6 ms·
If your laptop is getting inspected at the border of an actual authoritarian police state: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubber-hose_cryptanalysis https://en.w
by walrus01 7y ago
If your laptop is getting inspected at the border of an actual authoritarian police state:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubber-hose_cryptanalysis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubber-hose_cryptanalysis
- dmos62 7y agoWhat countries do this? I saw a mention of Australia.
- chupasaurus 7y agoAny, if they would really want the data.
- dmos62 7y agoAll borders don't have privacy protection laws? Hard to believe.
- kube-system 7y agoThat just raises the bar for how much they need to want it. It doesn’t eliminate it.
- duxup 7y agoDepends on the border / country.
- IggleSniggle 7y agoAll things are fungible
- Turing_Machine 7y agoAs far as I know, every country asserts the right to thoroughly inspect anything that crosses its border. There may be a few exceptions, and it may not matter in a practical sense for situations like (e.g.) within the EU, where you don't actually have to go through customs when you cross the border, but in the general case, it's true.
- 87zuhjkas 7y agoAre there any protection mechanism against that? Something like, even if you are being tortured you cannot provide the access to anyone else?
- Santosh83 7y agoSharded secrets... you only have one part of a key or keys needed to decrypt some data so even extracting that from you by torture will not suffice. Of course this isn't always practical.
- maxaf 7y ago“They” (whoever they are) can torture more than one person at a time.
- gruez 7y agoPresumably the other key holders are in a different jurisdiction.
- bluGill 7y agoThe trick is to ensure you are never near all the people who know the secret when there is the possibility of trouble. That makes kidnapping everyone harder. Of course if you really worry about such things you shouldn't be trusting the other people you are working with either...
- amoshi 7y agoPlausible deniability, like hidden containers in TrueCrypt? That's a double edged sword though - imagine you give up, surrender the password and are then being asked to unlock a hidden volume, which you don't have.
- ben_w 7y agoYes, but: 1) they might not believe you, and 2) that’s still true even if the reason you don’t have a key is because you don’t actually have a secret encrypted partition — or whatever — to supply a decryption key for So the best thing to do is avoid being in a situation where someone is allowed to do that in the first place.
- bergheim 7y agoReminds me of this xkcd: https://www.xkcd.com/538/ https://www.xkcd.com/538/
- joantune 7y agoThat's why TrueCrypt, and I think Vera Crypt have support for a volume that can be decripted with two keys - one will yield a decoy volume where its free space is actually the real volume that you want to protect which gets decoded only with a second key I'm not sure if the entropy analysis of that free space can suggest that there's something funky about that free space or not.. Because usually free space is either actual info just marked as deleted, or info reset to zeros by some pro active wiping of the free space. So, having a bunch of whacky data that doesn't look like any kind of file, can probably be used as a tell tale sign? No?
- brianjlogan 7y agoIn most instances I think torture would yield all of your knowledge including the secondary unlock. Unless you're thinking your attacker would exclude you from torture for "yielding" the password. I would think if they are capable of torturing you than they wouldn't stop at a polite confession.
- varenc 7y agoVeraCrypt hidden volumes are supposed to be a 100% deniable. There’s no way to prove they exist. The idea is that they’ll stop torturing you because they don’t know of the existence of the hidden volume. (In practice I suspect it leaves some subtle queues, but maybe perfect for a border crossing )
- frandroid 7y agoMy understanding is that people who torture you don't know what you don't know; so they don't know when to stop. As such, they'll keep torturing you way past the point where you've admitted to everything you know. This is why information obtained under torture is considered unreliable: eventually you'll just say anything to stop the torture; further admissions will support the use of torture as an information extraction tactic, and then lead to more torture.
- 7y ago
- goblin89 7y agoThe same tradeoff as with any security measure applies to border officials. They may or may not go beyond scanning for low-hanging fruit, and in a typical scenario probably won't.
- contingencies 7y agoI was at the Sydney launch event for Assange's implementation[0] in 1997. It is amazing that, after all of this time, it is still apparently such a major theoretical touchstone within the open source cryptography landscape[1]. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubberhose_(file_system) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubberhose_(file_system) [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deniable_encryption https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deniable_encryption