Speaking for myself here. The workforce is spread across the states. When you're drawn to the mission like I am, late nights here and there don't matter at all

Speaking for myself here. The workforce is spread across the states. When you're drawn to the mission like I am, late nights here and there don't matter at all. I communicated with my wife and I'm sure others informed their significant others what was going on etc and why Friday, Saturday, Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday would be thrown out of wack. Members of the team put in much more hours than I did and that is truly impressive. It takes all of us with our different specialties to make an accurate and effective response. Some of the things we do are internal post mortems and find ways to prevent the issue from happening again by either improving alerting/monitoring, writing a runbook, fixing code, and fixing misconceptions about a part of the entire system. We do weekly readings of various RFCs, the Baseline Requirements, and other CAs CP and CPS documents to again better understand our system and Web PKI as a whole. This is an understatement, but we heavily rely on automation. From the moment the call was made to stop issuance, an SRE was ready to run the code that disables the issuance pipeline. The biggest takeaway is that communication and leadership makes all the difference. I have to go, there's work to be done.