destroys all the value of a reproducible build. A reproducible build should not _undermine_ software freedoms, specifically those protected by a Free Software license. But trusted computing always undermines software freedoms: that's by design. It's intentional. It's all about locking 100% of the users into a single monoculture where there is minimal freedom. And that's fine in a managed IT environment such as a corporation. But it's not ok when I buy hardware and the manufacturer refuses to hand over the certificate chain to me.
- lxgr 7y agoA kernel would not be something that you would run in a trusted enclave. It's way too big of a surface area (containing your entire operating system and application layer, after all), so what would be the point of attesting that to anyone? This is the "old" way of using a TPM, and I agree, it does not make sense at all. After all, it never came to be, and that's not only because of the vocal protests against it. It simply does not make sense! But I would encourage you to read up on how, for example, the Signal foundation is thinking about using something like SGX.
- sounds 7y agoIt was the ME firmware that was compromised with this CSME exploit. Of course, few people notice if the ME firmware is updated, and Intel doesn't often update deployed ME firmware. But it verifies the BIOS, and the BIOS verifies the kernel. And that's the point where people start caring. Hence I used the kernel as an example. Signal is thinking about using SGX, but they also have other ways to grant the user reasonable security. After this CSME exploit, Signal may reconsider using SGX. Either way, my point still stands: verifiable builds do not rely on trusted computing at this point. I hope they never do. It would be twisted logic to tell the user the only way they can have their software freedom is by asking the trusted computing infrastructure to verify it for them. The trusted computing infrastructure being absolutely as opaque and locked-down as possible. Trusted computing is not reproducible! Its designed-in purpose is to be opaque, to hide things from the user.
- lxgr 7y ago> verifiable builds do not rely on trusted computing at this point. Of course they don't. They are orthogonal, i.e. one does not imply the other, but one also does not prevent the other. The verifiable build serves you, the hardware owner, in knowing that the software does what its vendor claims. The trusted platform's assertion serves the software vendor, allowing them to trust the environment that their software is running in. > It would be twisted logic to tell the user the only way they can have their software freedom is by asking the trusted computing infrastructure to verify it for them. Nobody is saying that. If you want to trust your computer to do what you think it does, you don't want trusted computing; you probably want reproducible builds, trusted boot etc. But trusted computing also does not inherently prevent you from doing that. The two are orthogonal!
- derefr 7y agoWho is "you" in this scenario? I want to be able to secure my computer (an ATM, say) against people with physical access to it. A root of trust (that the original purchaser of the device controls) allows for that. Or, to be slightly more dark, I, as an enterprise IT administrator, don't want the employees fucking around with the hardware I deploy, even when they have all day to poke and prod around. I'm the root user of those workstations, not them. I need to be able to enforce enterprise security policies on them, and I can't do that if they can "jailbreak" the company's computers. (They want to run arbitrary code for personal reasons? They can do it on their own arbitrary personal devices, then, for which I have conveniently provided them a partitioned-VLAN guest network to join.)
- tenebrisalietum 7y agoWith the way things are set up currently, Intel is your root user, not you.
- derefr 7y agoAnd in a monarchy, businesses exist at the behest of a writ from the monarch saying they can. That doesn't mean that the business doesn't "own" stuff. It just means that the king can capriciously revoke their asset-ownership, in much the same way that a tornado can capriciously revoke their building. It's a rare natural disaster that you insure against.
- zymhan 7y agoI really like that analogy, but I do have to point out that many countries have come to realize a monarchy robs people of their freedom, just as the untrustable trust module does.
- K0SM0S 7y agoI'm confused, are you claiming it's OK that my x86 Intel platform (and whatever data passes through it) exists in a "monarchy" of sorts (along with other phone-home drones), and that I should find it acceptable? ("I" being a business, or individual, any proxy for society at large) The fact that a tiny few human beings had the power of a "tornado" over others' lives ended fairly abruptly in some circumstances, with apparently good enough reason that it stayed that way. Note: you're referring to absolutism, which is a mode of monarchy (also found in totalitarianism, dictatorship). By contrast, most monarchies still 'alive' today operate more in "symbolism" mode, in the constitution of their country.
- AgentME 7y agoTrusted computing enables you to prove to a remote party what your machine is executing. This would be useful to cloud providers so they could prove to their users that their servers are only running their users' code without snooping on it. People would no longer have to choose only from well-known cloud providers to find a trusted host. You could imagine a marketplace where anyone could sell the compute power of their home computers (undercutting cloud providers' prices to make up for their lesser network connectivity) and use remote attestation to prove that they're not spying on or modifying their customers' compute workloads. The people selling their compute power like this can use sandboxing to protect their own system from the customers' compute workloads, and use trusted computing / remote attestation to protect the customers' compute workloads from their own system. I think it's extremely good for users when a technology removes the need for trust in big brands and allows anyone to compete.
- sounds 7y agoTo me that's twisted logic. "I don't want to have to trust my cloud provider." "Ok, we'll absolutely pinky-swear by this API you can access that our machines are running a trusted setup." "Ok! I'll just trust the API you provide." Even if the API is an x86 instruction, even if you do timing checks and side-channel checks in your code, you're still just in an arms race with your cloud provider while they hold all the power.
