12 ms·
Revoking certain certificates on March 4
- shakna 7y agoThankfully it's fairly painless to see if you're affected: curl -XPOST -d 'fqdn=example.com' https://unboundtest.com/caaproblem/checkhost Replace example.com with your Fully Qualified Domain.
- MrStonedOne 7y agoThat can only test port 443, and not say, sstp on port 8384, or soap/https on port 3443 or other rando ports for various internal https layered applications
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- rswail 7y agoIt can only test hosts that it has access to. Otherwise you can download the file and check your serial number against the list.
- zimpenfish 7y agoIt can't test hosts that aren't on 443 though, regardless of access to the relevant port, e.g. (obvs. elided mydomain here.) $ curl -XPOST -d 'fqdn=pop3.mydomain:995' https://unboundtest.com/caaproblem/checkhost invalid name pop3.mydomain:995 404 page not found $ openssl s_client -connect pop3.mydomain:995 -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -text -noout | grep -A 1 Serial\ Number | tr -d : Serial Number 0325f31485b9c0f393e27b00e4678e881e3c
- Ayesh 7y agoAll my recent certificates are affected. I think it is the same case for the majority of us.
- vesinisa 7y agoI use DNS validation to obtain one certificate with both domain.tld and *.domain.tld wildcard. My certificates seem not to be affected. My certs last auto-renewed on 2020-02-20.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- tialaramex 7y agoThe most likely cause will be that you issued similar certificates a few days (more than eight hours) earlier with the same Let's Encrypt account. Suppose on Wednesday you get a cert for example.com and www.example.com, and then on Thursday you realise you also need images.example.com - you use the same ACME account (if you run Certbot this will happen by default if you use the same machine and user account, it silently makes you a free account if you don't have one already) and so Let's Encrypt can see that this account showed proof-of-control for two of these names on Wednesday, so only fresh proof-of-control of images.example.com is needed. Unfortunately this bug means Let's Encrypt forgot to re-check CAA for the old names, and so there's a risk they technically were no longer authorised to issue for these names and shouldn't have given you the Thursday certificate. Rather than try to argue about whether it's appropriate to disregard this check, Let's Encrypt decided to revoke all ~3 million affected certificates. That's maybe 2-3 days worth of normal issuance in the last 90 days, so lots but hardly "the majority".
- owenmarshall 7y ago> We confirmed the bug at 2020-02-29 03:08 UTC, and halted issuance at 03:10. We deployed a fix at 05:22 UTC and then re-enabled issuance. Wow. That is a truly impressive way to handle a security bug and I know it’s not the first time Let’s Encrypt has responded extremely quickly. I would love to hear how their engineering practices make this possible.
- d33 7y agoAnd I'm curious about the work culture park. They're a small organisation in terms of workforce, but somehow managed to respond within minutes on Saturday. How does that work? Do they have shifts or somehow the workers are so devoid of private life that they have to respond during early morning on weekend?
- icebraining 7y agoIn California, it was Friday evening still.
- m_eiman 7y agoI assume they probably have 24h support, but also consider time zones: 3 AM Saturday in UTC is Friday evening in San Fransisco: https://duckduckgo.com/?q=03%3A00+utc+to+pst&ia=answer https://duckduckgo.com/?q=03%3A00+utc+to+pst&ia=answer
- michaelt 7y agoThe blog post only says they halted issuance within minutes of confirming the bug - not that they confirmed the bug within minutes of receiving a bug report.
- pgporada 7y agoIt takes time to correctly determine if a bug report is real and to determine the possible scope of the bug.
- lidHanteyk 7y ago
- MrStonedOne 7y ago>CAA What is a CAA? Letsencrypt: please dont use initialisms in customer facing blog posts without using the FULL name at the first use. Makes things more learnable and googleable.
- anderskaseorg 7y agohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_Certification_Authority_Authorization https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_Certification_Authority_Au...
- tyingq 7y agoConfused me too. They even already have a page they could have linked to. https://letsencrypt.org/docs/caa/ https://letsencrypt.org/docs/caa/
- Ayesh 7y agoCertificate Authority Authorization. It's a fairly common initialism in CA/TLS world (heh). The DNS record is also named "CAA".
- rswail 7y agoIt's a free service. I understand your frustration, but CAA is a well known DNS record type. If you read the description of the problem, it explains it.