- lxgr 7y agoYou don't trust the cloud provider, you trust the hardware vendor. They are the root of trust in this scenario. Of course, if that trust, due to malice or implementation defects, is misplaced, you're not better (but also not worse) off than without something like SGX.
- sounds 7y agoI addressed that when I said "x86 instruction." An x86 core with SGX can be emulated... (Edit: SGX can't be emulated. I stand corrected. Perhaps a better argument would have been arguing that verifiable builds give the user software freedom by granting them the ability to run the same code everywhere. But trusted computing != verifiable builds.)
- viraptor 7y agoIt's not a misnomer. When you define trust you need to define who you trust. If X's trust in Intel to provide a platform where the code runs verified doesn't agree with your ethical view, that meant you likely don't trust X and Intel. That's all - there's no betrayal, or traitors, or other ethical dilemmas here. Trust is not universal and you cannot trust everyone. You're probably more interested in trustless computing, where those modules are irrelevant.
- sounds 7y agoWhy would I want my computer to make decisions against my will because of a very carefully defined version of "trust"? When the alternative is software freedom which gives me the power (and yes, the responsibility too) to direct my computer the way I want? And yeah, that responsibility includes checking for updates and downloading security fixes. "Trust" is always used in "Root of trust" and "Trustworthy computing" to mean "deny software freedom to the user." That's not even close to what the dictionary says trust means.
- Reelin 7y agoYes, trusted computing is currently mostly used to curtail user freedom - generally in the name of security. And yes, implementations make use of a cryptographic root of trust to realize their design goals. It doesn't have to be that way though. I'm fine with a root of trust I have complete control over, and a trusted computing chain built on that would be welcome. Such an arrangement would do nothing to curtail my freedom, since I could install my own keys and thus firmware. And it wouldn't require any additional trust in the hardware vendor beyond what I already place in them. It could even ship with the vendor's keys installed by default, the same way Secure Boot works today. I'd still have mixed feelings about something like SGX (in its current form) being standard in consumer hardware though, since at its core it consists of the hardware working against the owner. I can see why such an arrangement is desirable for cloud providers, but widespread consumer adoption would allow a third party (presumably a content provider) to require its use as part of a DRM scheme. That being said, even SGX could be made palatable if there was no vendor provided key in the hardware at all and it instead attested everything with _my_ key. This would still protect remote systems against myriad forms of physical attack and allow for screening VMs from each other, all without compromising the integrity of my system (from my perspective). The downside, of course, is that it would require actually trusting your cloud provider.
- phlip9 7y agoOr spun differently, _I_ can run private, trusted code on an adversarial, remote EC2 instance without compromising my privacy and preventing the adversary (Amazon) from tampering with my secure execution. At least in theory. IIRC, a number of side channel attacks are exploitable on Intel SGX, so the adversary could leak secrets but not tamper with execution.
- hedora 7y agoI have an inexpensive Acer WinBook. The BIOS lets you nuke the preloaded public keys, and explicitly white list the current bootloader(s). Now, if anyone tries to boot it with something other than Grub, it will fail and prompt for a password. This seems like a reasonable tradeoff for secure boot, though it would be nice if Grub had a lockdown mode for this use case.
- folmar 7y agoGrub has a _password_ and _verify_ settings which are what you want. Or take a look at a ready-made configuration: https://github.com/CrowdStrike/travel-laptop https://github.com/CrowdStrike/travel-laptop
- matheusmoreira 7y agoThere's nothing wrong with trusted computing as a technology. The problem is users don't own the keys, fundamentally antagonistic companies and government agencies do. It'd be great if we could install our keys in the system and use the technology to make sure only software we have signed ever executes. The problem with trusted computing is in how Apple, for example, uses it to prevent users from running software they don't like on their own phones. The problem is the fact that Apple is in control instead of the user, not the technology it uses to maintain the control.
- saagarjha 7y agoThis is precisely the security model of Chromebook, and it's pretty great.
- jwr 7y agoI really dislike this take (it's from RMS) — it focuses on a single use case (indie user wanting to have complete control over his/her platform), while ignoring countless other use cases where someone legitimately does need to ensure that the platform can be trusted (e.g. it can be authenticated and runs the code it is supposed to run).
- rini17 7y agoWhy just indie user? Companies need to have trust in their property, too.
- smolder 7y agoThey need the illusion of trustworthy hardware so they can operate as if it is. If it turns out people need actual control over their own things and information for some reason, like to prevent subversion of our society from the inside, from the peak of power and privilege... we might just be shit out of luck.
- rini17 7y agoDepends. Farmers can't live with that illusion, they prefer something they can fix themselves (that is a recurring topic on HN.). It's possible more enterprises will end up like that as the current wave of outsourcing everything will ebb.
- smolder 7y agoI would say the farm equipment DRM isn't even giving the illusion of control. It's plainly obvious it restricts the equipment's use to everyone who owns them, and not in some lawfully required way. Backdoored/coincidentally-flawed software and hardware and things like that which are pervasive in tech don't get in people's way so much. As soon as flaws become more widely known they get patched. Surveillance doesn't get in people's way, directly. DRM like EME stops some copying but goes unnoticed by most, and can be rationalized easier than the farm equipment.
- 7y ago
- allovernow 7y agoGood point. FYI asterisks can be used to italicize for emphasis.