- djsumdog 7y agoI've been doing development and devops for years and have never heard of a CAA. Then again, I use http-01 and not dns validation, so that's probably why. Before LetsEncrypt I'd buy certs and it involved a lot of copying/pasting CSRs into web interfaces.
- pfg 7y agoTo be clear, CAA is relevant even if you're using http-01. CAs need to check whether the CAA records of a given domain allow/forbid issuance in addition to any of the methods used to demonstrate domain ownership to the CA.
- deweller 7y agoWill a nightly certbot invocation will replace these revoked certificates without manual intervention?
- londons_explore 7y agoI don't believe so. I hope they add support for that soon.
- schoen 7y agoIt was included in the Certbot 1.3.0 release today. https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/certbot-1-3-0-release/115107 https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/certbot-1-3-0-release/11... (only certbot-auto users are likely to get this release immediately)
- tialaramex 7y agoDo you have analytics that give you some idea what fraction of subscribers use different versions of Certbot and other ACME clients ? The API is HTTP so presumably all clients could provide an HTTP user agent, although obviously some will show up as generic library defaults. Was this feature something already planned (albeit presumably not for release today) or was it entirely inspired by this problem? I confess if you'd asked me "What extra features does Certbot need?" I would not have listed "Check OCSP to trigger renewal" though in hindsight it's a good idea.
- schoen 7y ago> Do you have analytics that give you some idea what fraction of subscribers use different versions of Certbot and other ACME clients? Those do exist, though I don't personally have access to them. When things are calmer, you might ask bmw or jsha on the Let's Encrypt forum for some more information. > Was this feature something already planned (albeit presumably not for release today) or was it entirely inspired by this problem? I wrote (incomplete) code for this feature several years ago -- specifically inspired by the idea that certificates might sometimes be revoked unexpectedly -- but I don't think anyone planned to continue working on it until this problem came around.
- ge0rg 7y agoThere is a list of all affected certificates posted under https://letsencrypt.org/caaproblem/ https://letsencrypt.org/caaproblem/ - and it looks like they are also leaking the account IDs from the list, so now you can map different domains/certificates to the account that got them issued.
- tialaramex 7y agoYeah, it does seem like it'd have been sensible not to list the account ID in this file. It's convenient if you know your account ID and want to pull out just your certs, but for most people this associates all their certificates together. If you own both https://www.happy-rainbow-nursery.example/ https://www.happy-rainbow-nursery.example/ and https://hardcore.bdsm-videos.example/ https://hardcore.bdsm-videos.example/ you probably go to some lengths to avoid visitors realising the connection. Nothing you're doing is illegal or even unethical - but it's obviously going to cause uncomfortable conversations so why not avoid that altogether. Let's Encrypt aren't doing you a favour if tomorrow a mom at nursery says now she knows why you sound so much like Masked Mistress Martha...
- djsumdog 7y agoYea, this is really bad. I've done some searching of the data. Sometimes it doesn't matter. It looks like whoever is currently running gab.com is probably a big consulting company with like 100 other clients, so there's no big relation there. But if you run a small personal blog and use the same e-mail address for maybe more controversial sites that are hosted on different IPs, now you could get doxed. I'm guessing customer IDs are associated with e-mail addresses? This seems like a good case of using different e-mails for ever cert. There are open source tools like anonaddy.com you can host yourself or buy from them (they have a decent free tier). I feel like this list seriously needs to be pulled. There is some serious lack of oversight here.
- pfg 7y ago> I'm guessing customer IDs are associated with e-mail addresses? They are (on Let's Encrypt's end), if an email address was provided. It's a 1:n relation, the same email may be used for any number of ACME accounts. Roughly speaking, for most clients, the ACME account maps to a specific ACME client on a specific host. If you run three servers with separate ACME clients, you're probably using three ACME accounts (even if you're using the same email and issuing certificates for the same domain). Large or custom implementations may reuse the same ACME account across many servers and domains. (Issuance would typically be centralized and operated as a separate system in these scenarios.)
- appleflaxen 7y agoThere are several links in this thread, but the following page allows you to enter your hostname and check online. (no SSH, terminal access, etc) and it's from the letsencrypt team (linked in blog post). https://unboundtest.com/caaproblem.html https://unboundtest.com/caaproblem.html
- zimpenfish 7y agoAlas, only works for things on port 443 which is a bit of a problem for most of my certificates...
- b4d 7y agoIf anybody needs a bulk check: for domain in $(cat domains.txt); do printf "$domain :" && curl -XPOST -d "fqdn=$domain" https://unboundtest.com/caaproblem/checkhost; https://unboundtest.com/caaproblem/checkhost; done
- karimmaassen 7y agoYes, let's. https://www.reddit.com/r/ProgrammerHumor/comments/7x2ugb/lets_encrypt/ https://www.reddit.com/r/ProgrammerHumor/comments/7x2ugb/let...
- 32gbsd 7y agoSo it starts
- GuyPostington 7y agoSo what starts?
- tialaramex 7y agoI suppose this is one way to answer my question I asked (on m.d.s.policy) on the 29th how many issuances were affected, Jacob replied saying they intended to spend that day figuring out the answer, but then there was nothing further from him. The incident doesn't seem drastic enough to prompt urgent answers so I intended to revisit later this week if I heard nothing further. Now we have a complete list of affected certificates instead, (the answer to my original question is about 3 million) I was sort of hoping the answer was going to be like five thousand or something manageable. Alas. In hindsight I guess this was to be expected.
- thenewnewguy 7y agoWell, from my understanding, they have no idea of whether or not a given certificate was misissued as long as it meets the baseline criteria for triggering the bug (which seems to be just "issued after X date with more than 1 domain"). So while the number of certificates that should not have been issued due to a blocking CAA record is likely small (or possibly even 0), they have to revoke every cert that could have triggered the bug, as they have no way to travel back in time and find out what the CAA records they didn't check would have been.
- tialaramex 7y agoThe criteria also require that the challenge answers used to validate control were old (more than eight hours old). If all proof-of-controls were fresh the CAA checks are also fresh for those proof-of-controls so there's no bug. That's why the big list is "only" about three million certificates. Suppose you own example.com, example.org and example.net and all you do is every 60 days or so you spin up Certbot once to get a certificate for six names, the three domains and the associated www FQDNs - that won't trigger this bug because each time your old proof of control have expired and new fresh ones will be used, triggering fresh CAA checks. You're right though that it's likely the number of truly mis-issued certificates may be zero because the most common way to have a CAA record deliberately changed to forbid Let's Encrypt after having successfully done a proof-of-control (the scenario that would trigger their bug) is researchers looking for bugs in CAA checking, and of course such researchers would have reported this to Let's Encrypt triggering exactly the same incident but probably at a more friendly time like a Monday morning.
- IceWreck 7y agoYes, I just got their mail. Four certs out of six, all issued at the same time were affected. The other two were not.
- rswail 7y agoThis bug only affects you if you got domain validation (eg by dns-01) but didn't immediately issue a certificate. Letsencrypt validates the domain ownership for 30 days, so the bug allows you to issue a certificate within that window, even if you added a CAA record after validation that says "don't allow issue by letsencrypt, or only allow issue by MyCA.example.com". But if you have everything automated, you're checking for renewal and issuing every day and probably validating as part of that, so unlikely to encounter the bug, unless you validate in one step and then sometime 8h+ later, issue a certificate.
- JeanMarcS 7y agoThank you. I was just about to run tests on all my clients certs but as I’ve never done that it seems it’s not usefull. (Will still have a look but less stressfully)
- kn100 7y agoI don't think this is true - I don't recall using domain validation. I think it's more related to multi domain certs.
- saluki 7y agoy, I use an automated tool to issue/renew them and all of mine that I checked were listed as OK.
- wbond 7y agoEmailing users and giving them only 24 hours before their certs are revoked seems very unreasonable. Say you are down and out with a stomach bug or on holiday for a day or two. My understanding is that the 90 day lifetime is largely because revocation can be thwarted. Thus the practical difference between 24 hours and one week is meaningful for server admins, but inconsequential if someone is staging an attack.
- thdrdt 7y agoWell it is very inconvenient, but isn't this the strength of certificates? When something is wrong you can revoke them immediately. Why leave a potential vulnerability open for more than 24 hours?
- wbond 7y agoBecause revoking them will cause interruption to legitimate users, but doesn’t stop an attack. I’m just starting to think LE is more aimed at large organizations than people running smaller configurations. Which is fine, thankfully we still have traditional CAs. I just hope we don’t devolve into a monoculture of ACME-only SSL.
- M2Ys4U 7y agoACME-only isn't the problem, it's a Let's Encrypt mono-culture I'm concerned about. We could do with another LE-style service (or two) operated independently (both organisationally and geopolitically).
- wbond 7y agoMy point there was more about automation in the cert space could lead to traditional CAs leaving the space, in which case small operators like myself (handful of minor servers) would be forced down the automation route, which isn't necessarily a net positive.
- 7y ago
- rswail 7y agoIt also only affects you if you are issuing the certificate for more than one domain name if I'm reading it right. What's supposed to happen: For each fqdn in the request if challenge succeeds (eg dns-01) check whether caa record exists if (it doesn't) or (it does and allows issue) issue certificate In the step on "check whether caa record exists", instead of using the domain name that is being issued in this loop, it uses the first one it found (or one of them, it's unclear which one). So theoretically, if you wanted a cert for: domain1.example.com, domain2.example.com and you had a CAA record for domain1 that allowed letsencrypt but then a different CAA record was added between the CAA check on domain1 and the CAA check on domain2 (which wouldn't happen because of the bug) you could get a cert for domain2 that the CAA record said not to issue.
- captncraig 7y agoKinda frustrating having certs revoked when there have never been CAA records for any names involved. I know they can't know that to be true historically, but I wish they could do some additional filtering.
- terom 7y agoHere's some quick&dirty stats from the list of revoked certificates: https://gist.github.com/SpComb/6338facd12e020ec4fe561ca91f3254f https://gist.github.com/SpComb/6338facd12e020ec4fe561ca91f32... There's 3M "missing CAA checking results" in total, of which 2M are dated from 2020 and 1M from last month. FWIW the only certs of mine affected were old certs from 2019-12 which had since already been renewed in Feb, and the renewed certs are not affected? The largest account has 445k certs revoked, and the most revoked certs from last month (most likely to still be in active use?) is 43k for a single account. I hope your rate-limits are in order if you're going to start reissuing all of those before midnight :/ BTW account number 131 at the top of the file seems to mostly be akamaiedge.net sites :)
- terom 7y agoFor context in terms of what caused this, here's the PR which I assume fixed the bug in question: https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/pull/4690 https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/pull/4690 It looks like a nasty and subtle pass-by-reference of a for-range local variable, although I'm having trouble figuring out where the reference is stored: https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/blob/542cb6d2e06e756aeeca964965ae6fc04c3dc62a/sa/sa.go#L1409 https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/blob/542cb6d2e06e756a... I've spent plenty of time hunting down similar bizarre bugs in Go code as well, where the called function ~implicitly~ takes a pointer to the iteration variable and stores it somewhere. Each iteration of the for loop updates the stack-local in-place, and later reads of the stored reference will not read the original value. It's hard to spot from the actual call site :/ EDIT: This was an explicitly taken `&v` reference, but the same thing can also happen implicitly, if you call a `func (x *T) ...` method on the variable.
- heavenlyblue 7y agoPeople say Rust’s borrowing rules are only useful for multi-threaded environments. This is one of those issues that they are supposed to solve.
- fortran77 7y ago"People" say that? Really? Now you build up straw men so you can slip "Rust" into every discussion.
- steveklabnik 7y agoAn example from less than a day ago: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22466354 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22466354
- tedunangst 7y agoI'm not super confident I understand the bug, but it looks like sequential access to the reference. If I'm not mistaken, a mutable borrow in rust would end up with the same bug.
- kn100 7y agoYeah my domain was affected. Renewed, that would have sucked if I hadn't seen this! Also, I didn't get an email and I'm pretty sure my certs were generated with my email!
- rb808 7y agoCertificates are such huge a maintenance problem. So many mines waiting to blow up. We really need something better.
- talkingtab 7y agoSo lets see, the deal is that I get free certificates on any and all of my domains. I get an easy way to install and update my certificates that works with my nginx services. I can move the service to a new address and instantly get a new certificate. The certificates are universally trusted. I get notified by email when there is a problem along with a way to detect and fix the problem available to me. I'm speechless. I used to pay real money to get certs without half the service I get now for free. Thanks letsencrypt.
- wowaname 7y ago>I get an easy way to install and update my certificates You're lucky, because it took me forever to devise a renewal system that met my requirements of being able to renew certificates for domains that are used across multiple machines, both physical and virtual, many of the virtual machines which share IPv4 behind NAT thus cannot sanely use HTTP-01 renewal. Fine, use DNS-01, but: having to deal with my strict DNSSEC setup where I sign zones at home on a trusted device, keeping my keys off live servers, ensuring keys don't end up on untrusted hardware, and wanting my TLS private keys only on the servers they're being used on—all that suddenly makes my deployment more complex. What I'd rather do is, since my nameserver runs a cronjob to pull signed zones from my home device (unauthenticated because the signed zonefiles are public information), I wanted to incorporate that into my DNS-01 ACME verification too. But all the existing tools (certbot, dehydrated, acme.sh, et al) seem not to support this style of setup well, where I can batch my DNS challenges, wait for my nameserver to pick them up, and then verify the challenges en-masse an hour or a day later (LE challenges last for seven days, so this is acceptable delay for me). But I'm stuck with the CNAME/alternate NS approach where I have to run yet another network-facing service from home, for the duration of renewals, because I simply do not have time nor patience to sift through ACME's specification and implement a better tool suited for my needs. >I get notified by email when there is a problem LE has a mailing list for critical announcements in the interest of current customers and interested prospectors? Do tell, because all I know about is their blog and the Discourse forum, neither of which are solely for critical announcements.
- ferzul 7y ago
- qXlihgad7n 7y agoIs there an RSS feed that you can subscribe to for alerts like this? I can't see one.
- thenewnewguy 7y agohttps://community.letsencrypt.org/c/incidents.rss https://community.letsencrypt.org/c/incidents.rss perhaps? (Pro tip: you can append .rss to many pages on discourse to get an RSS feed)
- low_key 7y agoLooks like LE will be adding to the billion certs they've issued! https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22434466 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22434466
- low_key 7y agoPSA: The unbounded checker doesn't seem to work if you have certificates issued for both ECC and RSA keys. For some of mine, it passes the check with status "OK" and shows the serial number of the certificate for the ECC key. The certificate that is going to be revoked is not shown.
- tialaramex 7y agoIf you have more than one certificate in use, regardless of what flavour, they only see one and assess that. Maybe the checker should emphasise that. For small users they probably only have one certificate in use, so this avoids some problems. The issue would probably also affect people who have geographically separate certificates e.g. if you have two servers in different regions and decided rather than make things more complicated for key distribution you'll just have them each get their own certificates for the same name - that's totally fine with Let's Encrypt (it doesn't scale, but if you had 500 servers not 2 you'd probably redesign everything) but obviously this test only sees one of those servers and won't check the other certificate. There's no way to know, given that two (or more) valid certificates exist for a name, and seeing one of them, whether the others are still actively used anywhere. It would obviously be pretty easy to build a web form where you can type in an FQDN and get told if any certificates matching that name will be revoked, but then you get false positives where it says yes, this certificate for some.name.example will be revoked, you rush to replace your certificate for some.name.example but maybe actually the one that will be revoked is from 20 December 2019, and you already got a newer one which was unaffected in February.
- namibj 7y agoI wish they'd issue short-term scoped CAs under the same criteria as they currently use for wildcards. No significant load on their infrastructure, and you'd not have to break the "private keys don't move over _any_ network" rule.
- tialaramex 7y agohttps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-subcerts/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-subcerts/ Delegated Credentials is the proposed mechanism to do what you actually want to achieve here. The certificate issuance is mostly the same except there's an OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.44363.44 and the digitalSignature KU is present meaning this certificate is intended to be used with Delegated Credentials and thus can sign things. Although tightly constrained subCAs (which is roughly what you're describing) might be a way to achieve your goal, it's seen as disproportionately complicated and risky, so hence this proposed much more narrowly defined new feature for TLS.
- bobmaxup 7y agoOnly 13 out of ~3,500 of certificates I manage required renewal
- vermontdevil 7y ago3,500? wow. What are you managing if I may ask?
- bobmaxup 7y agoA CMS platform with customer provided domains.
- donatj 7y agoCan we get a “(some)” for the title?
- mholt 7y agoFWIW, I believe any Caddy sites will not be affected by this since caddy does not manage multi SAN certificates. Even if it did, Caddy will immediately replace a certificate when it sees a Revoked OCSP response. So, if you're using Caddy, there's probably nothing you need to do. But if you are a caddy user and are impacted, let me know.
- Tomte 7y agoI haven't got a mail (I think), and I don't see that on their web site or on their blog. Is wading through Discourse threads now the new minimum requirement for using services?
- gindely 7y agoNo, you can get your information from Hacker News. (Do check your domain even if you didn't get an email, since they have not delivered emails to everyone who is affected.)
- gindely 7y agoIf like me you have several hundred certificates to check, please do something like this: cd somewhere-nice wget https://d4twhgtvn0ff5.cloudfront.net/caa-rechecking-incident-affected-serials.txt.gz https://d4twhgtvn0ff5.cloudfront.net/caa-rechecking-incident... gunzip caa-rechecking-incident-affected-serials.txt.gz for i in $(cat domains); do (openssl s_client -connect $i:443 -showcerts < /dev/null 2> /dev/null | openssl x509 -text -noout | grep -A 1 Serial\ Number | tr -d : | tail -n1) |tee serials/$i; done cat serials/* | tr -d " " | sort | uniq > serials.collate grep $( cat serials.collated | head -c-1 | tr "\n" "|" | sed -e 's/|/\\|/g' ) ../caa-rechecking-incident-affected-serials.txt It will take a moment and then it may tell you that letsencrypt misspoke when they said they sent emails to everyone whose contact details they have.
- Operyl 7y agoI thought I was in the minority there! We have 45 certificates (of many more) that were affected, and our account id was listed, and it has an email contact associated. I got no email whatsoever, but I'm glad I had the foresight to check anyway.
- gindely 7y agoI just noticed I got an email at 1949 UTC. I guess they're still sending them out. Presumably some people will receive their emails after the revocation.
- Operyl 7y agoI spoke to someone from the team, they’ve got another 10% to go (presumably much less now). I finally got mine as well, and they’re still coordinating to figure out the timeline to revoke. Presumably they’ll wait for the emails first.
- paulfurtado 7y agoDoes anyone know of a generic way to detect that letsencrypt will revoke a certificates soon? The goal would be to have our automation automatically rotate the certificates when similar issues occur in the future.
- pfg 7y agoTo my knowledge, there's no such mechanism in any of the relevant protocols (i.e. ACME and OCSP).
- ck2 7y agoThat thread enlightened me to a great trick to force cert renewal even if it's been done too recently: add a second (sub)domain and make a new cert with both
- geocrasher 7y agoHere's a bash one-liner to check all the domains you have: for domain in $(cat list-of-domains.txt); do curl -s -X POST -F "fqdn=$x" https://unboundtest.com/caaproblem/checkhost https://unboundtest.com/caaproblem/checkhost ;done | sed '/is OK./d'
- TwoNineFive 7y agoThey have known for over 30 days and they didn't notify me until about 10 hours ago that several of my domains were affected. That's not okay. That's serious negligence. EDIT: My bad. They have known about this for maybe a week, and they did a blog post 4 days ago. I was basing my thought that they had known for 30 days based on the title of the post and in the URL: https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/2020-02-29-caa-rechecking-bug/114591 https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/2020-02-29-caa-recheckin...
- forbiddenlake 7y agoI'm confused about what you mean; 2020-02-29 was 4 days ago, not 30. They didn't know the extent of the bug until the 29th of February: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1619047#c1 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1619047#c1
- chrisMyzel 7y agoOh Let's Encrypt - what a chaos tuesday this was for me - I was informed yesterday, 19:00 (UTC+7) and it was a fun evening - many befriended companies and their clients where not informed at all. Funny to find out the otherwise awesome traefik has no force-renewal other than messing around with acme.json until it renews
- robjmills 7y agoIs there anything to suggest if this relates to Certbot or API provisioning only? or both? We've checked a whole bunch of API v1 provisioned certs against their tool and nothing has been listed so far.
- robjmills 7y agoFWIW I think the reason we're unaffected (as far as we can tell so far) is because we're not re-issuing certs within a short time period. The bug their end was to do with checking CAA records, if you re-issued the cert for a multi-domain cert within a short period of time after the initial provision then it wouldn't re-check the CAA records. This meant that subsequent CAA changes wouldn't be checked and theoretically a cert could be re-issued despite a CAA record being added to prevent this. As i'm reading it, if you didn't re-issue within this timeframe then your cert can be assumed to be correct as the original CAA check wasn't a problem.